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Introduction 
Throughout the world, the increasing use of electronic data processing and storage devices 
has created new phenomena. Nowadays, there is hardly an area of social life not penetrated by 
electronic means and its possibilities of rapid information exchange. The development in the 
field of electronics over the last two decades is astonishing. The single fact that e.g. storage 
space increased from around 100 MB to currently approximate 2 TB1 is absolutely mind 
boggling as is the similar development of working memory (RAM)2. Within 20 years the 
possible storage space and working memory/speed of computers multiplied enormously. 
Thanks to these technical improvements, the Internet could be ‘established’ as a 
communication network for everybody. Globalization is the magic word in this context and it 
triggered a ‘reflattening’ of the world, as Thomas Friedman called this.3 The reshaping of the 
world and the communication process over the last two decades was carried out by geo-
economics as well as the already mentioned technological improvements. In a globalized 
world, borders and other physical barriers are in the process of being diminished. It does not 
matter anymore where you are as all necessary information, tools and software is available in 
an easy and affordable manner. For the common good, one might say; and indeed, the 
common good can be seen everywhere: communication networks work faster, letters (e-mails) 
are being delivered within seconds to any part of the planet, people in different places on the 
Earth can attend (online or video) conferences in real time without getting out their office, as 
long as there is a connection to the Internet. People are able to handle their banking affairs, 
shop for their groceries or purchase any other item via the World Wide Web. Governments 
conduct research in order to establish a cheaper and more efficient public administration via 
e-government; so do many international corporations and a lot of other businesses. The 
Internet offers a lot of opportunities and everyone can benefit, be it used as a sales market (e-
commerce), as an outsourcing option or just as a communication platform.  
                                                          
1 One Megabyte is 106 Byte = 1.000.000 Byte meaning that 100 Megabyte are 100.000.000 Byte; on the 
contrary to this modern computers do have a storage capacity of 2 Terabyte meaning 2 x 1012 Byte = 
2.000.000.000.000 Byte; thus it is 20.000 time higher than 20 years ago.  
2 In 1981 a personal computer had the capacity to proceed 640 KB (640.000 Byte), in 1994 4 MB (4.000.000 
Byte) and nowadays already 8 GB (8.000.000.000 Byte), thus its speed multiplied by 12.500 over the last 
30 years, cf. <http://www.arbeitsspeicher-info.de/die-entwicklung.html> retrieved 15 February, 2010.  
3 cf. Friedman, Thomas L., 'It’s a Flat World, After All', New York Times 3 April, 2005; he points out 10 
flatteners (e.g. the breakthrough of the Microsoft Windows 3.0 operating program; the dot.com boom; 
'Outsourcing'; 'Off shoring'; 'Open-Sourcing'; etc) merging in 2000 and building up a new playing field – 
the globalized world we know today.  
 8 
 
However, the brighter the light, the deeper the shadow. All these benefits mentioned above, 
can have inherent negative outcomes as information could be used for other purposes. 
Everybody knows the annoying consequence of simple, cheap and fast communications 
means – spam. Who has never been bothered by such e-mails? Furthermore criminals all over 
the world use the technology provided for their unlawful needs: ‘phishing’ attacks intended to 
collect passwords, PINs and TANs4, fraud committed via computers (Internet fraud) or 
hacking attacks with the aim to spy on secret data or communication, are just a few examples. 
Legislators in many countries responded to these often devastating threats and established not 
only corresponding provisions in their criminal codes but also a close cooperation between 
the investigation authorities. Today, a multitude of provisions is in force dealing with 
computer crime. 
In addition, investigating authorities obtained powerful procedural competence in order to use 
the same electronic tools for their investigations. However, as investigation and monitoring 
devices can interfere massively with fundamental and human rights of the affected persons, 
highly controversial questions might pop up. Especially since the attacks in September 2001, 
the discussions in this matter are omnipresent. Governments try to weight the justified 
freedoms of the individual with the no less justified interests of the public order and peace. 
Every person scarifies parts of his/her freedom for the greater common good. For instance, 
digital CCTV5 cameras are ever present and people have already gotten used to them. The 
main argument in favor of such surveillance methods is crime prevention, but also the solving 
of crimes is mentioned as justification for the application of cameras. The question whether it 
is a beneficial tool to prevent criminal incidences, respectively whether the individual feels 
safer due to these cameras, is something completely different. Furthermore, it is to point out 
that the rising danger of terrorist attacks has provoked legislators all over the world to 
establish special provisions. Besides the old methods of wiretapping, or the employment of 
undercover agents, visual as well as acoustical surveillance can be implemented in certain 
circumstances. However, these procedural tools are seemingly still too weak to sustain the 
current need and demand for security. Hence, in order to maintain and preserve security and 
freedom, the Austrian government wants to establish a new method. For the government, 
‘remote forensic investigations’ are the key to counter terrorism and other serious crimes, and 
a lot of effort has been put in, in order to path the way for it. 
                                                          
4 Personal Identification Number (PIN) and Transaction Number (TAN). 
5 Closed Circuit Television. 
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Content and Purpose of this Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an introduction and general overview of the newly 
developed method of remote forensic investigations. It intends to present RFIs in a rather 
broad and general way. The first chapter is solemnly intended to give a clear definition of the 
object of interest, involving a distinction between technology and law, a clarification of the 
term remote forensic investigation and its potential fields of application.  
 
The intentions behind this analysis are distinct and include principal technical questions and 
sole legal issues. Hence, both, the technical, as well as the legal requirements for remote 
forensic investigations are illustrated.  
 
The main question the author tried to answer was, whether it is possible from a technical point 
of view to apply an RFI without the target person’s knowledge. Thus, it is analyzed whether 
this method of investigation would work in the field or only on paper. The main argument 
against the possible implementation is certainly that there is a broad range of different anti-
spyware programs capable to prevent spying attacks on computers. Therefore, the second part 
of this thesis is dedicated to the technical aspects of a remote forensic investigation: It starts 
with the presentations of software programs potentially capable to be applied in such 
investigations. The terms of ‘malware’ and ‘viruses’ are also clarified, as are the expressions 
‘spyware’ and the various forms of ‘Trojan horses’. Special attention is given to the technical 
issues and properties of telecommunication as well as to that of decryption and encryption.6 In 
order to show how a computer has to be searched physically by law enforcement agencies, the 
author gives a brief introduction into computer forensics. This is especially important as there 
should be no qualitative difference between an actual physical search and a remote search of a 
computer. The illustration includes a description of the established procedures for the 
investigation authorities and the various principles the process is based on. Furthermore, a 
brief overview of the special hardware as well as software tools is given. Thereafter, a 
presentation of the potential application of a remote forensic investigation in regards to its two 
                                                          
6 Note that the awareness of the technical properties and the consequent differences are of great importance 
when evaluating remote forensic investigations from a legal point of view. In addition, this presentation 
will give the reader a broader view on the technical properties and permit a sophisticated insight into the 
whole matter. 
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main purposes, i.e. obtaining access to a computer and the exploitation of that access. The 
chapter is finished off with a summary of the findings and the conclusion that can be drawn. 
Special attention is given to presently available anti-spyware programs and the author 
presents an answer to the above mentioned, technical question of whether such protective 
tools are useful against an RFI. In this context, gaining remote access to a target computer is 
of particular interest and the most pressing question. Is it possible to secretly install and run 
remote forensic software tools without the knowledge of the user of the target computer?  
 
The second major topic, investigated by the author, deals with a solemnly legal issue: would 
the conduction of an RFI by the Austrian security agencies be legal under the current law. In 
order to investigate this issue the author provides the fundamentals, thus with a brief overview 
on the framework of constitutional provisions at the beginning of chapter 3. In this context, 
especially the principle of a State of Law in respect to fundamental and human rights, and the 
corresponding question of proportionality are illustrated. The relationship between the 
Austrian Federation and the Federal States (Laender) is another aspect presented, as well as 
the difference between criminal police and public security police. To present the problems 
without any procedural provision for the security agencies, the author gives a summary of 
important substantive law provisions. This is necessary in order to show that the security 
agencies would – without empowerment to conduct a remote forensic investigation – commit 
a criminal act and would therefore be liable for it as well. In this context, the international 
framework, i.e. the Convention on Cybercrime is also presented and so is the national 
provision on computer hacking or illegal interception of data etc.  
In a state of law, the security agencies have to follow certain procedures in order for their 
actions to be considered within their legal limits. This is also true for all measures taken 
during criminal investigations. Hence, a large portion of the legal part in this thesis is 
dedicated to procedural provisions in the Austrian legal system. In order to answer the raised 
question a detailed examination of the provisions in question has to be done. Such provisions 
can be found in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the Austrian Security 
Police Act. However, before going any further certain common principles of criminal law 
have to be illustrated. After an introduction into criminal procedures law, involving an 
illustration of general principles – such as the principle of indictment, or the system of 
warrants – the relationship between the criminal police, the public prosecution and the court 
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as well as their special tasks and competences, the provisions in regard to remote forensic 
investigations are pointed out extensively. As remote forensic investigations can be conducted 
for three different purposes,7 the presentation is oriented towards these purposes. The author 
examines in the first place the provision of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and 
thereafter the potentially relevant provisions in the Austrian Security Police Act.   
In concrete terms this means that the procedural regulations for a search of locations and 
objects are displayed. This includes the requirements in regard to the demanded degree of 
suspicion, and the rights of the people affected by the process. Moreover, the question of what 
happens to items found but not searched for (accidental discoveries), and the aspects of 
danger in delay are set out as well.  
Second of all, the provisions in respect to surveillance of communication are taken into 
account and due to their importance a major part of this thesis is dedicated to them. Following 
an illustration of the formal requirements for surveillance and its general principles, the three 
main methods are presented. The Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure offers the option of 
surveillance of data and communication, a disclosure of transmission data, and an optical and 
acoustical surveillance of persons – also known as major, respectively minor electronic 
eavesdropping operation.  
This presentation is followed by an illustration of the Austrian Security Police Act. After a 
short introduction, the competences of the security agencies in respect to remote forensic 
investigations are presented. These competences contain inter alia, the competence to enter 
and search premises, rooms and vehicles, or the legitimacy to process personal data and other 
special regulations in respect of investigations. Thus, the competences of the security police 
appear to be quite similar. However, the major differences between the two will be illustrated.  
The subchapters in the third part are concluded by an extensive effort to subsume a remote 
forensic investigation under the presented procedural provision. Hence, the realization of an 
RFI with the illustrated procedural provision is examined and therefore the provisions 
potential capability to ‘host’ an RFI is verified.  
Without anticipation, this attempt proved to be more difficult than expected mainly due to the 
fact that there are only some good starting points. However, in every illustration a component 
                                                          
7 Firstly, in order to search remotely a computer; secondly, in order to monitor the activities set out via a 
computer; and thirdly, in order to monitor telecommunication; cf. below for further details. 
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is missing in order to achieve a sound and proper outcome – i.e. a clear and distinct 
subsumption. This means that none of the present provisions provide the necessary legal 
framework in order to allow the conduction of a remote forensic investigation or alike.  
 
The final question of this thesis deals with the inherent problem of a remote forensic 
investigation. Besides its pure repressive character, RFIs do have a certain preventative touch. 
Therefore, the author researched whether and in which form prevention is legally possible, 
respectively who is responsible for the prevention of incidences and which tools does this 
agency have to act upon these situations effectively. In this regard it may be noted that the 
author does not believe that the prevention of a criminal incident can be legally conducted 
within the framework of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure8. Hence, in order to find a 
conclusion to this question, the forth part deals with the delicate relationship between the task 
of preventing criminal incidences and the competences set out under criminal procedural law. 
The author presents his doubts of the fact that the prevention is a task of the criminal police 
by pointing out the difficulties of this special relationship. It will be shown that prevention is a 
manifold issue and not easy to handle. A simple empowerment of the criminal police with 
preventive powers does not work and should be subject to closer investigation. Special focus 
should be on four diverging aspects, which have to be taken into account when establishing a 
new provision to deal with these special cases.  
In the first place the connection and relationship between the principles of the public security 
police and that of the criminal police, respectively their tasks and competences are examined. 
Since their functions and duties are only alike on the first sight, serious problems on how to 
effectively deal with crime prevention arise. It is to show that the responsibilities of the 
criminal police do have a pure repressive character, while the duties of the public security 
police are partly preventive. 
Secondly, it is pointed out that this provision9 could possibly constitute a systematic failure 
within the Austrian legal framework. Due to the fact that the method of a remote forensic 
investigation is intended to be applied in a repressive as well as in a preventive way 
constitutional problems occur.  
                                                          
8 Note in this respect, that the Austrian legislator intends to establish a corresponding ‘RFI provision’ within 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
9 Not only this but also some established earlier.  
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Thirdly, to a certain extent substantive provisions within the Austrian Criminal Code deal 
with questions of prevention, or involve at least a particular semblance in this regard. The 
difficulties arising from these provisions are illustrated, raising awareness to them.  
The last but probably most important point of critique deals with the issue of general 
suspicion. It investigates the level of suspicion that is required in order for authorities to 
conduct a remote forensic investigation. It is commonly agreed that the more serious the 
crime, the more serious the repression. The same is true for investigations, meaning that the 
more serious the crime, the more severe (i.e. interfering with fundamental/human rights) the 
investigation method can be. However, since in certain instance a crime has not even been 
committed and the 'investigations' are only based on assumptions, the degree of suspicion 
plays an important role.  
 
These four parts give an extensive overview of the difficulties and controversies remote 
forensic investigations are facing within the Austrian legal system. Not only is this 
investigation method highly debatable with regard to human and fundamental rights11 but 
there are great concerns in respect to procedural and constitutional principles as well.  
The author wants to point out that this thesis does not deal with questions rooted in the area of 
fundamental rights, but rather with issues of procedural questions. The reason for this is that 
the topic of fundamental rights is already one of advanced discussion and literature. The 
contributions of German lawyers have to especially be mentioned in this context. Hence, the 
author refers the interested reader to further reading materials.  
 
In regard to the technical part of this thesis it is to say that the author intended to provide a 
broad overview on numerous aspects. Certainly, there are many more interesting facets, which 
could be elaborated on in the course of this thesis; however, due to the highly technical nature 
of the topic, the author only illustrates the basic information necessary for comprehensive 
purposes. Most importantly in this regard is that the author does not claim the completeness of 
all aspects. The interested reader is once again referred to technical essays dealing with this 
issue. In addition, it is to mention at this stage that the author tried to obtain information from 
                                                          
11 The author is aware of the difference between fundamental and human rights. Both expressions are used 
synonymic throughout the thesis.  
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the Austrian Ministry of the Interior on how customary searches of electronic devices are 
conducted and whether there is something like a good handbook for officers. The existence 
and the use of such guidelines were confirmed by e-mail in August 2009. Unfortunately, these 
guidelines are only for the internal use, hence not publicly available. However, the author is 
confident that the ‘good practice guide’ presented in the technical chapter of this thesis gives a 
good and comprehensive insight on the work of investigating authorities and the 
corresponding proper principles for conducting a search. 
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1 General Aspects – Defining the Object of Interest 
Before going into further detail, it is mandatory to define some fundamental terms this thesis 
is dealing with. This is especially true since ambiguous terms are being used. First of all, there 
is an absence of a universal terminology in this respect, meaning that, in particular the media 
is mixing and misusing terms and meanings quite often. This has been leading to a lot of 
confusion. Second of all, techno-legal terms have a high potential to cause even further 
misunderstandings on both sides – on that of technicians as well as that of lawyers. Thirdly, in 
general minor but important distinctions have to be made on both, the technical and the legal 
side. These differentiations imply different outcomes as well as technical and legal 
consequences.  
 
1.1 Technology and Law 
From a technical point of view, there are physical boundaries due to the laws of nature. These 
borders are final, meaning that you cannot overcome them, just because you want to. If 
something is physically not possible, then it is not working. With law it is the other way 
round, however, there are limited boundaries. If we talk about boundaries in a legal context, in 
most cases, we mean human rights or principles of law binding legislators to a framework of 
what is possible and what is not. 
The relationship between technology and law is an interesting aspect. In general it can be said 
that technology is always one, if not two or more steps ahead of its corresponding legal 
regulations. Technical progress is too fast for lawmakers to keep up the pace. A good example 
for this time lag is the enormous development of the Internet over the last 15 to 20 years, 
which is still ongoing. It took legislators all over the world quite a while to respond to the 
things going on the Internet. Even today, with no end of this expansion in sight, lawmakers 
everywhere are still behind on the concept of what is and will be technically possible. This 
indicates that legislators are always in a defensive position, as their main agenda is to react to 
technical phenomena and to implement them into the legal framework. On the other hand, it is 
to note that not everything that is legal is possible from a technical standpoint. 
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The intended goal for this brief introduction into the bizarre relationship between law and 
technology is to raise awareness for the sophisticated relationship, its interactions and the 
variety of potential outcomes.  
 
1.2 Remote Forensic Investigation (RFI) 
In general, this thesis is dealing with three fields of application, which can be subsumed under 
the umbrella term of remote forensic investigations. RFI is neither in a technological nor in a 
legal sense a fixed term. There are various expressions used for more or less the same kind of 
investigation. Hence, there is need for a clarification and a definition of the terminology. The 
cornerstones of this investigating method for law enforcement agencies can be drawn out of 
the debate, which has lasted several years in Austria and Germany as follows:  
RFI is the employment of technical devices (soft- as well as hardware), which are secretly 
installed on a certain computer in order to gather knowledge about the content of the hard 
drive, to monitor sent and received e-mails, or to monitor the page view of certain Internet 
sites. It is important to note that the user of that specific computer is unaware of the ongoing 
RFI.12 During a parliamentary request session, August. Hanning, secretary of State and the 
coordinator for intelligence services of the German government, defined an RFI as a search 
for criminal act relevant content data on a data carrier to which there is no physical access for 
the law enforcement agencies, so that the access has to be established via telecommunication 
networks.13 An RFI is a technical means to search and/or survey data carrier for data relevant 
in criminal proceedings, without the need of physical presence of the investigative officer. 
With the assistance of technical devices it is possible for the law enforcement agencies to 
obtain data in a remote way and to use them for their investigations. Furthermore, the 
investigation is done without the knowledge of the computers user – the potential suspect.  
 
                                                          
12 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich durch das Bundesministerium für Justiz und das 
Bundesministerium für Inneres hinsichtlich der Erweiterung des Ermittlungsinstrumentariums zur 
Bekämpfung schwerer, organisierter und terroristischer Kriminalitätsformen („Online-Durchsuchung’), 17 
October, 2007.  
13 cf. furthermore BT-Drs. 16/3231, p. 11 at <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/032/1603231.pdf> 
retrieved 21 October, 2009.  
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1.2.1 Field of Application 
Remote forensic devices – be it soft- or hardware – can technically be used in various ways. 
Generally speaking, three main ways of application have evolved for the law enforcement 
agencies. Each one of these fields needs certain technological and legal input; thus entailing 
certain technological and legal consequences. Hence, it is important to keep the differences 
between the applications in mind when dealing with an RFI. Apart from the similarities of the 
remote forensic devices, they result in fundamental distinctive legal and technical outcomes if 
used for different purposes14. Law enforcement agencies can use remote forensic devices for:  
 remote access to a suspects computer in order to make a search,  
 (real time) surveillance of the activities done with a certain computer, or 
 (real time) surveillance of the telecommunication done with a certain computer over 
the Internet 
 
1.2.1.1 Remote Access for Search Purposes15 
In order for law enforcement agencies to obtain information stored on electronic devices it is 
legally mandatory to first confiscate the physical device and to search this seized data carrier 
afterward. This procedure is time consuming and involves numerous people. An RFI would 
offer a rather uncomplicated way to achieve the same results – a snapshot of the hard drive’s 
content.16 From a technical point of view, there are two different options to execute an RFI for 
search purposes: First of all, via the (remote) installation of a Trojan horse it would be 
possible for the law enforcement to search the suspects hard drive live – thus in real time. A 
remote access enables the investigating officer to search files, data and information on the 
computer, as this search would be conducted (physically present) on site. The big advantage 
of this approach is that a search conducted in such a manner offers access to nearly 
everything, as the use of encryption software does not matter to such an extent17. 
                                                          
14 There is a difference between a one-time access and surveillance of a computer; not only does this involve 
different legal precondition but also must there be different technical support.  
15 cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 9.  
16 e.g., Buermeyer, Ulf, Die „Online-Durchsuchung’. Technischer Hintergrund des verdeckten hoheitlichen 
Zugriffs auf Computersysteme, HRRS 4/2007, p. 160.  
17 cf. for further details Buermeyer, Technischer Hintergrund, p. 160.  
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Secondly, a special electronic device could physically be installed on the suspect’s computer 
and this device creates a copy of the hard drive. Afterward, this copy only needs to be 
transmitted to the law enforcement agencies and finally searched for relevant information.  
 
1.2.1.2 Surveillance of Activities18 
This field of application means the continued recording of data. Contrary to an image of a 
hard drive, continued surveillance of the activities is not like a snapshot but rather prolonged 
information on what happened in the course of time. Each alteration, manipulation etc. of data 
is recorded, trusting that sooner or later, suspects will use passwords in order to decipher their 
files. Thus, if this method is conducted long enough, a good copy of the hard drive may be 
created.19 Furthermore, monitoring in such fashion enable law enforcement to record files that 
are stored only temporarily. Concerning this, particularly a temporary storage area – cache – 
has to be brought up, offering a useful tool to reconstruct online activities.20  
 
1.2.1.3 Surveillance of Telecommunication 
From a legal perspective, communication over the Internet is in fact a special form of 
telecommunication.21 Therefore, it is rather not surprising that the legal regulations 
concerning the surveillance of customary telecommunication are applicable as well. Examples 
for telecommunication realized via the Internet can be Internet telephone services, e-mail 
messages, as well as the participation in instant messaging chats and the participation in 
online games, inquiries in databases and the customary surfing of the World Wide Web.22 The 
provisions of the ‘offline’ world can be transferred directly into the online world.  
From a technical point of view it is to state that there is a huge difference between the 
surveillance of customary and that of Internet telecommunication. Not only is it necessary to 
                                                          
18 cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 9.  
19 cf. for further details Buermeyer, Technischer Hintergrund, p. 161.  
20 In such areas, abundant data is stored for fast access. If data is stored in the cache, it is faster in the future to 
use the copy (in the cache) than to recompute the original data; cf. further Buermeyer, Technischer 
Hintergrund, p. 161.  
21 However, there are technical differences which are going to be presented below.  
22 Rux, Johannes, Ausforschung privater Rechner durch die Polizei- und Sicherheitsbehörden, in JZ 6/2007, p. 
287. 
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encrypt communication in the latter case, there is also a special need for law enforcement 
agencies to have direct access to the terminal of the receiver or sender. This necessity is 
required due to the technical properties of the Internet and how communication on it works. 
The interception of Internet telecommunications via the assistance of an access provider is not 
satisfying. Therefore no method is more suitable than an RFI to intercept Internet phone calls. 
The goal is to install surveillance devices directly onto the terminals of receiver and/or sender, 
or to have at least direct access to these terminals. Otherwise the content data of the 
telecommunication cannot be obtained. From a technical point of view the interception of an 
Internet telecommunication is a more powerful interference than a simple analogue or 
‘offline’ interception.  
In short, the surveillance of telecommunication over a longer period of time enables the 
collection of data on conducted information flow. This can be far more relevant, 
comprehensive, and valuable that a simple ‘snapshot’ of data. 
 
1.2.2 Timeframe of Application 
There are two questions in regards to RFI and a timeframe. One is how many times an RFI is 
conducted, the other is when: This will consequently also answer the question of when the 
law enforcement agencies will start their investigation. The exact point of time, i.e. at which 
stage of a criminal activity, when law enforcement agencies start their activities implies not 
only the question of the legal basis of their acting23 but also it involves the very interesting 
field of the different grounds of justification.24 There are three different kinds of 
investigations distinguished by their launching time. Generally, the RFI techniques can be 
applied before, while or after a criminal act was committed.25 
                                                          
23 e.g., can the single act be classified as prevention of a criminal act or is it already an investigation, etc? The 
former would be governed in Austria by the Security Police Act (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz) and by section 3 
of the Austrian Criminal Code (self-defense) while the latter is regulated by the Austrian Criminal 
Procedure Code. For further clarification cf. the legal section of this thesis. 
24 cf. previous footnote.  
25 cf. regarding the distinction: Rux, p. 287. 
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1.2.2.1 Preliminary Stage of a Criminal Act  
The averting of danger prior to the actual criminal act26 is one of the most important tasks of 
security agencies. The prevention of criminal acts is always better than solving them because 
nobody was harmed and there are no actual damages. Hence, prevention in general occupies a 
crucial part in the daily work of the police forces. Furthermore, it is to state that there is 
hardly a strategic concept leaving questions of crime prevention aside.27 In fact, an RFI is 
(according to its proponents) all about prevention, as it is intended to become the most vital 
part in the prevention of serious, organized or terrorist crimes.28 Hence, at this stage an RFI 
supports crime prevention.  
 
1.2.2.2 Averting of Danger29  
At this stage, the actual offender has already started to commit a criminal act, meaning that 
the physical elements of a crime have been put in place. The law-breaking act is in progress 
by the time a law enforcement agency starts an RFI. Logically, an RFI at this stage can only 
be conducted if it continues and lasts at least for some time. Therefore, only criminal acts 
lasting for some time or constant/continued activities representing a criminal act30 can be 
investigated via an RFI. Otherwise, if the criminal act is completed, there is no need for the 
averting of danger, as the danger is already gone. At this stage, an RFI helps to overcome or 
lessen the amount of danger in case of an attack. 
 
1.2.2.3 Post-crime Investigation 
When the actual threat is over, the criminal act committed and the law enforcement agency 
commences its investigation, the purpose of RFI changed once again. There is nothing to 
prevent or lessen anymore; from this point of time onward, an investigation is purely 
dedicated to the prosecution of an offender. After a criminal act is committed, collecting 
                                                          
26 Thus, when the actual criminal act has not yet happen and the offender is still in the process of preparation. 
27 cf. homepage of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Internal Affairs at 
<http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BK/praevention_neu/wir_ueber_uns.aspx> retrieved 22 October, 2009. 
28 cf. the titel of BMJ/BMI (2008).  
29 Note that this is not a legal expression and therefore 'nothing' to do with the task of the public security 
police. 
30 e.g. an offender persevered in committing the criminal act.  
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evidence and tracking the criminal is the main goal of an RFI.  
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2 Technical Aspects of RFI 
Having clarified the relationship between technology on the one, and law on the other hand as 
well as having defined the object of interest and all its aspects, the next chapter deals with the 
technical aspects of RFI. Software and hardware tools are illustrated as well as a description 
of potential methods to conduct an RFI is given. The chapter is concluded by a brief 
presentation of the potential application of an RFI in regard to its main purposes, namely 
access obtaining and exploiting such. 
 
2.1 Malware  
2.1.1 Introduction  
The term malware is a combination of the words malicious and software. It is used for 
software designed to infiltrate or harm computer systems. Malicious software can be divided 
into subgroups and is distinguished by its aims and goals as well as by its technical 
functions/abilities. Therefore, a distinction is made between Trojan horses, worms and 
computer viruses31. These three main subgroups are often not distinguished explicitly but 
rather used incorrectly in public discussion and by the press. For example, the term computer 
virus is commonly brought into play for all sorts of different malware without acknowledging 
that there are differences and that not all malicious software programs are viruses. 
Furthermore, it is to mention that adware, root kits and spyware as well as the various tools of 
hackers32 can also be subsumed under the term malware. Hence, malware is the general 
expression for harmful computer software. Another phrase utilized in this context is ‘rouge 
program’ which is, in general, the same as malware. 
Although this thesis is mainly focused on Trojan horses and similar programs, which offer the 
ability to spy (spyware) on a target computer system as their main focus, it is the intention of 
the author to give a brief overview on the other groups of malware. This information is 
                                                          
31 Klaeren Herbert, Viren, Würmer und Trojaner (2006), pp. 102-103.  
32 There are three different ways to comprehend the term hacker, with slightly different meanings in nearly 
the same circumstances. In this context I will use the expression hacker in the sense of a person who is 
using programs to enter a computer system with the intention to commit a crime of whatever substance 
(illegal access, theft, fraud, data or system interference etc). 
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essential for the reader’s comprehension and his/her better understanding of the bigger 
picture. 
In general, there are minor differences between all these computer programs, tools and 
electronic devices. Each of them can obey different orders. Furthermore, various mixtures and 
hybrids have been designed over time in order to cause greater damage or to guarantee better 
surveillance. Having said this, it is to be noted that the following overview shall not be 
regarded as a final, everlasting list of devices. It is rather intended as presentation of not only 
the tools themselves but also the basic technical concepts, ideas and purposes behind their 
invention.  
 
2.1.1.1 Intentions Behind Malware 
The intentions behind the invention of malicious software vary based on the ideas of their 
creators. There were also shifts in the course of time: at the beginning of the development 
there were two main reasons coining the creation of malware, i.e. on the one hand, the 
purposes for programs, nowadays seen as rouge ones, were mainly harmless experiments. For 
instance, the first official33 Internet worm – the Morris worm34 – was intended to gauge the 
size of the Internet. On the other hand, these programs were meant as pranks, people trying to 
annoy colleagues without any bad intentions – such as causing serious damage to computers. 
The early viruses were the product of ‘virologists’, computer scientist who studied these new 
extraordinary phenomena. They tried to learn by programming viruses, thus learning by 
doing. As it is commonly known, however, everything has a backside and as it can easily be 
imagined the difference between a beneficial, purely scientific approach of the matter and an 
unlawful, i.e. criminal handling is minimal. The distinction lays only in the intention of the 
user/creator. Somehow, it is like a customary kitchen knife, which can be used in two ways – 
to chop vegetable, or to harm or even murder somebody. Thus, it is really not surprising that 
more and more criminals were attracted by the discoveries in the field of malware and that 
even well minded scientists changed the side of the law.  
 
                                                          
33 Or better the first one, which got broad media attention.  
34 It infected 6.000 computer systems in the U.S. (mass infection) – at that time approximate 10 per cent of all 
servers of the ARPANET-network, which was the predecessor of the today Internet. One of its victims was 
the server of the NASA. cf. further Robens Daniel, Internet-Spionage – der Sicherheitsratgeber für Ihren 
PC (2000), p. 26 and Kaspersky Eugene, Malware (2008), p. 108. 
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2.1.1.2 Changing the Side 
When it comes to the intention of a suspect we are dealing with delicate situations. What 
matters is the intention behind an act. If a person engages in an activity that could be of illegal 
nature, but his/her actions as such are permitted by law, the person cannot be held accountable 
for them.35 Hence, it is important to note in this context that the change of affiliation is 
working in both directions. From the early days, hackers saw the whole matter of malware as 
playing a game. They were searching for gaps in the security systems of networks or single 
computers with the intention to overcome the hurdles, to hack into the system and to show 
that the programmer had failed to protect it efficiently. This was mainly the intention of early 
hackers. These goals have hardly changed in recent years and there are still enthusiasts 
playing this kind of game. The fact that hacking is not necessarily a harmful act but rather one 
with beneficial consequences, led to controversial discussions regarding the treatment of 
hackers. As history shows, hackers often changed sides after becoming convicted of computer 
crimes. Big corporations or even public entities were, and are still looking for these criminals 
in order to hire them. The main reason is that these criminals have gathered so much 
knowledge and experiences of networks, their security, potential gaps and weaknesses that 
they are the ideal partners to assist in improving these systems. Other hackers came out of 
illegality to sell their know-how to major companies such as Microsoft. They founded their 
own companies and sell their anti-virus programs.36 It is further not surprising that the 
evolution and expansion of the anti-virus industry went along with the increasing number of 
appearing malware.  
 
2.1.2 Computer Virus 
A virus (the expression steams from Latin and means ‘poison’ or ‘toxin’) in the biological 
context is not a living organism - it is more a collection of genetic material. This material is 
                                                          
35 cf. as well the conclusions of this chapter and Posch, Reinhard, 'Technische Aspekte zur Online-
Durchsuchung ' in Online-Durchsuchung (2008), p. 40 
36 A good example is the creator of the Morris worm, Robert T. Morris Jr. - ironically enough son of a chief 
executive of the National Security Agency (NSA). His worm, reasoned by an error in programming, caused 
damages of approximately 10 – 100 million US Dollar. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment on 
parole, 400 hours of charitable activity as well as a 10.000 US Dollar fine. He co-founded Viaweb, an e-
commerce hosting service, which was later sold to Yahoo and he became an associated professor at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; cf. further Klaeren, pp. 100-101; Robens (2000), p. 34; moreover 
Robert Morris biography at <http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~rtm/> retrieved 14 May, 2008 
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capable of infiltrating into cells, modify their DNA and alter these cells into virus producing 
ones. Hence, a virus is not able to reproduce itself outside a host cell. In the context of 
computers, this means that viruses are programs which copy themselves in the form of Trojan 
horses37 into other programs in order to alter the function of these programs. Then they use 
these infiltrated programs as newly created virus distributing engines. The original function of 
the now infiltrated programs (the new distributing programs) rests unchanged.  
 
Gregory Benford mentioned computer viruses for the first time in 1970. In an article he 
warned that such viruses would be established soon and he recommended the invention of a 
vaccine. Furthermore, he designed some viruses himself in order to support his theory. His 
viruses were only intended to spread around but not to cause damage to the infected 
computer.38  
Generally, it is to say that a modern virus has at least two different functions: firstly, a 
reproducing function afflicting other programs and integrating itself as Trojan horse. 
Secondly, there is the harmful purpose, which could be activated immediately. In most cases 
the latter function will not be exercised until a certain event or date. Sometimes viruses are 
programmed to wait for a remote order. Originally, viruses only spread via the exchange of 
discs and other external data carrier but nowadays viruses circulate mainly through the 
Internet, which offers a brilliant breeding ground.39 Computer viruses have three different life 
phases: activation, reproduction and manipulation. Activation is the moment when the virus 
logs into a computer for the first time – mostly via a common source. Reproduction is the 
phase where the virus is trying to infect as many victims as possible. The moment a virus 
enters into force is called manipulation. This enforcement depends on the programmer’s 
intention and can be connected to a certain date or another incident.40 
 
2.1.2.1 Classical vs. Contemporary Viruses  
In a recent study, Eugene Kaspersky pointed out that, as a distinguishing character between 
                                                          
37 cf. below. 
38 cf. Klaeren (2006), p. 104. 
39 cf. Klaeren (2006), p. 104.  
40 Chirillo John, Der Hacker-Angriff (2004), p. 315. 
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other forms of malware – especially worms – classical viruses41 do not use network services 
to get into computers. The reproduction of a virus attains only in other computers if the 
infected object (i.e. another program) is activated, for reasons not in conjunction with the 
function of the virus. Kaspersky provides the following examples: a user who is sending e-
mail with an infected attachment; the case of a virus copying itself on removable media or on 
infecting files on such media.42 Furthermore, he shows that new viruses have properties of 
other kinds of malware, as for instance, viruses containing components of Trojan horses in 
order to harm or damage computers. The development from the classical viruses (which do 
not need the resources of networks) to the modern day viruses (the combinations between 
more types of malware) is based on various reasons. One of them is that the development of 
rouge programs became more and more inspired by criminal intentions. A growing number of 
criminals are seeking easier and more efficient means for their unlawful purposes in 
cyberspace.43 Nevertheless, the methods by which viruses infect files are still applied. 
Especially within contemporary worms and Trojan horses which were programmed for 
criminal purposes. Present day worms and Trojans horses are designed to harm the computer 
through the infection of files of the operation system (e.g. Windows) in order to aggravate the 
detection of the malware and its removal from the system.44  
 
2.1.2.2 Classification of Viruses 
Traditional viruses can be classified by two characteristics: the environment where they occur 
and the method of infection.  
The former refers to the make-up of a computer, such as the operation system or application, 
required in order to infect files.45 In this context four kinds of viruses,46 can be differentiated,
                                                          
41 e.g. the Michelangelo-virus, which spread only via disk. Detailed information can be found at Robens 
(2000), pp. 43 and 282-284. 
42 Kaspersky (2008), p. 51. 
43 This is a metaphor for the Internet. The term itself is a combination of the words cybernetics and space, and 
was coined by William Gibson in his scientific novel ‘Burning Chrome’ (1982).  
44 Kaspersky (2008), pp. 51-52. 
45 cf. <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
46 cf. Kaspersky (2008), pp. 56-57; for further detailed information cf. http://www.kaspersky.com/virusinfo> 
retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
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 namely  
 file viruses – occurring in file systems 
 boot sector viruses – occurring in boot sectors47 
 macro viruses – occurring in macro environments48 and 
 script viruses – occurring in script hosts.  
The latter criterion classifies the different forms of viruses by the employed tricks and used 
techniques to infiltrate a target and inject the virus code into an object.49 Hence, the above 
shown types can be further divided.  
 
The most significant types are file viruses. They have been used for over 20 years in order to 
comprehend the technology behind viruses. Due to this popularity, hackers and other 
programmers of viruses invented ever more-newer methods. Hence, today there is a very 
broad scope of different levels of viruses. They reach from simple and even primitive ones to 
technical highly developed approaches, able to infect the source codes. Seven types and 
targets of viruses can be distinguished:50 
 Overwriting virus – it is the simplest form of infection and means that the virus 
replaces the code of the file by his own code. The original file is useless and it is not 
possible to restore it.  
 Parasitic virus – it is the most widespread category of all file viruses. They alter the 
code of the infected file. This modification can influence the functionality of the host 
file. Within this group there are four further sub-categories, namely perpending51, 
                                                          
47 As their name let one divine these viruses infect the boot sectors of media such as floppy disks of hard 
disks (Master Boot Record – MBR) and further Kaspersky (2008), p. 61 and 
<http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
48 The most widespread macro viruses are for Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel and PowerPoint) 
which save information on OLE2 (Object Linking and Embedding) format. Viruses for other applications 
are relatively rare. cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 62 and 
<http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
49 cf. <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
50 cf. Kaspersky (2008), pp. 58-61 and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> 
retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
51 Meaning the malicious code is written to the beginning of the file. This is the easiest method because the 
virus is shifting the whole content of the file backwards and inserts his own code at the created space. cf. as 
well Kaspersky (2008), p. 59 and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> 
retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
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appending,52 inserting,53and entry point obscuring (EPO) viruses.54 
 Companion virus – this category does not alter the code of the file. It is just 
duplicating the infected file, which contains its own code. Launching the file will open 
the duplicate file containing the virus.  
 Link viruses 
 Object modules (OBJ)  
 Compiling libraries (LIB)  
 Application source code 
 
The harmful results of viruses on computers and networks can vary immensely. They range 
from a slight, not even noticeable, higher volume of sent data,55 to a total breakdown of the 
whole system, or a complete loss of data. Furthermore, viruses can result in simple data-theft 
or even identity-theft. Thus, the (monetary) measurable extend of damage goes along with the 
intention of the malware programmer. In addition, it can be said that quite often the effects of 
the viruses are not even noticed by the actual user of the infected computer. Hence, it is 
somehow always a matter of luck to detect injures.56  
 
2.1.3 Worms 
In the contemporary western world, everybody has come across the term ‘computer worm’. 
The main distinguishing criterion among the different types of worms lays in their method of 
spreading, meaning the manner of how worms copy themselves onto other computers. Worms 
can be diverted by the technique used to infiltrate a system and how computers execute their 
                                                          
52 Meaning the malicious code is written to the end of the file. Most of the viruses fall under this category. cf. 
further Kaspersky (2008), p. 59 and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> 
retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
53 Meaning the malicious code is inserted in the middle of the file. cf. further Kaspersky (2008), p. 59 and 
<http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
54 These include both appending and inserting viruses and are highly complex. Further information can be 
found at Kaspersky (2008), pp. 59-60 and 
<http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474> retrieved 15 May, 2008. 
55 e.g., if a Trojan horse uses the infected computer to send spam; cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 43.  
56 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 43. For further detailed information cf. ibid pp. 43-47. 
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copies. Moreover, other features also found in other groups of malware, can be used for 
distinction purposes.57  
 
The most commonly known category of worms is the e-mail worm. Quite surprisingly, this 
kind is spreading by electronic mail. The worm is sending a copy of itself as attachment, 
respectively the sent message includes a link to a specially prepared website. The worm is 
activated, in the first case when the user tries to open the attached (and infected) file or as it is 
with the second case, when the file is downloaded from the contagious website, i.e. when the 
user clicks the provided link. In both cases, the e-mail itself is only the transmitting medium. 
Well-recognized e-mail worms were for instance the Melissa58 or the LoveLetter worm.  
Worms in instant messengers such as ICQ or MSN spread through the use of these vehicles. 
They are sending messages with links to infected websites to everybody on the local contact 
list. Thus, only the broadcasting means diverts this method from the e-mail approach. Similar 
to this strategy, worms spread out through Internet relay chats as well.59 
Other distributional techniques for worms are  
 to copy it on networked resources,  
 to exploit operating system vulnerabilities to penetrate computers and/or networks,  
 to penetrate public networks or  
 the use of other malware to act as a carrier for the worm.60  
 
These manners of spreading can stand-alone, but in many cases copies of worms distribute 
simultaneously in different ways throughout networks, as the worm Nimda showed in 2001.61 
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that worms use also file-sharing networks. In order to 
                                                          
57 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 53.  
58 In 1999 this worm e-mailed copies of itself to the first 50 people in a victims Outlook address book and 
caused in this way massive break- and shutdowns of e-mail networks, even that of Microsoft. Through its 
practice it caused $ 80 billion on damages; cf. further <http://articles.winferno.com/antivirus/computer-
worms/> retrieved 19 May, 2008. 
59 cf. further Kaspersy (2008), p. 54.  
60 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 54 and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540408> 
retrieved 19 May, 2008.  
61 The Nimda worm – backward spelled Admin – was so effective because it used three different ways to 
infect other computers: i.e. it spread via e-mail, it copied itself on open network shares and it used as well 
compromised web sites; cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 55.  
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spread, the worm places a copy of itself – usually under a different, unsuspecting name – into 
a shared folder. Due to the technique used by peer-to-peer networks (P2P) other users gain 
knowledge that a new file is available and they are able to download it directly from a user’s 
computer. Hence the P2P client as external service provider grants the distribution resource.62  
 
2.1.4 Spyware 
Spyware is a specific subgroup of malware.63 It includes several more or less different tools 
and techniques, which enable to ‘spy’ on a target person. These applications are dedicated to 
the gathering of information of people’s electronic data, their electronic communication or 
their habits using electronic devices. While the original intentions for the invention of most of 
these tools were focused on well-meant goals,64 the image of these tools has altered in the 
course of time. This was mainly due to their changed use, particularly their employment for 
negative and even criminal purposes. Hence, the various, once praised items became the 
condemned ones. This is also expressed in a verbal way – the branding as spyware; although 
one still profits from their positive outcomes. 
Spyware can be either soft- or hardware and accomplish quite different tasks. The effects of 
the various tools reach from key logging devices, noticing and storing every pushed button on 
a keyboard, to the installation of ‘backdoors’, which enable hackers to enter as system 
undiscovered. Another example is the screening of people’s surfing habits for the purpose of 
direct advertising. However, the last mentioned scenario could potentially reach a point at 
which identity thefts become possible. This means that the criminal gathered so much 
information about a person that the data can be used to ‘live that person’s life’: for instance to 
get a second mortgage on the victims house, pay with their credit card or even sell the 
victim’s house. Identity thefts are mainly the outcome of the accumulated usage of different 
spyware programs and are highly dangerous for the victims as they could lose everything.  
 
                                                          
62 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 56.  
63 As Kaspersky points it out, spying programs are already included in the category of adverse, unwanted and 
potential dangerous software (i.e. malware) and the term has not a autonomous, technical meaning rather 
than it is a marketing expression; cf. Kapersky (2008), p. 75.  
64 e.g., there was the intention to enhance security, especially data security through storing all processes and 
inputs. Further it is to note that these tools were applied as well for educational reasons, such as to figure 
out how users work with their computers and to show them afterwards in which way they could improve 
the application of the device.  
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Usually, a computer, when bought is not infected with spyware. Thus, these programs have to 
be installed afterward. This is mainly done by users – the victims - themselves. In most cases 
spyware comes as a Trojan horse along with unsuspecting software downloadable for free via 
the internet, but it can also be included in image files on a website. Barely recognizable, the 
application runs in the background and reports the demanded information to the creator of the 
program. As mentioned earlier, the potential application of spyware is quite broad. Hence, the 
functions of the different tools divert among each other as well as the grade of intrusion 
ranges from low to high.  
 
2.1.4.1 Trojan Horses 
The right term for these tools is Trojan horses and not just simply Trojans as suggested. The 
short form is not only incorrect, but was also chosen ambiguously: In the Greek mythology 
the city of Troy was besieged by the Greeks during the Trojan War. During this event the 
Greeks only conquered the town of Troy through a trick. They bluffed the Trojans (inhabitants 
of Troy) with a present – a giant wooden horse. The Greeks left this horse in front of the city 
gate and pretended to leave. As the Trojans believed that they had won the war, they brought 
this horse behind the city walls into their town and celebrated their victory, unaware that the 
mightiest of the Greek soldiers were hidden within the horse. For those soldiers it was very 
easy – especially because of the celebrations – to leave their concealment, overrun the guards 
and open the city gates for their fellow soldiers.65 This clearly indicated that the Trojans were 
the victims rather than the method. Hence, the only right expression for this kind of spyware 
is Trojan horse because it is the means, which cheats and smuggles the ‘enemy’ into ones 
computer.  
 
Trojan horses are nowadays one of the most widespread and dangerous group of malware. 
They contain programs, which perform various functions in secret, such as deleting or altering 
of data, the damage of the computer’s functions or the abuse of computer recourses for 
criminal purposes.66 As it is in general with all malware, it is also possible to divide Trojan 
horses into several subgroups. The main distinctive criterion for categorization is the 
                                                          
65 cf. Robens (2000), p. 293.  
66 Kaspersky (2008), p. 52.  
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intentions behind the Trojan horse program, i.e. a distinction by their behavior and functions 
they execute on an infected workstation. For instance, there are several applications of Trojan 
horses, which cause damage to remote-computers, or within networks without harming the 
performance and functionality of the infected computer. This kind of Trojan horses is used for 
compact attacks on other computers, or designed especially for sending Spam. Briefly, there 
are the following kinds of Trojan horses: 
 
2.1.4.1.1 Backdoors 
Backdoors work similar to customary, lawful programs used for the remote management of a 
computer in a network, also known as system administration. Via remote management 
programs, the system administrator of a network is able to maintain all computers of the 
network from a distance, This means that the authorized persons are not forced to leave their 
workstation in order to maintain another workstation – system administrators have direct but 
remote access via their own computer. Hence it is possible to monitor every action taken on a 
computer respective to perform every function67 of the victim computer remotely and secretly. 
Attackers of a computer system establish such backdoors in order to return later to collect the 
gathered data of an earlier installed sniffing program. Due to the fact that hackers are 
concerned that ‘their’ backdoor will be discovered and closed, they often create a further 
backdoor, either via a secret server process or an additional administrator account on the 
target computer.68 The difference between a legal and illegal use is simple the lacking 
knowledge and/or consent of the affected person about the installation. In order to find 
activated backdoor programs, it is advisable to have a look on the list of open network ports.69  
 
2.1.4.1.2 Trojan PSW 
PSW stands for ‘Password Stealing Ware’ and includes Trojan horses, which are designed to 
                                                          
67 e.g. a criminal can use the victim computer to send or receive, to open, delete or execute files, to display 
notification, to delete information stored on the computer or simply to reboot the computer etc. Backdoors 
combine the functionality of most other types of Trojan horses in one package and this fact makes them for 
one thing so powerful and for another thing so dangerous. cf. further Kaspersky (2008), pp. 63-64 and 
<http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540521> retrieved 20 May, 2008.  
68 cf. Geschonneck, Alexander, Computer Forensik – Systemeinbrüche erkennen, ermitteln, aufklären (2006), 
2nd edition, pp. 27-28.  
69 cf. Geschonneck (2006), p. 77. 
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‘steal’ various information of a target computer, especially system passwords. The Trojan 
horse – or sniffer as it is further called – is programmed to monitor and protocol the whole 
traffic of a network and to search for files containing secret information such as phone or PIN 
numbers70 and send this data to an e-mail address. 
 
2.1.4.1.3 Trojan Clickers 
A Trojan clicker is used to promote certain websites; i.e. this subgroup forwards the victims 
computer to certain websites. They are doing so by sending either the needed command to the 
Internet browser or by replacing the standard Internet URLs.71 The goals behind these actions 
are to increase the hit-count, thus for pure advertising purposes, to organize Denial of Service 
attacks72 or to spread viruses and Trojan horses.73 
 
2.1.4.1.4 Trojan Downloaders 
Trojan Downloaders are something like an ‘update service’ for malware. They are 
downloading new versions of malicious software and installing them unnoticed by the 
computer user. 
 
2.1.4.1.5 Trojan Droppers  
Trojan Droppers are employed for the covert installation of other malware. They transfer the 
                                                          
70 Further potential targeted types of information can be certain details of the computer system (memory, disc 
space or operating system details), IP-address or passwords for online games. cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 64 
and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540521> retrieved 20 May, 2008. 
71 The website to which one is directed when one opens his/her browser.  
72 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are intended to arrange an ‘overheating’ of a server. Hence, if there are too 
many clicks on a website within a short time, it can happen that a host server will not able (technically) to 
provide this source any longer and it might crash and have a breakdown. Such a breakdown can cause 
serious damages to the company providing the web service because it cannot offer its service any longer. 
e.g. imagine such an attack on Amazon.com, if its server will break down, it might not be online for a 
couple of hours or even a day … the loses (the potential profits gathered, if it would have been online) 
might be quite serious. Moreover Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Trojan horses are spread around 
and infect numerous computers. As they are designed to visit a certain website at a specific time (or on 
command of the ‘master’), they are used for blackmail. Regarding this cf. especially Kaspersky (2008), p. 
65.  
73 As mentioned above under worms. 
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newly downloaded applications to a special location on a computer where these will be 
launched. Trojan Droppers can act covertly, i.e. without notification of the download or they 
can use deception for the installation. The latter means that they portray fake messages, such 
as errors etc. Usually, this kind of Trojan horses contains, next to the malicious, of at least one 
element that appears to be useful (a picture, a joke or a game) and which is intended to 
distract the attention of the user. The aim of this element is only to cover the ongoing process 
of installation. Besides the purpose of a hidden installation of other malware, Trojan Droppers 
are also intended to mislead antivirus programs, which are technically incapable to investigate 
all elements and to find the malicious code within the Trojan Dropper.74  
 
2.1.4.1.6 Trojan Notifiers 
The simple purpose of Trojan Notifiers is to confirm a successful infection of a victim’s 
engine. They send a message to their ‘master’ and include regularly information about IP-
addresses or open port numbers. Generally, Trojan notifiers are included into a complete 
Trojan horse package and do not stand alone, since this would not make any sense.  
 
2.1.4.1.7 Trojan Proxies 
The intention of Trojan proxies is to achieve secret access to Internet services. Trojan proxies 
serve as a proxy server. These programs are especially used for mass e-mailing, thus for 
spamming.  
 
2.1.4.1.8 Root kits 
The expression ‘root kit’ originates from the Unix75 world in which the term root means the 
same as the term administrator in the Microsoft world. If somebody logs on as an 
administrator, a root, they have special power over a computer. It is possible for these certain 
                                                          
74 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 66. 
75 Unix is a computer operating system (OS), hence the software section of a computer system in charge for 
the coordination and management of all activities of the computer. Another OS would be e.g. Microsoft 
Windows or Mac OS X.  
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‘users’ to change the various settings of a computer, to add or delete users and to govern their 
sphere of action, where each user can store their files and so on. A root is a certain empowered 
‘user’ of a computer whose function is to manage it. 
Root kits are in general words, a compilation of programs employed by a hacker to evade 
discovery while the criminals are seeking access to the remote computer. Usually a hacker 
installs the root kit after customary user-level access is obtained. In most cases cracking 
passwords or taking advantages of other weaknesses of the computer enables this access. 
Once the status of a regular user-level is achieved, it will be used to collect further user IDs of 
the workstation and finally access as root, respective administrator to the system.76  
 
2.1.4.1.9 ArcBombs 
ArcBombs are Trojan horses that are designed to sabotage the decompressor as well as the 
virus-scan programs. The ArcBombs themselves are archived files and if they are clicked on 
in order to open them, a computer might crash or slows down its processing speed. A further 
great danger stems from ArcBombs intended to influence file or e-mail server, especially if 
these servers use a system of automatic manipulation of incoming information. This is 
especially dangerous because these Trojan horses can easily bring servers to a 'thrashing', i.e. 
the server crashes.  
There are three different types of ArcBombs: the incorrect header in the archive, the repeating 
data and a series of identical files in the archive.77 
 
2.1.4.1.10 Trojan Spies 
The most dangerous subgroup of the Trojan Horse is that of Trojan Spies. This group includes 
programs, which gather secret data, monitor every act of a user, assemble these actions and 
transfer the information to an unauthorized user. The range of data collected reaches from 
secret banking data, such as the access code to an account, over the listing of the visited 
websites to the control of the keyboard and which keys have been pressed, as well as simple 
                                                          
76 cf. further Kaspersky (2008), pp. 68-69. 
77 cf. Kaspersky (2008), p. 69 and <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540521> 
retrieved 9 June, 2008. 
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screen shots, logs of active applications or other user actions.78 Trojan spies include a wide 
variety of spy programs created to track and save all activities of a computer user.  
The intentions behind this are, for instance that it is necessary for direct advertising to know 
the surfing customs of the user. Thus, these programs are designed to collect, store and 
transmit information about the visited websites. This is already invasive but not as intrusive as 
the gathering and transfer of passwords by a key logging device.  
 
To sum up, it can be said that Trojan horses, can be grouped according to the activities they 
exercise on the infected computer. Furthermore, these groups can be divided into further 
subgroups based on the seriousness of the damage they are inflicting. The harmfulness of 
Trojan Clickers, Downloaders, Droppers, Proxies and Notifiers is not that serious, since they 
not only support other malware but often carry out additional, more positive, functions79. The 
other programs mentioned above, on the other hand, have the potential to influence not only 
the computer as a machine but also the personal life of the user in a far more drastic way. 
Root kits, Backdoors, PSW Trojans, and especially Trojan Spies and ArcBombs can have far 
reaching consequences to the single user and its computer. They can cause great harm and 
damage to computers as they might be designed to destroy or alter all data. Apart from this 
surely unwelcome effect, which can end in massive financial loss, they have further the 
capability to ‘erase’ the existence of the user or at least their basis of life. With the help of 
sniffing and spying programs, criminals may obtain a huge amount of data, enabling them to 
become a great threat to people’s lives – the criminal is not only able to steal the victim’s 
money but also his identity.  
 
2.1.4.2 Keyloggers 
As previously mentioned, another possibility for hackers to spy on somebody is the usage of 
so-called key loggers. The term itself is neutral and describes simply the main function of the 
device’s respective program. Basically one is assuming a software tool, which was created to 
covertly observe as well as record all strokes on a keyboard done by the user of the computer. 
Although the vast majority of key loggers is software, some of them come in the form of a 
                                                          
78 cf. <http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540521> retrieved 9 June, 2008. 
79 As giving notice to the master that a computer was infected; cf. above at Trojan Notifiers.  
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physical apparatus. This fact needs to be taken into consideration because the two different 
tools can cause distinctive consequences. Another important fact in this context is that unlike 
most other malware, key loggers do not harm the computer system itself. Its only goal is to 
spy on the user which makes the threat different but not less dangerous.  
 
Once again, the discrepancy between a positive and a negative key logger lays in the intention 
of the user. Similar to other malware, the creators of early key loggers had nothing criminal in 
mind. On the contrary, their goal was to enhance security, especially data security, by storing 
all inputs made by the user, or they were driven by educational purposes. In the latter case, the 
instructor – by a look into the key logging transcript – was enabled, on one hand, to figure out 
what went wrong80 and on the other hand to help the user to correct his errors. Hence, the 
instructor can reproduce all the user’s operations and can present solutions for a better use and 
thereby enhance productivity. The good intentions, however, did not hinder criminals to use 
these freely available programs and devices in a law-breaking manner – as for instance, in 
order to steal passwords. Nevertheless once again, there is a very fine line between the 
positive and negative usage of key loggers.  
Legal soft- as well as hardware sold via the Internet or in customary stores is often advertised 
as a legitimate tool to investigate computer history, justifying that parents should be allowed 
to get knowledge about the online or simple computer habits of their children. Furthermore, 
network and especially company security are catchwords for vendors as it is possible to 
monitor the habits of the company’s employees. This can be seen as having the necessary 
control over one’s own resources such as the company laptop or computer network. Hence, 
the employer is able to see and control whether their employees behave in accordance with 
their employment contract. Another advertising trick for key logger promotion targets jealous 
and or mistrusting people telling them that it is possible to track their potentially cheating 
partner. This instance is legally a bit trickier and might be located already in a juristic gray 
area. These examples show that it is not so easy to solve the problem of key loggers and one 
must always – as it is in the field of legal studies – take the purpose and intention of the 
performer into account. It can be pointed out, however, that nowadays, key loggers are 
primarily applied with fraudulent, i.e. criminal intentions and that the broad majority of newly 
                                                          
80 e.g. whether it was a handling error caused by incorrect use or an error of the applied program itself.  
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created key loggers are written for these very purposes only81.  
As mentioned earlier and as the name key logger lets one assume, their applications are used 
for monitoring keystrokes and sending the gathered information to the creator of the malware. 
In general there are a several different types of key loggers:  
Firstly, key loggers on a target data processor are software programs and designed to operate 
on the targeted computer. These key loggers can be ‘kernel’82 or ‘hook’83 based. Secondly, 
there are hardware key loggers, which are small inline84 devices. These apparatuses are 
regularly placed somewhere in between the computer and the computer keyboard. Due to 
their size it is really hard to find them and often they stay undetected for long periods of time. 
Hardware key loggers’ advantage over a software one is that the hardware device is 
independent of the computers operating system. This means that it is not impairing other 
programs running on the computer. Thirdly, there are wireless key logger sniffers, which are 
created to gather transmitted information between a wireless input device and its receiver. The 
last group of key loggers is acoustic key loggers. They operate on a sound analyzing basis.  
 
Similar to other malicious programs, key loggers can be spread through different methods. 
For instance, they can be installed on a target computer when the user opens a file recently 
received via e-mail. Furthermore, the same can happen when the user is launching a file 
directly from an open-access directory on a P2P85 network. Another possibility for the secret 
installation of a key logger is if a web page script utilizes the weakness of a browser. In this 
case the key logger itself will be launched when a certain, infected website will be visited. 
Another possibility is that other installed malware is installing key loggers, if it was designed 
to do so.86 In this context it is crucial to mention that a lot of key loggers include the function 
of a root kit as well, empowering them to hide themselves and letting them become a Trojan 
horse program.87  
                                                          
81  cf. as well the section above about Trojan Spies, which track user activity, save the information to the 
user’s hard disk and then forward it to the author or ‘master’ of the Trojan 
82  These key loggers are located at the kernel level, hence practically invisible. If such a type is used, the key 
logger can function e.g. like a keyboard driver and thus gather all information which was type on the 
keyboard; cf. further <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1829> retrieved 11 June, 2008. 
83  These kind hook the keyboard with aid of the operating system; cf. further 
<http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1829> retrieved 11 June, 2008. 
84  cf. at <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1829> retrieved 11 June, 2008. 
85  Peer to Peer is a special kind of network, mostly these networks are just ad hoc. 
86  cf. above Trojan downloaders. 
87 cf. <http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=204791931> retrieved 10 June, 2008. 
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2.1.4.3 Computer Protection Software 
The technical properties of programs designed to prevent spying attacks, also known as anti-
spyware tools are of crucial importance in this context. Currently available programs are 
largely capable of detecting malicious software while the infected data is accessed (on-access-
scan). These same programs can also search for infected files stored on a computer while they 
are not being accessed. In order to become aware of infected files, anti-spyware programs use 
a variety of different strategies.  
 
On the one hand, anti-spyware programs rely on the signatures of a file which describes its 
function and type. Therefore it covers the name of the function, its parameters as well as the 
type of the file.88 Signatures can be seen as the fingerprints of files. Due to the fact that 
signatures also identify the functions of Trojan Horses etc, anti-spyware program are capable 
to find these files and notify the user of the computer, who then, in return becomes aware of 
the fact and is not accessing the file preventing the Trojan Horse from being activated. 
However, the big disadvantage of the signature based detection method is that infected files 
can only be found if the spyware's signature is already known to the anti-spyware software. 
The various anti-spyware producers update their database constantly, but due to the fast-paced 
development of computer programs and spyware, they are always a step behind. Hence, even 
if the anti-spyware scan is updated regularly, this does not guarantee absolute safety. Neither 
is signature based detection effective against newly created and therefore unknown spyware. 
The second approach to identify spyware is called heuristic detection. The typical behavior of 
spyware builds the basis for its detection. Heuristic detection is quicker than the detection by 
signature, as it includes the search for characteristic performance of software. If this method is 
applied, anti-spyware program notifies the user in case it identifies suspicious activities on a 
program. However, this approach does involve also a certain level of uncertainty because it 
only notifies suspicious behavior. Thus, the anti-spyware scan notifies the user even when it 
only assumes that something is spyware. This can lead to false alarms and therefore, the user 
may not take notifications seriously enough.  
 
                                                          
88 Note that depending on the programming language signatures contain once more and once less different 
information, such as the function's return, the return value, errors it can pass back or the type of its 
arguments.  
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2.1.4.4 Summary 
In summary, the first part of this chapter dealt with the main objective of this thesis and 
presented many technical tools and devices intended to be used for remote forensic 
investigations. More technical details will be presented when the information becomes crucial 
to the understanding of future topics. Moreover, it can be concluded that the most obvious 
technical device to conduct a remote forensic investigation is a Trojan Horse. However, as 
shown above, there is a variety of different options as well as various combinations of such 
possible. The question whether it is possible for anti-spyware programs to prevent remote 
forensic investigations cannot yet be answered definitely. It may, however, be assumed – 
based on the investigated technical properties and functional principles of these tools – that 
they are quite capable of doing so. 
 
2.2 Telecommunication 
2.2.1 Introduction 
We live in the age of telecommunication. The nature of telecommunication its properties and 
technical functionality as well as its integral part in RFI are of great importance in this 
context. In the following chapter the author will be discussing telecommunication devices, 
their commands and how gathered information is transmitted to a third party. It will also show 
the steps that have to be taken and the procedures that have to be followed in order to identify 
a potential suspect, prosecute the guilty and defend the innocent 
 
In order to protect their privacy, people all over the world have always tried to conceal 
relevant information. They invented special codes to communicate or locked their documents 
in a vault. Nowadays, as these documents are increasingly stored on electronic devices, the 
question of cryptology plays an important role. Not only is it of up-most importance for law 
enforcement agencies to crack the code in order to obtain data, but cryptography also offers a 
wide variety of techniques to ensure that the gathered evidence can be used in a criminal trial. 
Later on, the author will give a short overview on de- and encryption.  
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In general terms, telecommunication is nothing more than regular and customary 
communication. The relatively young term telecommunication etymologically consists of 
‘tele’, a Greek prefix meaning ‘distant’ or ‘far off’ and the Latin word ‘communicare’ 
meaning ‘to share’ or ‘speak’.89 On the one hand, the term ‘tele’ is a synonym for the medial 
opening of distances, thus a media bound communication with another place – independent 
where it is located. It is possible for various people to work simultaneously in the same media 
– for instance via computer-based action on a draft for a tenement – while they do not have to 
be at the same place. The pioneering technology for this was telegraphy.90 On the other hand, 
the modes of communication in general changed in the course of time. As B.P. Lathi 
illustrated it: ‘In the past, runners, carrier pigeons, drum beats and torches have carried 
messages. These schemes were adequate for the distances and ‘data rates’ of that age. In most 
parts of the world, these modes of communication have been superseded by electrical 
communication systems, which can transmit signals over much longer distances (even to 
distant planets and galaxies) and at the speed of light.’91 To sum up, it can be said that 
telecommunication is the transfer of information (communication) from a transmitter or 
sender to a receiver across a distance (tele).  
 
2.2.2 Types of Communication 
Communication can happen in a variety of ways: 
First of all, there is a divergence between synchronous and asynchronous communication and 
secondly, between one-way and two-way communication. Synchronous communication 
means that the information is transferred simultaneously from sender to receiver, for instance 
a face-to-face conversation, a phone call or a live broadcast. If the flow of information is not 
simultaneously it is called asynchronously. This means that the sender does not know whether 
it will get any feedback on the sent information from the receiver. An archiving media is 
needed do have asynchronous communication.92 The main distinction between synchronous 
and asynchronous communication is time. The difference between one-way and two-way 
communication, is simple the number of channels used for the purpose of communication. In 
                                                          
89 cf. as well New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd ed. (2005). 
90 Brandl (2001), p. 26. 
91 B.P., Lathi, Modern Digital and Analog Commuication Systems (1998), 3rd edtion, p. 1. 
92 Examples for this type of communication are books, journals, newspaper or e-mail; cf. further Brandl 
(2001), p. 26. 
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the former case information can only be transmitted in one pre-assigned direction. A two-way 
communication (or duplex communication)93 means that both ends can either send or receive 
information, thus the endpoints could change.94 An example for a typical one-way 
communication is for instance the mass media, such as radio, newspaper or TV where the 
person receiving the message has no means to respond. Face-to-face conversations or phone 
calls are not only synchronous but also two-way communications. The Internet as the most 
modern tool for communication can be used for both as one-way and two-way 
communication media. Customary ‘surfing’ on the Internet can be seen as the typical one-way 
form95 while Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)96 and chat applications are seen as classical 
two-way communications.97  
 
2.2.3 Communication Systems  
Modern communication systems consist of the following components: the source, the 
transmitter and a receiver. The source is the origin of a message, such as a human voice, a 
television picture or data. If the data is no electrical – such as human voice or a television 
picture – it must be converted by an input transducer into an electrical waveform referred to 
as the baseband signal or message signal. The transmitter, also known as the sender or 
source,98 modifies this signal for efficient transmission and a medium – the channel99 or 
circuit100 – such as a wire, coaxial cable or a radio link is used to send the output of the 
transmitter. At the other end of the ‘line’101 is a receiver102 processing the signals received 
from the channel. The receiver does so by decoding the signals’ modifications made by the 
transmitter and the channel. Thereafter, the receiver’s output is fed to the output transducer, 
                                                          
93 The term duplex is only used in communication between two parties or devices.  
94 A two-way communication can happen in two different forms: alternating which means that the endpoints 
of the communication cannot send and receive at the same time, and simultaneous which means that the 
just mentioned actions are possible, thus one can listen and talk at the same time.  
95 Despite the fact that, reasoned by the technical circumstances (i.e. the Internet Protocols), nowadays a two-
way communication is necessary. cf. further Brandl (2001), p. 27. 
96 Note that VOIP is not a communication rather than it is a protocol describing how communication works.  
97 Brandl (2001), pp. 26-27. 
98 Horak, Ray, Telecommunication and Data Communications Handbook (2007), p. 2. 
99 In formal standards terms, a channel is a means of one-way connection between transmitter and receiver, 
therefore, a one-way circuit or signal path. cf. for further clarification Horak (2007), p. 4.  
100 A circuit is a communication path, over an established medium between two or more points, form end to 
end, between transmitter and receiver. cf. Horak (2007), p. 2. 
101 cf. for further clarification Horak (2007), p. 3. 
102 The receiver, also known as the sink, is the target device, or destination device, that receives the 
information transfer. cf. further Horak (2007), p. 2. 
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which converts the electric signals into its original form – the message.103  
 
2.2.3.1 Analogue vs. Digital 
Electronic communications systems or better electronic transmission systems can further also 
be differentiated between digital and analogue. While in the analogue form of electronic 
communications, information is represented as a continuous electromagnetic waveform, 
digital communications involves modulation (i.e. changing) of this waveform. This is done to 
represent information in binary form (1s and 0s) through a series of blips or pulses of discrete 
values, as measured at precise points in time or intervals of time.104 Both transmission 
systems work but it is necessary that within an analogue system, all components have to 
operate in continuous-waveform (analogue) mode. The same is true for digital transmission 
systems which has to be digital from one end to the other. However, a network can consist of 
both systems requiring adoption in order to resolve the incompatibility. Both, analogue as 
well as digital communications systems have their advantages and appropriate applications.105  
 
2.2.3.2 The Internet – Circuit vs. Packet-Switched 
When speaking of the Internet and other related forms of communication, one has to mention 
that the modes of transmission from the originator to the receiver have changed dramatically 
over the last century. In the late nineteenth century, the traditional land line telephone system 
– the plain old telephone service (POTS) – involved only a permanent wired connection 
between two telephone instruments. This wired connection consisting of a twisted pair of 
wires (two wire circuit) – the telephone line – handled the signaling and the audio information 
at the same time. After more and more people wanted to be set up with a telephone it became 
increasingly inconvenient to connect every station set106 with one another and a solution had 
to be found. Initially manual switchboards and later on switching machines were 
                                                          
103 Lathi (1998), pp. 1-2. 
104 Horak (2007), p. 12. 
105 cf. for a detailed overview on the single advantage Horak (2007), p. 16. 
106 A telephone instrument is often called a station set. cf. Lathi (1998), p. 430. 
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established.107 The development moved on, new inventions were made and finally analogue 
communication was replaced by digital. The main difference between a regular phone call and 
a modern telecommunication via the Internet lies in a different mode of data transmission. 
While the transmission during a regular phone call is circuit-oriented – i.e. there is an ongoing 
stream of data108 – the transmission via the Internet is packet-oriented. This means that in the 
former case there is no buffering, neither with analogue nor digital technique.109  
 
Since circuit switching was far too inefficient and expensive for intensive computer 
communications a new solution had to be found, which packet switching was. In order to set 
up an interactive, asynchronous computer-to-computer communication, the US Advanced 
Research Project Agency (ARPA) network established ARPANET, the first deployed packet 
switching in 1971. The ARPANET and its successors, such as the Internet – using the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)110 – work by the transmission of 
data formed into packets and sent across a shared network.111 This means that a message or 
information is split into packets of data prior to the transmission and after this transformation 
they are handed over into the Internet, along with other information of other users.112 Each of 
these blocks of data is sent independently of each other through the net and arrives 
individually at the designated receiver. The receiver’s job is then to reassemble the packets in 
the right (original) order. The single packet – also known as cell – consists of an information 
part (payload) in the trunk and a navigation part as its header. The information part of the 
packet contains its origin, destination, length, etc.113 To sum up, packet-switched 
transmissions require routing control and packet assembly and disassembling.114  
 
When examining such a packet-transmission on an IP basis, it is clear that there is no actual 
connection at all between the two ‘communicating’ partners. The ‘senders’ direct IP packages 
                                                          
107 For a detailed overview on the development please cf. Lathi (1998), p. 430.  
108 Circuit switched: a fixed circuit is set up end to end and maintained during the period of use. cf. Lathi 
(1998), p. 368. 
109 Nölle, Jochen, Voice Over IP - Grundlagen, Protokolle, Migration (2005), 2rd edition, p. 35. 
110 The TCP/IP is not only essential for the functionality of the Internet, it serves also as basis for a number of 
developing high-speed packet networks optimized for voice, currently challenging the traditional circuit-
switched PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Networks) for dominance. For further information cf. Horak 
(2007), p. 34.  
111 Horak (2007), pp. 33-34. 
112 Ebner, Gerhard, Voice Over IP – Grundlagen, Einrichtungen und Konfiguration (2006), p. 3. 
113 Brandl (2001), p. 68. 
114 Lathi (1998), p. 368. 
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into the Internet without noticing whether and when their packages reach the receivers. This 
characteristic of IP networks can be compared to the distributional network of regular mail: If 
you post a letter at your local post office, you do not know if and when your letter will reach 
the designated receiver. Only when the originator takes further steps – for instance a phone 
call – he/she can be sure that the letter found its way. Which way the letter took, however, will 
remain uncertain – whether the letter was transported via lorry, airmail, ship or train is not 
sure. The same is true if the originator posts several letters. Hence, the originator will never 
know whether the letters arrive simultaneously or via the same way at the addressee.115 
 
2.3 Encryption and Decryption 
2.3.1 Introduction  
While the last chapter dealt with communication itself, this next chapter will focus on other 
vital aspects in this matter, such as confidentiality of sent messages.  
Since the Internet as such was established as a pure network for scientific and educational 
purposes, all participants (universities, scientists, etc) were glad to have such media to 
communicate with each other. Nobody was even thinking of potential threats, as we know 
them today. These threats, due to the millions of worldwide Internet users, can be divided into 
two subgroups, namely active and passive attacks:  
 
2.3.1.1 Active vs. Passive Attacks 
Passive attacks are in general quite hard to pull off, since it is difficult to access data of a 
phone line – as you have to tap the wire or open the circuit distribution box. It is, however, 
rather simple and less dangerous to access data on the Internet. For instance, within a LAN116 
packets are sent in a broadcast mode, meaning that everybody having access to this LAN can 
easily gain access to the sent information as well. Since the number of wireless LANs is 
                                                          
115 Example taken from Nölle (2005), pp. 36-37. 
116 Local Area Network: a computer network which covers a rather small physical area (group of buildings, an 
airport or just a home) – on the contrary to WAN's, Wide-Area Networks. 
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increasing rapidly, these problems have become a real threat.117 Active attacks, on the other 
hand, manipulate data accessible on, or packets sent via the Internet. This can be done using 
different techniques.118 Overall it can be said that, ever since communication has existed, 
people are looking for confidentiality and they have tried hard to achieve this goal. Neither 
the sender nor the receiver wants some uninvolved third person to have access to their 
messages. Therefore, various proceedings and techniques were established in order to keep 
secrets concealed.119  
 
2.3.1.2 Protection of Confidentiality  
In principal, three different measures on how to protect confidentiality could be adopted: 
organizational, physical, and cryptographic measures. An organizational measure is taken by a 
walk through the woods for the purpose of getting engaged, or to hand over a ‘confidential 
matter’ document to a reliable runner. Secondly, physical measures can be deployed in form 
of storing a document in a safe or sending a letter sealed. Thirdly, cryptographic measures can 
be used, which means that the message is distorted so that it appears completely absurd to an 
outsider.120  
 
2.3.1.3 Cryptography 
The scientific field dealing with confidentiality problems is called cryptology. Cryptology 
works on keeping secrets secret using codes. This brief introduction is imminent in order to 
understand why the legislator wants to empower its security agencies to conduct RFIs. The 
main reason for the establishment of this investigation method is for agencies to have direct 
access to a suspect’s computer/electronic device and to read its content. Only at the sender’s 
                                                          
117 According to press releases – cf. e.g. <http://www.openpr.de/news/111062/Mit-der-Chipsdose-im-WWW-
surfen.html> retrieved 10 July, 2009 – it is possible to follow all communications happening within a 
wireless LAN with via real simple means; cf. further Schwenk, Jörg, Sicherheit und Kryptographie im 
Internet – Von sicherer E-mail bis zu IP-Verschlüsselung (2005), 2nd edition, pp. 4 and 180-183. 
118 e.g. IP Spoofing, Port Scans, DNS Poisoning or Denial of Service Attacks; cf. for details Schwenk, (2005), 
p. 5. 
119 e.g., people used lemon juice to as ink to write a letter or they codified the message with a prior agreed 
code so that the receiver could read it. cf. further Beutelspacher, Albrecht et al, Kryptografie in Theorie und 
Praxis – Mathematischen Grundlagen für Elektronisches Geld, Internetsicherheit und Mobilfunk (2005), p. 
1. 
120 Beutelspacher, Albrecht et al, Moderne Verfahren der Kryptographie (2006), 6th edition, p. 1.  
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receiving device is the confident message readable because this is the place where the 
message is encrypted respectively decrypted. On the other hand, access to a suspect’s 
computer offers the option to gather the encrypting code etc.  
As it can be easily imagined, its first employment was for military and political purposes as 
well as for Secret Service matters. There are numerous cases known in ancient Greece and 
Rome, which dealt with the hiding and codifying of messages.121 However, it was not until 
the age of Renaissance that cryptology was further developed in Europe. Throughout history, 
there has always been a struggle between those who wanted to keep a message secret and 
those who wanted to crack the code of the messages intercepted.122  
 
The term cryptology is derived from the Greek words ‘κρυπτός, kryptos’ meaning ‘hidden’ or 
‘secret’ and ‘λογία, -logia’ meaning to ‘speak’ or ‘word’. Furthermore cryptology is divided 
into:  
cryptography – ‘γράφω, -grapho’ (‘write’) means the science of writing secret messages, or 
the science of mathematical lock and key 
 cryptoanalysis – the science/art of deciphering encrypted messages 
 steganography – the discipline of hiding information and 
 steganalysis123 
 
Steganography is intended to hide information, while cryptography encrypts it and therefore 
hides the meaning, but not the information itself. Hence, cryptography is overt secret writing, 
while steganography is covert secret writing.124 Today, cryptography has established itself as a 
mathematical sub-discipline, which is not astonishing, since mathematics is most suitable to 
deal with and solve cryptographic question.125  
 
                                                          
121 e.g., Julius Caesar used a simple system of substituting one letter for another to send secret messages to his 
generals. He used a cyclic movement of letters by a certain amount of places – e.g. they replace 'a' by 'd', 'b' 
by 'e' and so forth. This code is known as Ceasar-Chiffre. cf. further Curtin, Matt, Brute Force – Cracking 
the Data Encryption Standard (2005), p. 3 and Beutelspacher (2005), p. 13. 
122 Beutelspacher (2005), p. 1.; Wätjen, Dietmar, Kryptographie – Grundlagen, Algorithmen, Protokolle 
(2008), 2nd edition, p. 1.  
123 Salomon, David, Data Privacy and Security (2003), p. 4. 
124 Salomon (2003), p. 4. 
125 Beutelspacher (2005), p. 1. 
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Encrypted messages come along with a number of properties: 
 Confidentiality: only an authorized person can read an encrypted message. The 
authorized person is able to read the original message due to secret extra information 
(the ‘key’). 
 Authentication: It is distinguished between the authentication of the participants and 
that of the message/information. In the former case the participants confirm each 
other’s identity while in the latter the participants can confirm the origin and 
destination of the message. Authentication is needed to ensure that both, receiver and 
sender, are who they claim to be.126  
 Integrity: This means that the message cannot be altered or modified in any way, not 
while stored or in transit. Such incidents would be detected.127  
 No repudiation: The sender is unable to deny having sent the message.128  
 Anonymity: Encrypted messages can be used to conceal someone’s identity (either 
that of the sender or the receiver or even both) or to cover the fact that there was any 
form of communication between them.129  
 
Sounds like a good thing, doesn’t it? However, readers might ask themselves now, how does 
cryptography work and are there different methods and techniques to encrypt? The author will 
try to give a brief overview on the main and substantial ways. 
 
2.3.2 Symmetric Cryptography 
This is one of the oldest methods for secret communications and was already used by Julius 
Caesar in information exchanges with his generals. Symmetric cryptography requests that 
both, sender and receiver, know how do decrypt and encrypted messages, meaning that both 
have the same cryptographic key. In order to do so, it is necessary that they have contact with 
each other prior to the first secret communication because they have to exchange this 
cryptographic key. Symmetric cryptography is only (successfully) possible within bigger IT 
systems, because it requires a radial communication structure. This means that there is one big 
player in the middle having a lot of partners surrounding him. This center can provide its
                                                          
126 cf. Beutelspacher (2005), p. 2, and Salomon (2003), p. 212. 
127 Salomon (2003), p. 212. 
128 A send B a message. This message is formally binding, if B can proof to C afterwards that this message 
originates from A. cf. Beutelspacher (2005), p. 2. 
129 Beutelspacher (2005), p. 2. 
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 partners with their personal key, while keeping its slave key. Thereby both partners – i.e. the 
big player and his counterpart – are able to communicate with each other secretly, as they can 
encrypt their and decrypt the others message. The keys of both participants are identical in 
such proceeding.130 This principal is called Kerckhoffs principal131 which claims that the 
important part of a secret code is not the encryption algorithm but the cryptographic key.132 
Kerckhoffs himself put it this way: ‘One should assume that the opponent knows the method 
used to encipher data, and that security must lie in the choice of key. This does not necessarily 
imply that the method should be public, just that it is considered public during its creation.’133  
 
2.3.2.1 Algorithm 
The algorithm used in symmetric encryption of data can be divided into two subgroups, 
namely block cipher and stream cipher. Block cipher encrypts a message by breaking it up 
into small blocks (typically 64 bit), encrypting each single block individually and turning each 
block of plain text (plainblock) into a block of cipher text (cipher block) that has the same 
size.134 Examples for block ciphers are DES (Data Encryption Standard), its successor AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) and IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm). 
Contrary to this, stream cipher encrypts messages one bit a time. Therefore, a key-stream 
encodes the bits of a binary string one at a time, using a very simple rule. Stream ciphers are 
faster and easier to implement than block ciphers, especially in hardware. They are a natural 
choice in cases where the binary string has to be encrypted and transmitted at a constant 
rate.135 The prototype of all stream ciphers is the One-Time-Pad.136  
 
2.3.2.2 Hash Function  
Hash functions are used in symmetric cryptography137 in order to create non-manipulable 
                                                          
130 Buchmann, Johannes, Einführung in die Kryptographie (2003), 3rd edition, p. 61.  
131 Named after Dr. Auguste Kerckhoffs, a Dutch cryptographer and linguist. Also known as Kerckhoffs' 
assumption, axiom or law.  
132 Salomon (2003), p. ix. 
133 Auguste Kerckhoffs, as quoted in Salomon (2003), p. 15. 
134 Salomon (2003), p. 155. 
135 Salomon (2003), p. 134. 
136 cf. Beutelspacher (2005), p. 9. 
137 Schwenk (2006), p. 11. 
 51 
 
‘fingerprints’ of messages. A one-way138 hash function is a collision-free (minimized 
collisions)139 one-way function compressing messages into a hash table of a fixed length 
(normally either 128 or 160 bit). One-way hash functions are also called cryptographic hash 
functions. Such functions match exactly the function of a regular fingerprint: a fingerprint 
does not indicate who it belongs to but there are never two people having the same.140 Hash 
tables are intended to protect sets of data from being altered and therefore they have certain 
properties: 
 to compute the set of date out of a hash table (one-way function) 
 to find a set of data equal to another set of data (collisions-free, minimized collisions) 
and  
 to possess two sets of data having the same hash table. 
 
Practically impossible, in this context, means that it is not possible to calculate this, neither 
with today’s technology nor with computers in the near future, within a reasonable time 
frame.141 Hash functions are part of symmetric cryptography. 
Examples for the use of symmetric cryptography – or private key cryptography as it is also 
known – can be found widely in the telecommunication or pay TV business.142  
 
2.3.3 Asymmetric Cryptography 
Ever since cryptography was established it was proceeded on the assumption that it is 
necessary for the sender to have a secret key in order to communicate with the receiver. This 
key has to be equal to that of the receiver. Hence, the central problem occurring in symmetric 
cryptography was always the distribution and administration of the keys. It has always been 
necessary to exchange the key prior to a secret communication and therefore there has to be a 
secure channel for this exchange. Either a courier has to deliver the key or another solution 
has to be found. The problem is further increasing with the number of participants in the 
                                                          
138 cf. below. 
139 cf. Salomon (2003), p. 378. 
140 cf. further Beutelspacher (2006), p. 12.  
141 cf. Schwenk (2006), pp. 11-12 and Buchmann (2003), pp. 191-192.  
142 Schwenk (2006), p. 7. 
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communication network.143 For many years it was believed that there would not be any 
satisfactory solution to this dilemma.  
In the 1970s, however, there was a breakthrough – a simple and ideal solution was found 
which would become the basis for modern day cryptography:144 asymmetric cryptography. 
Asymmetric cryptography works, to put it simply, as follows: Every participant in a system 
gets a private key as well as a public key. As it can be easily imagined, only the private key is 
to be kept secret because it is the actual key. Contrary to the private key, the public key is 
accessible to as many people as possible. In order to send a secret message to a particular 
participant, it is necessary to figure out the receiver’s public key. This public key is then used 
to encrypt the message, which can than only be opened by the owner of the corresponding 
private key – i.e. the receiver. Thus, the sender encrypts a message and puts it into a publicly 
accessible mailbox, equivalent to the public key and it is only the owner of this particular 
mailbox who can open and therefore read the message.145 In asymmetric cryptography 
systems, there is no need for key exchange between the users because encryption keys are 
listed in public directories and although everybody may read those directories, they must be 
protected from unauthorized usage. 146  
Due to its mechanism, asymmetric cryptography is also called public-key cryptography. 
Examples for public-key algorithms are for instance the RSA proceeding,147 the first and still 
the most important encryption proceeding, ElGamal,148 DSS (Digital Signature Standard) and 
DSA.149 As mentioned, this technique is mainly used for secure communication over the 
Internet, especially for digital signatures.  
 
2.3.4 Summary  
Summarizing, it can be said that both, private and public-key cryptography have their 
                                                          
143 cf. for potential solutions to this problem Buchmann (2003), p. 133.  
144 Diffie/Hellmann established a public-key cryptography algorithm that generates a shared secret key 
between two entities after they publicly share some randomly-generated data; cf. Diffie, W. and Hellmann 
M. E.New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions of Information Theory, 6 November, 1976, 644-
654.  
145 cf. further Schwenk (2006), pp. 13-14; Buchmann (2003), pp. 133-162.  
146 cf. Buchmann, Johannes A., Introduction to Cryptography (2003), 2nd edition, p. 164.  
147 Named after its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman, cf. Buchmann (2003), p. 137.  
148 ElGamal, T., A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme based on Diskrete Logarithms. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-31 (1985), pp. 469-472; cf. Buchmann (2003), pp. 156-160.  
149 A special highly effective modification of ElGamal, invented by C. Schnorr and further developed by the 
NSA; cf. Schwenk (2006), pp. 17-18. 
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advantages as well as their disadvantages:150 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Private 
key 
 de- and encryption algorithms 
can be fast in soft- as well as in 
hardware 
 keys are relatively short 
 ciphers can be used to 
generate pseudo-random 
numbers, hash functions and 
digital signatures 
 ciphers can be combined to 
create very secure encryption 
 Key distribution problem 
 key must be replaced quite often 
 digital signature algorithms 
require large keys  
Public 
key 
 Solves the key-distribution 
problem 
 key does not have to be 
replaced often 
 in a large network, only a 
small number of keys needed 
 supports efficient digital 
signature algorithms 
 Encryption algorithms are much 
slower than symmetric ciphers 
 keys are much longer 
 
 
2.4 Examination of a Computer – Computer Forensics151 
2.4.1 Introduction  
To search the scene of a crime requires some special techniques, rules and principles.152 This 
is especially true if the collected evidence is needed later to identify suspects, prosecute the 
                                                          
150 cf. for further details Salomon (2003), p. 133. 
151 According to Judd Robins, computer forensics is simply the application of computer investigation and 
analysis techniques in the interests of determining potential legal evidence. Evidence might be sought in a 
wide range of computer crime or misuse, including but not limited to theft of trade secrets, theft of or 
destruction of intellectual property, and fraud. Computer specialists can draw on an array of methods for 
discovering data that resides in a computer system, or recovering deleted, encrypted, or damaged file 
information. Any or all of this information may help during discovery, depositions, or actual litigation; cf. 
<http://www.computerforensics.net/forensics.htm> retrieved 12 August, 2009.  
152 In this context the author wants to refer again to an e-mail received in August 2009 from the Austrian 
Ministry of the Interior confirming the existence and the use of guidelines; unfortunately, these guidelines 
are only for the internal use, hence not publicly available.  
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guilty and defend the innocent. Speaking in general terms, forensic science provides such 
principles and techniques facilitating investigations and prosecution of criminal offenses.  
During a criminal investigation, anything being applied to identify, recover or to analyze 
evidence is part of forensic science. This may include various scientific principles or scientific 
techniques. Which are used for:  
 to detect and examine fingerprints and DNA 
 to invest the authenticity or source of a document 
 to recover damaged or deleted data from a computer hard drive 
 to make copies of digital evidence  
 to collect digital data transmitted through networks 
 to verify that digital evidence has not been modified 
 to affirm that digital evidence is authentic 
 to define the unique characteristics of a piece of digital evidence153  
 
In court procedures there is no real difference between digital and physical evidence, except 
for the fact that the former is less tangible. Contrary to their physical counterpart, digital 
evidence is made of magnetic fields and electronic pulses that can be collected and analyzed 
using special tools and techniques.154 A computer is therefore the carrier of evidence and can 
be searched in order to get incriminating data. The range of information is broad. Due to the 
principles of how computers and the Internet work,155 there is always a massive amount of 
data and information involved. This information contains for instance data about an 
individual’s online activities, such as sites visited, duration and time frames of visits, etc. 
Based on the fact that every person who enters the Internet leaves ‘electronic footprints’ 
behind which the computer stores indefinitely, (not only, but also) the police is able to track 
everyone’s online activities. This principle, originally invented for the ‘real world’, is called 
                                                          
153 cf. Eoghan, Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer Crime – Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet 
(2000), p. 3.  
154 cf. Eoghan (2000), p. 4.  
155 When entering a webpage one is getting a copy of the data stored on a server, hence the view data such as 
images, text, sounds are copied from the host server to one own computer and stored there.  
 55 
 
Locard’s Exchange Principle156 and applies now to the Internet as well. This provides the 
investigation authorities a wide pool of potential evidence. Hence, in order to be 
acknowledged before a criminal court, digital evidence has to be gathered and obtained in a 
certain legal way using specially formulated procedures.  
 
Electronic information and data can be of great value for ongoing investigations and provide a 
huge amount of potential evidence. This data is mainly transmitted by and stored on a 
computer.157 Despite its electromagnetic property, however, when used as evidence, this data 
has the same properties and value as ordinary, physical evidence. Electronic evidence is latent 
in the same sense that fingerprints or DNA evidence is latent. The only difference is that one 
cannot see physically the content of the computer. Therefore, further tools, both hardware as 
well as software applications are necessary to obtain all possible evidence.  
 
The law enforcement agencies response to electronic evidence requires that its entire staff 
play a role. Throughout the whole investigation process, everybody involved has to do their 
due diligence and follow proper procedures so that the collected evidence will hold up in 
court. Starting with the recognition and collection of evidence to its preservation, 
transportation and storage, special proceedings and rules have to be followed in order to 
secure the evidence. Hence it is up most importance that all the staff of law enforcement 
agencies have to be trained and equipped adequately that they can handle electronic evidence 
properly. First of all, personnel have to be aware that, due to its very nature, electronic 
evidence is quite fragile. Data can be damaged, altered or even destroyed should the devices 
be handled inappropriately or if an examination was done in an improper manner. Therefore, 
it is necessary that there are special, universal standards – precautionary proceedings – in 
order to avoid these unwanted outcomes. There have to be rules of procedure to document, 
                                                          
156 Locard's Exchange Principle states that with contact between two items, there will be an exchange. cf. 
Thornton, John I, ‘The General Assumptions And Rationale Of Forensic Identification,’ in David L. 
Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, & Joseph Sanders (eds), Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law 
And Science Of Expert Testimony (1997), 2nd edition. 
157 For the ease, the author is just using the term computer – however firstly a computer consists of numerous 
physical components proceeding and storing information (CPUs – Central Processing Units or Memories) 
and secondly there are certainly more potential hardware components able to hold digital data. Such 
devices are e.g. Smart Cards, Dongles, Biometric Scanners, Answering Machines, Digital Cameras or 
diverse handheld devices such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) or Electronic Organizers. For an 
exhaustive list cf. United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, NJI 187736: Electronic 
Crime Scene Investigations: A Guide for First Responders, 2001, pp 12ff. 
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gather, preserve and investigate digital evidence. It should be kept in mind that any failure of 
following these rules may cause the evidence to be scrutinized in court. Furthermore, not only 
are these rules necessary to secure the usage of the evidence but also to avoid inaccurate 
conclusions.158  
 
The following chapter is going to give a brief overview on the current rules and regulations 
regarding the handling of digital evidence and the soft- as well as hardware equipment 
required by the law enforcement agencies to fulfill their task.  
 
2.4.2 Procedures established for Examinations 
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) was established on 20 October 
1995. The intention behind this network was for the directors of Western European 
governmental forensic laboratories to meet regularly in order to discuss topics of mutual 
interests. Another purpose of the ENFSI was to share knowledge, exchange experiences and 
come to common agreements in the field of forensic science. ENFSI is therefore recognized 
as an expert group in the field of forensic sciences. The number of members has increased 
steadily since the beginning, from 11 laboratories in 1993 to currently 56 laboratories in 32 
European countries.159 According to its homepage, ENFSI is recognized as a pre-eminent 
voice of forensic science worldwide by ensuring the quality of development and delivery of 
forensic science throughout Europe. One of the most important goals of this network is the 
encouragement of all ENFSI laboratories to comply with best practice and international 
standards for quality and competence assurance. These best practice manuals and glossaries of 
forensic terms are published regularly in several languages.160 In order to handle a wide area 
of forensic science, ENFSI maintains 16 specialized groups dealing with different tasks and 
topics.  
 
                                                          
158 ACPO Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (2005), Issue 4,p. 6.  
159 Member states are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine and the United Kingdom; cf. further the homepage of ENFSI at <http://www.enfsi.eu/index.php> 
retrieved 28 July, 2009. 
160 cf. further the homepage of ENFSI at <http://www.enfsi.eu/index.php> retrieved 28 July, 2009. 
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For this thesis, the interest of the, most relevant working group – the Forensic Information 
Technology (FIT) working group are ‘[a]ll the sciences and technical disciplines combined to 
allow the examination of material that contain information (computers, networks, electronic 
devices etc…) to assist an investigation and, eventually, present evidence for a trial.’161 This 
means that the group analysis computer data, the technical aspects of Internet investigations 
and the examination and search of electronic devices. The main goals of the FIT working 
group are the development and promotion of the discipline of forensic information technology 
in ENFSI member laboratories and the establishment of quality in all aspects of forensic 
information technology.162  
 
2.4.2.1 ENFSI Guidelines  
Currently the 5th version of the Guidelines for the best Practice in the Forensic Examination of 
Digital Technology is available, which was finally completed in Istanbul, Turkey during the 
3rd EAFS conference, in September 2003. This document was finally agreed upon at the 
ENFSI FIT working group meeting held in September 2005 at the Netherlands Forensic 
Institute. The document claims to be the ‘Quality Assurance “core” document’ and is intended 
‘to promote consistent and reliable evidence through the whole forensic process, from scene of 
crime to court. Amongst others, it is the policy of the Board that all member laboratories 
should achieve, or should be taking steps towards achieving, ISO Guide 25 compliant 
accreditation (e.g. EN 45001) for their laboratory testing activities’163 Furthermore, the 
guidelines contain requirements concerning qualifications, competence and experience of the 
personnel (points 3.3 and 3.4) and their training and assessment. Regarding the equipment 
used for the collection of evidence, the guidelines state that an equipment inventory needs to 
be established for all significant items used. Moreover, these tools have to be suitable for its 
purpose (point 3.7) in order to ensure the validation of the evidence. In regard to such a 
validation the guidelines state that: 
 there is an agreed requirement for the technique or procedure; 
 the critical aspects of the examination procedure have been identified and the 
limitations defined; 
                                                          
161 cf. <http://www.enfsi.eu/page.php?uid=62> retrieved 28 July, 2009.  
162 cf. <http://www.enfsi.eu/page.php?uid=62> retrieved 28 July, 2009.  
163 cf. point 3.1.1 of the Guidelines for the best Practice in the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. 
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 the methods, materials and equipment used have been demonstrated to be fit for 
purpose in meeting the requirement; 
 there are appropriate quality control and quality assurance procedures in place for 
monitoring performance; 
 the technique or procedure is fully documented; 
 the results obtained are reliable and reproducible. 
 the technique or procedure has been subjected to independent assessment and, where 
novel, peer review; 
 the individuals using the technique or procedure have demonstrated that they are 
competent to do so.164 
 
2.4.2.2 IOCE Principles  
The ENFSI guidelines refer mainly to a document set out by the International Organization on 
Computer Evidence165 (IOCE), which was appointed by the G8 to do so. These principles166 – 
the ‘G8 Proposed Principles For The Procedures Relating To Digital Evidence’ – were 
intended to ensure the harmonization of methods and practices among nations and guarantee 
the ability to use digital evidence collected by one country in the courts of another country: 
 
 When dealing with digital evidence, all of the general forensic and procedural 
principles must be applied.  
This rule speaks for itself and once again - the same regulations that apply for documentary or 
physical evidence are employed to digital as well. Since there is legally no difference between 
digital and physical information in the court of law, there is no difference in the gathering, 
usage and, finally, the presentation of it in court.  
 
 
                                                          
164 cf. point 3.8 of the Guidelines for the best Practice in the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. 
165 The IOCE is an NGO and provides an international forum for law enforcement agencies to exchange 
information concerning computer investigation and digital forensic issues. 
166 cf. G8 Proposed Principles For The Procedures Relating To Digital Evidence at 
<http://www.ioce.org/fileadmin/user_upload/2002/G8%20Proposed%20principles%20for%20forensic%20
evidence.pdf> or <http://www.ioce.org/core.php?ID=5> retrieved 5 August, 2009. 
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 Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should not change/alter that evidence.  
Operating systems, such as Windows or Unix, as well as other programs frequently alter 
and/or add to the contents of electronic storage. This often happens in the form of automatic 
updates, often without the user’s awareness. This is a very important fact because, in principal 
the onus is on the prosecution to show the court that the evidence produced had not been 
altered from the time when it was first taken into the possession of police to the time of 
presentation.167 Hence, data held on a storage media, such as a computer, digital camera or 
external hard drive, must not be changed or tampered with, since the prosecution may rely on 
it in court.  
 
 When it is necessary for a person to access original digital evidence, that person 
should be trained for the purpose.  
Generally, in compliance with the principles of computer based electronic evidence of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), image processing techniques should be applied 
wherever and whenever possible. This means that an image of the entire target device has to 
be made.168 As an alternative, it is also possible to copy parts or just a certain selection of files 
onto a different hard drive. This may be done if the amount of data exceeds the storage 
capability of the device used for the image. However, in certain circumstances it may be 
necessary to access original data. This involves investigative work on the computer/storage 
device which is the object of a search, as for example, if the computer or storage device is in 
use, at the time. In such circumstances only a trained person is allowed to do so. Furthermore, 
this person is required to give evidence, explaining the relevance and the implication of 
his/her actions.  
 
 All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage or transfer of digital evidence must 
be fully documented, preserved and available for review.  
All activities that involve digital evidence have to be done in accordance to the rules. They 
have to be objective in order to secure the integrity and continuity of the gathered evidence. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the investigative agency is able to demonstrate how evidence 
                                                          
167 ACPO (2005), p. 4.  
168 For details please cf. below.  
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was gathered or recovered and that the search procedure the evidence underwent was clear. 
Hence, it is further mandatory that an audit trail is created for each digital device in order to 
record all the processes applied to the evidence. Furthermore, as it is with scientific writing 
and work in general, everything has to be objective, which means that a third person – a peer 
– comes to the same conclusions if they apply the same process. It is essential that 
information is replicable.169  
 
 An individual is responsible for all actions taken with respect to digital evidence 
whilst the digital evidence is in their possession.  
If an individual has acknowledged responsibility for an item by signing an access log they are 
responsible for all actions taken in respect of that item until such time as it is returned to store 
or formally transferred to another individual.170 This means that evidence in the hand of any 
investigating individual becomes this person’s solemn responsibility. These individuals are 
mainly the officers in charge of the investigation – the case officers.  
 
 Any agency, which is responsible for seizing, accessing, storing or transferring digital 
evidence is responsible for compliance with these principles.  
This last regulation is mostly just the extension of the precedent one. It means that despite the 
huge responsibility for the individuals involved, their employers – i.e. the agency whom they 
are working for – play, nevertheless, important roles and are required to fulfill their 
obligations and duties.  
As already mentioned earlier, the author tried to obtain information from the Austrian 
Ministry of the Interior on how customary searches of electronic devices are conducted and 
whether there is a good handbook for officers. The existence and the use of guidelines were 
confirmed by e-mail in August 2009. Unfortunately, these guidelines are only for the internal 
use, hence not publicly available.  
 
                                                          
169 ACPO (2005), p. 4. 
170 cf. point 7.1.E of the Guidelines for the best Practice in the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. 
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2.4.2.3 Recovery Process 
Principles are good ways to standardize procedures. However, each procedure has its different 
stages within which certain steps have to be taken and methods have to be applied. The 
previously mentioned Association of Chief Police Officers divided the whole recovery 
process into four different stages while stating that these four may not be the limit. This 
‘Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ points out that there has to be 
a collection phase, an examination process, an analysis phase and a reporting stage.171  
 
2.4.2.3.1 Collection Phase 
The collection phase includes the search for, recognition of, collection of and the 
documentation of computer-based electronic evidence. This can include real-time and stored 
information that may be lost unless precautionary steps are taken at the scene. In detail, digital 
evidence has to be secured in accordance with the internal guidelines of the law enforcement 
agency. All configurations of hard- as well as software have to be documented. First the 
diverse storage devices have to be identified, then physical access to them must be obtained, 
and finally the devices need to be disconnected appropriately to prevent the destruction, 
damage or alteration of data. Whenever it is possible the examiner’s system should be used – 
thus, if possible the storage device should be removed in order to perform the acquisition. In 
cases where the examiners use their own storage device it has to be guaranteed that this 
device is forensically clean when acquiring the evidence. When collecting the evidence and 
transferring it to the examiner’s storage device, appropriate hard- and software tools are 
required.172  
 
2.4.2.3.2 Examination Processing 
This phase is intended to turn collected digital evidence into ‘physical’ evidence – digital data 
is made visible in order to show its origin as well as its significance. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
171 cf. ACPO (2005), p. 24; further US National Institute of Justice, NCJ 187736 (2001), pp. 2-3.  
172 For further details concerning the acquisition of evidence cf. United States Department of Justice, National 
Institute of Justice, NCJ 199404: Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 
(2004), pp. 11-15. Regarding the appropriate hardware and software cf. below.  
 62 
 
evidence in its entirety is presented and it is possible to see the full content and state of the 
evidence. This gives the investigation authority the opportunity to discover all information 
and to reduce it to the relevant level. The latter is important as not the total load of data and 
information gathered in the collection phase is often necessary in regard to criminal 
proceeding. In general, it is to say that different types of cases and media may require 
different methods of examination.173 A cornerstone of the investigation is the principle that 
examination should not be conducted on the original evidence whenever possible.  
An examination consists generally of two different steps. Firstly, the preparation of working 
directories on separate storage devices or media to which the evidence can be extracted and 
secondly, the actual extraction of the evidence itself. Regarding the latter it is to mention that 
there are two different forms of extraction, namely physical and logical. While a physical 
extraction identifies and recovers data across the entire physical drive without any regard to 
the file system, the logical one does so based on the installed operating system(s), file 
system(s), and/or application(s).174  
 
2.4.2.3.3 Analysis Phase 
Analysis is the interpretation of the gathered and examined (extracted) data and its 
arrangement in a logical and useful format.175 Thus, after examining the entire information 
and the potential reduction to the relevant content, the outcome is analyzed regarding its 
significance and value to the criminal case. The difference between an examination and an 
analysis is that the former is a technical task while the latter is rather a legal one. Thus, at both 
stages, experts trained for the particular work have to be employed. There are various 
different types of analysis, such as timeframe analysis, data hiding analysis, application and 
file analysis and ownership and possession analysis.176  
                                                          
173 US National Institute of Justice, NCJ 199404 (2004), p. 15.  
174 Physical extraction includes keyword searching, file carving and extraction of the partition table and 
unused space on the physical drive; logical extraction includes e.g. the extraction of password-protected, 
encrypted or compressed files, unallocated space and the recovery of deleted files; for further details cf. US 
National Institute of Justice, NCJ 199404 (2004), pp. 15-16. 
175 e.g.: where did it come from, how did it get there and what does it mean; cf. US National Institute of 
Justice, NCJ 199404 (2004), p. 15. 
176 US National Institute of Justice, NCJ 199404 (2004), pp. 16-18. 
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2.4.2.3.4 Reporting Phase 
In the final step, all acquired, relevant information has to be brought together and packed into 
a final report, which can be used later on for testimony purposes. Moreover, the seized 
material has to be secured and 1:1 copies (true copy) have to be made without altering the 
original data. Additionally, records of the steps undertaken have to be available in order to 
show that the investigation process was conducted in an appropriate, continuous manner and 
all principles were applied so that the integrity of the evidence is given. Furthermore, the 
origin of any evidence has to be documented. Therefore it is necessary to establish a registry 
for every object seized (hard drive, notebook, PDA etc) to establish an unbroken chain of 
evidence.177 
 
2.4.3 Hardware and Software Tools 
Today a broad range of different commercial as well as free tools and software exists, which 
are required in order to perform a forensic examination of a computer. These applications are 
assisted by certain hardware specifically designed for forensic purposes. The next chapter is 
dedicated to these tools, their usage and applications.  
 
2.4.3.1 Imaging 
As already stated earlier, it is always better not to examine the original evident rather than an 
exact copy of it. This principle is mainly due to cogency of proof – the original evidence was 
not altered or damaged in any way, data on it is still the original one. In order to make an 
exact ‘copy’ of the digital evidence, a procedure of imaging is applied. In order to improve the 
procedure applied when conducting a forensic image, special hardware is needed, i.e. cloning 
hardware. For instance, highly integrated solutions, such as the ‘Solo-3 Forensic Kit’ by 
Intelligent Computer Systems178 are able to create a perfect duplicate at a high speed (up to 3 
GB per min). These hardware devices clone the digital evidence to a storage device other than 
                                                          
177 Geschonneck (2006), p. 71. 
178 cf. <http://www.icsforensic.com/index.cfm/action/catalog.browse/category/Solo-
3%20Forensic/id_category/1442ada0-380f-483f-baa7-434305bb26e9> retrieved 10 August, 2009 
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the original. Thereby, the examiners of the law enforcement agency can do their investigative 
work on the clone and the original evidence does not get altered.  
 
2.4.3.2 Disk Wipers 
Before it is possible to create a forensic image it is mandatory to have clean – ‘sterile’ hard 
drives. As it can be easily imagined, that the demand for such ‘disinfected’ storage devices is 
quite high because of computers’ increased storage space. The tools used to ‘sterile’ drives are 
called disk wipers. A disk wiping enables you to ‘wipe’ the content of a drive, which means 
that it is not possible to restore the data the drive contained at a later date. Hence, this process 
is not just used for the deleting of contents or the formatting of the hard drive – it goes far 
beyond that, because the data cannot even be recovered with the help of data recovery 
software. Disk wiping technology replaces all binary data – i.e. 0’s and 1’s – with simple 0’s. 
More sophisticated algorithms, however, use a combination of 0’s and 1’s in order to fill up 
the storage device with random data. Wiping is necessary because the evidence later cloned 
on this storage device can be easily differentiated from the ‘background’ of the wiped disk.179  
 
2.4.3.3 Additional Ways to Avoid Modifications  
Avoiding unwanted modification of data is also possible through the use of read-only images. 
There are multiple ways to access a read-only mode, such as to mount the evidence volume in 
read-only mode. This form of investigation is often quite risky because if using the wrong 
options when mounting a storage device, data on it can be altered.180 Furthermore, it is to 
mention that read-only mounting to achieve the stated outcome is only possible in Unix based 
operation systems – Windows is always altering the disk of the computer.181 Hence, for 
Windows, the read-only mode is a rather useless way to avoid any unwanted alteration of 
data. The solution to this problem is write-blocking devices. These tools exist in the form of 
software as well as hardware. A software write blocker is something like a layer between the 
operation system and the device driver of the disk. Via such software applications all disk 
                                                          
179 cf. Böck, Benjamin, Computer-Forensik (2005), p. 102.  
180 Solomon, Michael G. et al, Computer Forensics Jump Start (2005), p. 68. 
181 cf. Böck (2005), p. 101.  
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access requests using standard operation systems calls are prevented from writing to the disk 
and thereby no alteration of a disk containing evidence is nearly 100% guaranteed.182 The 
hardware version of a block writer operates in the same manner. This device is plugged in 
between the computer controller and the physical disk and can thereby block any write 
requests. The operating concept of both are the same, however, some think and argue that the 
hardware device is more secure because of the physical connection blocking commands to the 
disk.183 There are currently different software and hardware writer blockers commercially 
available, covering a broad range of potential applications – from notebook drives to card 
readers. Software tools are for instance PDBlock184 or EnCase,185 hardware devices are for 
example DriveLock,186 UltraKit or UltraBlock.187  
 
2.4.3.4 Combinations – Tool Kits  
Software tools are often used in combinations. Law enforcement agencies as well as private 
investigators hired for the reproduction of deleted data build up their own tool kits in order to 
be able to fulfill their agenda. There are a huge number of commercial as well as free tool kits 
available and thus only a few can be presented briefly: 
 
2.4.3.4.1 EnCase 
This Windows based application, is the leading commercial forensic software and offers a 
wide range of features. Inter alia it is capable to produce forensic images as well as import 
classical – via dd188 - produced images. Due to this broad variety of usage option it is not 
surprising that EnCase is considered a standard tool for law enforcement agencies.189  
 
                                                          
182 cf. Solomon (2005), p. 69. 
183 cf. Solomon (2005), p. 69. 
184 By Digital Intelligence Inc, cf. <http://www.digitalintel.com> retrieved 11 August, 2009. 
185 By Guidance Software, cf. <http://www.guidancesoftware.com> retrieved 11 August, 2009.  
186 By Intelligent Computer Solutions, cf. <http://www.ics-iq.com/> retrieved 11 August, 2009. 
187 By Digital Intelligence Inc, cf. <http://www.digitalintel.com> retrieved 11 August, 2009.  
188 dd is a Unix tool originally intended to copy; in this context copy means to produce a clone; cf. further 
Geschonneck (2006), p. 124.  
189 For a detailed description cf. Geschonneck (2006),pp. 120-124.  
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2.4.3.4.2 AccessData Forensic Toolkit190 
AccessDate Forensic Toolkit is another commercial Windows based application for forensic 
examination of digital evidence. Besides the option of producing images, it offers some 
special features, such as a filter – the Known File Filter ( KFF) – which is able to exclude 
unimportant files or a browser capable to analyze 270 different file formats at once,191  
 
2.4.3.4.3 Freeware Tools 
Freeware tools as well as tools based on open-source-software192 initiatives and their features 
are very similar to each other. A good example for freeware is the toolkit F.I.R.E. - Forensic 
and Incident Response Environment.193  
 
Further potential tools for forensic examinations of electronic storage devices can be found in 
Böck, Benjamin, Computer-Forensik (2005) which offers a comprehensive, but not exclusive 
overview on tools and their function on page 110-5. 
 
2.5 Potential Procedures of RFI 
As shown above, the described electronic tools can be applied to get access to data and 
information on an electronic (storage) device. Furthermore, they can be used in a variety of 
other ways, as for instance in the destruction of data on hard drives or to copy and send this 
information to somebody, or to even operate a computer from a remote location. In order to 
show the way these tools can be deployed by security agencies, a practicable distinction has to 
be made before going into further detail: namely the differentiation between obtaining access 
to a computer network and the use of this access thereafter.  
                                                          
190 By AccessData, cf. <http://www.accessdata.com> retrieved 11 August, 2009. 
191 cf. Geschonneck (2006), pp. 128-129 as well as Böck (2005), pp. 104-105. 
192 The term open-source software describes computer software for which there is no copyright holder; hence 
the source code and other rights are not reserved for copyright rather than they are a public domain. 
Thereby the public – the single user – is allowed to use, change, improve and redistribute the software.  
193 cf. Geschonneck (2006), p. 111.  
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2.5.1 Obtaining Access 
2.5.1.1 General Aspects  
As already shown with the illustration of Trojan horses and other tools, there are numerous 
possibilities to get access to a computer system – thus to ‘hack’ into it. Regarding a potential 
use of key logging devices by law enforcement agencies it is to mention that, it is easier to 
install/remove and communicate194 with software. This is especially true in situations where 
the computer is connected to the Internet. The easiest way to install RFS is to do it remotely 
where the software tool is uploaded to the target computer and installed afterwards. While this 
sounds quite simple in theory, it is rather hard in reality because somebody has to be tricked 
into doing so. This means that somebody needs to be encouraged – significantly the target 
person – to download and install the piece of software to the target computer, or to open a file 
received via e-mail. This can be a quite difficult task as criminals are aware of the potential 
dangers of such behavior. In order to obtain access to the target computer, various methods 
ranging from backdoors and the use of technical gaps to social engineering as well as physical 
attacks can be applied by security agencies.  
 
First of all, and one of the most important tasks before access can be obtained is the 
identification of the target computer (system). This means that a certain computer has to be 
assigned to a specific person, i.e. the target person, or suspect etc. It is of utmost importance 
that one can proof without a reasonable doubt that the target person/suspect was/is using the 
RFI infiltrated computer system. Otherwise, any obtained evidence or information will be 
subject to objections and dismissal at a trial. Hence, the authenticity of the target person and 
the target computer has to be guaranteed in order to establish a powerful tool for the 
investigation authorities.195  
Besides the various methods to install the spying device on a target computer, each of these 
approaches demands a detailed analysis of the computer system before it can be applied. This 
                                                          
194 The software key logger can copy files over the internet and send it to its originator via e-mail, ftp or 
wireless transmission; cf. Arends, Max, Surveillance in the Post 11 September, 2001 Era (2008), pp. 48-49.  
195 This is especially important in cases where computers are sold or passed to other persons, as well as in 
cases where various person use a computer commonly. In such circumstances, there might be the 
requirement of further measures to be taken, in order to grant authencity; cf. as well BMJ/BMI (2008), pp. 
10 and 12. 
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means that the security agency has to investigate which computer operating system the target 
person is using, which software applications are installed etc. Due to the fact that remote 
forensic software will be installed onto the target computer, causing an alteration of the entire 
computer system, it is necessary to know these things in advance in order to guarantee an 
authentic documentation of all system as well as security altering measures.196 As a further 
consequence this implies that these alterations have to be documented repeatedly and that all 
consequence of an installation and use of an RFS to a computer system have to be known and 
calculable. The same is true for the removal of the software tools.197  
 
2.5.1.2 Methods to Obtain Access 
2.5.1.2.1 Backdoors198  
Backdoors are a method to gain access to electronic data that have not been used to their full 
potential. Theoretically, legislators could mandate software producers to establish such gaps 
in their programs. Furthermore, the legislator could then delegate that the keys to these 
backdoors be made available to security agencies if required for any kind of criminal 
investigation. This would give security agencies easy access and knowledge about the data 
stored and processed on a computer if it is connected to a communication network, such as 
the Internet.  
However, this promising approach assumes that software producers cooperate more or less 
with them. Not only the producers of computer operating system but also the various 
producers of antivirus/spying programs would be covert, and there is a certain risk that they 
won’t all collaborate.199 This is mainly due to the risk of bad reputation in the form of bad 
press which comes along with an even higher risk to get kicked out of the market by small 
startup companies, not collaborating and hence producing valuable, highly demanded anti spy 
products. Moreover, a circumvention of an obligation to cooperate is very likely, as anti spy 
                                                          
196 The reasons for this are similar to the already presented ones. There is an urgent need for authenticity and 
integrity as already presented in the context of decryption and encryption; cf. especially BMJ/BMI (2008), 
p. 10. 
197 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 11. 
198 Please do not mix up this expression with backdoor Trojans as mentioned above although the idea behind 
their common name is the same.  
199 cf. the article 'McAfee replies -- by denying any FBI contacts of any sort' at 
<http://www.politechbot.com/p-02839.html> retrieved 18 December, 2009.  
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programs can be easily up- as well as downloaded to/from the Internet. Besides this, there are 
a number of open source programs200 intended to counter spying devices, so that an obligation 
to cooperate with the security authorities will be rather useless.  
 
The use of backdoors in software applications would technically be the easiest but practically 
the most unlikely ones to work due to non-cooperation respectively easy ways to circumvent.  
 
2.5.1.2.2 Technical Gaps 
Technical gaps are a little bit more complicated than backdoors as they require more technical 
skill and knowledge to be put into usage. Gaps, on a very general basis, can be divided into 
host- and network based loopholes.  
Host based gaps stem from errors of a software application of a computer system. This form 
of a technical gap is one of the most frequent security gaps and appears often in the form of a 
buffer overflow/overrun. This anomaly means that a massive amount of data is stored in a 
buffer outside the allocated memory. The outcome can be that the additional data overwrites 
bordering memory and can thereby result in a breach of system security. In order to trigger 
such an overflow, inputs have to done which are designed to execute code or to alter the way a 
specific program operates. As Feiler points out, a direct attack on the target (suspects) 
computer is possible if this data processor operates services which are accessible via the 
Internet (hence the suspect uses a HTTP server). However, this does not work without the 
active participation of the suspects themselves.201 
 
Network-based gaps, on the other hand, are the results of network protocol errors. 
Unencrypted protocols are being used to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks on certain 
computers. This is possible as HTTP or FTP do not need any verification of the partners to the 
                                                          
200 cf. e.g. <http://de.clamwin.com/> retrieved 18 December, 2009. 
201 cf. Feiler, Lukas, 'Technische Aspekte der Online-Durchsuchung' in Zankl, Wolfgang (ed), Auf dem Weg 
zum Überwachungsstaat? Neue Überwachungsmaßnahmen im Bereich der Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologie (2009), p. 175; as well as especially Elias, Levy (aka Aleph One), Smashing 
the Stack for Fun and Profit (2006) presenting a step-by-step introduction to exploiting stack-based buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities at <http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=49&id=14#article> retrieved 18 
December, 2009. 
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communication. Thus, the security agency, or any other third person could not only influence 
the authenticity of a communication but also impair its integrity. In order to achieve this, 
security agencies can even employ Internet service providers (ISP) in assisting with the 
process. This practice is intended to be established in Germany. All German ISP have to 
install a ‘SINA Box’202 in their network, allowing the police to monitor all communications 
that are taking place. As Birk shows in his article, these boxes could easily be modified at a 
low cost, so that it is possible to implement a remote forensic software (RFS) tool into any 
download. Hence, the content, as well as the source of the download do not matter. Shareware 
or test versions of new software, the update of the PDF reader, all of these downloads could 
be infected with an RFS. Users would install software that have RFS included in their 
programs.203  
 
The application and use of technical gaps – especially that of network based gaps – would be 
a potential technical possibility to conduct remote forensic investigations. As illustrated, the 
advantages seem to be outweighing the disadvantages – the only thing missing now are legal 
provisions in order to apply them in real life in a legitimate manner.  
 
2.5.1.2.3 Social Engineering 
Social Engineering is a form of attacks, which uses human tendency to trust and help other 
people and attempts to obtain required, personal information in a very open way.204 Remote 
forensic investigations have several options to use social engineering in order to obtain 
necessary information. As already shown with Trojan horses or similar spyware, the big 
challenge for the investigating authorities is to trick the target person to run a certain file or to 
install a certain software tool etc.  
                                                          
202 cf. for further details in German: 
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/cln_155/ContentBSI/Themen/sina/Systembeschreibung/sysbeschreibung.html> 
retrieved 12 August, 2009. 
203 cf. Birk, Volker, Der Staat als Einbrecher: Heimliche Online-Durchsuchungen sind möglich (2007) at 
<http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/24/24766/1.html> retrieved 12 August, 2009. 
204 cf. in this respect e.g. <http://www.microsoft.com/protect/terms/socialengineering.aspx> or 
<http://www.sicherheitskultur.at/social_engineering.htm> retrieved 18 December, 2009; Examples for 
social engineering attacks are e.g. when persons call a help desks, tells them that they would be a client of 
this company and have forgotten their password or they phone a person working for company X, tell them 
that they would be the person in charge for the IT application of the service provider of X and need the 
password of the person called, in order to install some new programs on their company desktop.  
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Similar to these methods are phishing attacks, consisting of e.g. e-mails pretending to be from 
a certain person or company and which demands the exposure of certain private information. 
If such common mass e-mails are sent to a specific group of people,205 the attack is called 
spear phishing, which means that the attack is very target oriented and only meant to obtain 
information of this specific group.206 However, the risk of being detected is quite high.207  
 
In summary it can be said that social engineering works rather well for criminals trying to 
obtain other people’s private information and thereby obtaining access to e-mail or banking 
accounts. However, the author doubts that it will be neither a useful, nor a successful device 
to counter criminal activities as felons are very well equipped and on constant alert in this 
respect.208  
 
2.5.1.2.4 Physical Attacks 
In situations where computers are not connected to the Internet, an installation procedure as 
described above is rather ineffective. Hence, security agencies have to come up with another 
way to gain access to the data processor. In these cases physical access to the computer is 
often the only solution to overcome the problem. The RFS or similar kind of hardware could 
be attached between the keyboard and the computer itself.209 In other cases software programs 
could be installed by the police itself after having obtained physical access to the electronic 
device.210 
 
In this context, special attention has to be drawn to the use of hardware devices in RFI’s: One 
                                                          
205 e.g. the potential or known members of a criminal organization or a terrorist association.  
206 cf. as well <http://www.microsoft.com/canada/athome/security/email/spear_phishing.mspx> retrieved 18 
December, 2009.  
207 cf. Feiler (2009), p. 174. 
208 However, it could be argued that everybody – thus also criminals – know that fingerprints are used to 
convict criminals, hence most offenders wear hand gloves when committing burglar etc. On the other hand, 
fingerprints are still one of the most important source of evidence, meaning that not every criminal – even 
aware of this fact – does apply such conviction-preventive measures.  
209  Note regarding this that, as mentioned prior key loggers can be transformed into Trojan horse programs by 
simply including a root kit.  
210 After having passed the entrance door, it is regularly not really difficult to mount a computer and install a 
specific program on it. As Feiler points out, the big advantage for the investigating authority is that it 
knows exactly on which computer it is installed; cf. Feiler (2009), p. 174. 
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of the advantages of hardware devices are, that they cannot be detected by any anti-virus 
software. Having said that, it is already questionable whether – at this point in time - any anti-
virus software would cause problems for law enforcement agencies. Virus scans, for example, 
recognize and delete only those malware programs already known publicly. In order to 
become commonly known, malware programs have to be spread regularly all over the Internet 
and thus all over the planet. However, this is exactly the opposite the special law enforcement 
RFS is supposed to do – ‘malware’ programs are only intended to be used in certain 
circumstances and in order to attack certain and specific target computers. Therefore, the hope 
that an anti-virus program might help with the detection of RFS is rather minor.211 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the producers of these anti-virus programs had their 
customers’ protection in mind. Some big, anti-virus producing companies already announced 
that they would not cooperate with government agencies in this matter, while others are still 
sitting on the fence.212  
The major disadvantage of hardware devices in RFIs is that physical access to the computer 
has to be obtained in order to activate the RFS. Furthermore, in order to achieve the goal of 
the investigation, access should be obtained and installation should happen without the owner 
of the computer noticing. Not only is this a massive problem as to how-to handle this in praxi 
but also is it a legal issue in western countries.  
 
2.5.2 Exploiting an Obtained Access  
2.5.2.1 General Aspects  
After access to a computer is obtained by the law enforcement agency, an RFI can be 
conducted. In principal, it is to say that as soon as the investigating authority has obtained 
access to a computer, it can virtually execute all functions of this particular computer. This 
means than the agency is able to install further software, browse through the directories, or 
simply just monitor the processes going on. Other options are, for instance, the use of already 
installed web cams or microphones in order to see and hear what is going on nearby the user 
or the computer.  
                                                          
211 cf. Birk (2007). 
212 cf. for further details Arends (2008), p. 55 
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2.5.2.2 Encryption 
The most important aspect of encryption is the investigating authority’s ability to encrypt 
coded communication as well as to listen to decrypted phone calls over the Internet.213 As 
illustrated above, decryption as well as encryption processes are conducted on the technical 
device used for sending the communication as well as for storing purposes. As soon as the 
communication is coded, there is no possibility to figure out its meaning. Not until it is 
decoded at the receivers’, or reopened by the person with the right key, the intercepted 
communication/stored document does not make any sense. With the obtained access to a 
computer the investigation authorities have the ability to read decrypted written 
communication or listen to regularly decrypted phone calls. Another possibility would be to 
use a key logging device in order to figure out certain passwords or access or encrypting 
codes of the users.   
 
2.5.2.3 Manual vs. Automatic 
RFI can be conducted manually as well as automatically. Both methods offer some 
advantages as well as disadvantages: While the manual way seems to be more difficult and 
more expensive (due to the employment of more well trained people), it appears to be more 
effective. Officers observing computer activities or browsing through the directories and files 
of a computer are more flexible in doing so. However, they are slower doing so, than if this 
procedure would be conducted automatically. Another argument against manual conducting is 
that the risk of mistakes is higher due to human imperfection. An automatic search or 
surveillance done by specifically adapted software tools, on the other hand, can be conducted 
on a rather minimal budget with a smaller incentive to failures and oversights. The 
disadvantage, however, is, that software is not as flexible as humans and it operates strictly 
according to its code. Moreover, the gathered information has to still be evaluated afterward 
and while the officers employed in a manual RFI can separate the obvious important 
information from trash, software tools cannot do so and collect everything.  
                                                          
213 cf. in this respect inter alia as the report of the expert group on this topic at BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 49; 
furthermore Buermayer, Ulf, Die ‘Online-Durchsuchung’. Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen des versteckten 
hoheitlichen Zugriffs auf Computersysteme, HRRS 8/2007, p. 331; further Buermeyer, Technischer 
Hintergrund, p. 160 
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2.5.2.4 Integrity of Evidence 
Besides the already mentioned authenticity of information that an RFI provides for law 
enforcement agencies, the integrity of the accumulated evidence is another essentialia for the 
reliable conduction of an RFI. This means that the risk of any alteration of the obtained data 
by the transmission process is non-existent. As the expert report points out, there is need for 
technical measures to ensure that RFS components cannot be substituted by other software 
tools by the target person. If it would be possible to exchange the RFS for any other tool in 
order to transmit only non relevant data to the authorities, the use of an RFI is more than just 
questionable. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that the applied RFS is unique, respectively 
personalized to a high degree.214 As these requirements for an RFS seem reasonable and 
logical, it has to be kept in mind that they are also huge hurdles for any RFI. Due to the vast 
investigations and the, consequently, high costs prior to an RFI, its application is rather 
unlikely to happen frequently or extensively. Furthermore, an RFI does not only cost money 
but also time and it will take plenty of it to obtain all necessary information in order to 
guarantee all mentioned preconditions for reliable evidences.  
 
2.5.2.5 Communication Channels 
It is crucial that there are communication channels available, meaning that the investigating 
authority can either communicate with the target computer directly (remote use for search 
purposes) or receive the gathered data from the target computer. Without any communication 
channel, it is not possible – with the exception of a physical attack – to install RFS, thus the 
target computer has to be connected to a communication network such as the Internet.  
 
2.6 Conclusion and Summary 
The question, the author tried to answer in this chapter was, whether it was possible from a 
technical point of view to apply an RFI without the target person noticing it. Thus, it was 
analyzed whether this investigation method works in real life scenario. Therefore, the various 
technical aspects of a remote forensic investigation were illustrated, from the software tools to 
                                                          
214 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 13. 
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the technical principles telecommunication, encryption or anti-spyware programs are based 
on. In order to give a broad and a distinguished view on the entire issue of an RFI, the author 
divided the technical question into two parts, namely the obtaining of access to a computer 
and the exploitation of that access.  
The conclusion of the conducted research was that obtaining (remote) access is the most 
difficult agenda for the security agencies due to a number of reasons. First of all, an 
identification of the target computer systems implies potentially extreme time consuming 
investigations prior to the actual 'attack' on that computer. Second of all, any technical 
information regarding the computer system (computer operating program, anti-spyware 
programs etc) has to be gathered as well. Not until the security agency has obtained this data 
it is possible to create a target customized software program in order to start an RFI. However, 
why it is important that the software tool of the security agency is customized? Why should it 
not be possible to use already existing tools in order to start efficiently an RFI? Besides the 
general problems with authenticity as already discussed above, problems related to the 
installation of that software tool on the target computer might occur. This is closely connected 
with the previously presented working methods of anti-spyware programs, i.e. signature based 
or heuristic detection:  
 
In order to obtain access to a data processing device, different approaches can be applied. Due 
to the fact that they rely on a further (i.e. mainly the target) person to behave accordingly, 
backdoors and social engineering are rather unreliable methods.215 A more dependable method 
for security agencies is the use of a direct physical attack on the target computer in order to 
attach hardware, such as a key logging device. However, as presented above, the most 
promising approach in this regard is the use of technical gaps, especially if an RFI is 
conducted as intended by Germany with its 'SINA Box'216. Via the application of such man-in-
the-middle attacks, the security agencies could easily attach the RFS to any unencrypted 
message. When opening this message, generally the target person installs the RFS onto its 
computer and an RFI could be conducted.  
                                                          
215 Regarding backdoors security agencies depend on the programmers of anti-spyware programs, while they 
depend on the target person itself when social engineering is applied, as the person is tricked into an 
installation of RFS. 
216 Note that in this instance the security agencies do rely on third persons as well, however, there are far less 
Internet service providers than provider for anti-spyware program; the remaining problem is still – and will 
always be – the target person itself ! 
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However, even if the target person installs the RFS onto the intended computer, this does not 
guarantee a successful start of an RFI. Concerning the problematic factor of anti-spyware 
programs it is to point out that if the protection program on the target computer is signature 
based, customary available spyware is rather likely to be detected. Once spyware is identified 
as such, it is indexed into the databases of the various providers of protection programs. The 
signature of the spyware, thus its 'fingerprint', is used to find further related software. 
Instantly, the protection program issues a warning to the user of the attacked computer. Thus, 
when being notified that a certain program is infected with malware the 'RFS' will not be 
installed. Consequently, an RFI cannot be conducted. This indicates furthermore, that 
signature based detection is only working against already known mal- and spyware. On the 
contrary, it is rather ineffective against newly created and therefore unknown spyware.  
Heuristic detection relies on typical behavior of spyware and is therefore quicker than 
detection by signature. An anti-spyware program using this method notifies the user if it 
identifies suspicious activities of a program. However, precisely because heuristic detection 
rests upon typical behavior, there is always some uncertainty in the notifications of the user of 
a computer. Suspicious behavior of a program letting the anti-spyware scan assuming that this 
program is spyware can lead to false alarms. As a consequence and if notifications happen 
frequently (even in connection with user reliable and trustful programs) the user could take 
these alarms not seriously enough.  
From a technical point of view, this means that current anti-spyware programs are capable to 
firstly detect customary, already widely known spyware and secondly that spyware behaves 
according to its indented use. Hence, special computer programs customized to circumvent 
the principles of customary protection programs do have the potential to work properly for the 
security agencies. Thus, if such tools are employed in order to obtain access to a target 
computer, the likelihood of success (the secret installation of that tool) is quite high. 
Consequently the answer to the first question has to be that anti-spyware program only have a 
limited capacity to identify threats. For the author this is true with the understanding that 
security agencies work with customized software tools, taking into account the whole package 
of a target computer, i.e. software as well as hardware components a computer is working 
with respectively attached to a computer. However, it is not quite as simple as it sounds. 
Security agencies have to investigate certain criteria before they are able to create such a 
customized piece of spyware. All this investigative work includes a massive engagement of 
personnel, thus it is time-consuming and therefore also connected to high costs. Hence, 
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remote forensic investigations will not be on the daily agenda of security agencies and 
applications will be limited to mainly serious criminal activities.  
 
As a finishing touch for the technical chapter of this thesis, the author wants to point out 
another, more general aspect of malicious software employed by security agencies:  
Despite the fact that remote forensic tools and other surveillance devices operate like 
previously mentioned programs they are not malware. This improper connection from remote 
forensic software tools and surveillance devices is often made in public discussions and 
contributes immensely to the ongoing confusion in this matter. As these tools are intended to 
be employed by criminal investigation authorities, there has to be a legal basis for them in 
order to avoid massive complications. 
To the contrary of malware RFSs do not attack a computer since the intentions behind them 
are completely different. Therefore there are neither offenders nor victims. In the case of 
malware it is the intention of an attacker to operate covert as long as possible and there are no 
real goals behind such an attack. Side effects are not important, they are just taken into 
account because there is no liability. Destruction is intended. The removal of the tool does not 
take place. Once the damaging effects are in force, it is irrelevant whether the victim becomes 
aware of an attack or not.  Hence, the intention to keep it secret that these tools were installed 
on a computer are rather minor. Furthermore, it is completely unimportant who the victim is 
because malware does not focus on one single person. In addition, malware is not subject to 
correctness, scrutiny, or integrity. The attackers are not concerned whether they damage one 
certain computer or not because they are more interested in the widespread effects of their 
attack. The only goal is the general, malicious effect.  
Furthermore, it is to say that provisions last regularly longer than technical possibilities, hence 
it is necessary to draft the corresponding legislation carefully and comprehensively. In order 
to do this successfully and avoid to be continuously ‘out of date’, it is essential to formulate 
broad general principles in a clear and unambiguous for on how remote forensic tools have to 
be handled and used.217  
 
This brief technical part concerning RFIs offers a broad view of the whole matter and the 
reader needs to be well aware of the fact that everything mentioned above is essential and has 
                                                          
217 cf. also Posch (2008), p. 40 
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to be kept in mind when dealing with RFI from a legal perspective.  
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3 Legal Aspects of RFI 
This next part of this thesis provides an overview on the corresponding Austrian 
constitutional provision – including some fundamental rights and the question of 
proportionality, as well as the relationship between the Federation and the Federal States. It 
needs to be pointed out that this thesis only deals peripherally with human rights in regards to 
RFIs. Despite the fact that the thesis deals mainly with procedural provisions, a short section 
on substantive law is also included in order to illustrate the impact of criminal behavior, if an 
RFI would not be legalized for security agencies by the legal framework. Following the 
potential basic structure for an RFI as well as its possible implementation into the legal 
framework will be presented. In addition, the corresponding procedural provisions are 
illustrated in detail: On one hand, there will be an examination of specific regulations in the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and on the other hand, we will look at some of the 
potential provisions the Austrian Security Police Act has to offer.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
From a legal perspective, the Austrian Federal Ministers of Justice and of the Interior218 
pointed out that an RFI should be made legitimate but not for every instance. Restrictions are 
mainly due to the massive interference of an RFI and people’s right of privacy. In concreto, 
the Ministers stated that an RFI should only be conducted in situations where it is necessary 
for the solution of  
 a criminal act punishable by imprisonment for a minimum period of ten years, or of  
 a criminal organization or a terrorist association according to sections 278a and 278b 
of the Austrian Criminal Code, or  
 for the solution or prevention of a criminal act committed, or planed by such an 
organization or association.219  
                                                          
218 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich durch das Bundesministerium für Justiz und das 
Bundesministerium für Inneres hinsichtlich der Erweiterung des Ermittlungsinstrumentariums zur 
Bekämpfung schwerer, organisierter und terroristischer Kriminalitätsformen („Online-Durchsuchung’), 17 
October, 2007.  
219 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich, 17 October, 2007.  
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Furthermore, an RFI should be legally conducted if a person is strongly suspected of 
preparatory works in relation to a criminal organization or a terrorist association (sections 
278a, 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code).220  
 
Before going into any detail and identifying any potential legal basis for an RFI, an overview 
of the legal framework, starting with the Austrian Federal Constitution, is given.  
 
3.2 RFI and the Austrian Constitution  
3.2.1 State of Law 
In Austria, the state of law develops from different regulations of the Austrian Federal 
Constitutional Law. Important in this context is that the Austrian Constitution handles this 
principle in its formal sense.221 However, according to this perception, every country is its 
own state of law, because every country regulates and controls the behavior of its citizen by a 
coercive order, without the establishment of this order. Putting it differently, in its formal 
sense, a state of law means the exercising of state functions based on general provisions made 
known to the public and the possibility to guarantee these rules by a coercive order. No 
reference is made to the content of the provisions, indicating that it is imaginable that these 
rules contravene completely with the matters of fairness or humanity.222 A state of law in its 
substantive sense is intended to overcome this ‘unwanted’ outcome of a state of law in its 
formal sense and to establish a just and fair-minded order. This is connected closely to the 
value concepts of the society, which was taken as point of critique, as it can be used by 
various ideologies as a basis for the establishment of totalitarian systems.223  
 
                                                          
220 These requirements are similar to those established for the conducting of an Optical and Acoustical 
Surveillance of Persons, according to section 136 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; 
cf. below.  
221 cf. Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 165, p. 90; furthermore it is remarkable that this expression was coined 
especially by Hans Kelsen as quoted in Koja, Friedrich, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1993), p. 124. 
222 cf. Funk, Bernd Christian, Einführung in das österreichische Verfassungsrecht (2007), 13th edition, MN 
110, p. 99. 
223 cf. Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 165, p. 91; as well as Funk, explaining the difference between the two 
concepts by the example of a National Socialist state; cf. Funk (2007), MN 110, p. 100 
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The formal aspect of a state of law is the basis for the principle that the entire public 
administration shall be based on law. In this respect, Art 18 para. 1 of the Austrian Federal 
Constitutional Law guarantees that for every single act of the Austrian Federation there has to 
be a legal basis,224 thus that there is no legal vacuum.225 Not only does each state authority 
need to have a legal foundation for his/her action but he/she is also obliged to not infringe 
other provisions higher in the hierarchy (according to their derogatory power).226 This 
principle can also be summarized as the principle of the rule of law, which binds all federal as 
well as (provincial) authorities of the Laender (provinces) in the same way. Thus, if the act of 
an authority is against a more powerful provision in the hierarchy, it is unlawful. Furthermore, 
formal aspects can be found in the constitutional provisions dealing with the functions and 
organization of the judiciary, including the system of administrative courts, and constitutional 
jurisdiction. Concerning this, specific options of judicial control and review227 have to be 
highlighted. The substantive aspect is put forward particularly by the provisions on 
fundamental rights, referring mainly to the principle of freedom and dignity.228  
 
3.2.2 Fundamental and Human Rights 
The hierarchy the sources of law are subjected to include one very vital and indispensable 
one: human rights. Within the Austrian legal system, fundamental rights can be found in 
                                                          
224 Note in this context that this explicit bondage to law means that the legislator has to determine 
administrative activities; however, since Austria became a Member State of the European Union, 
administrative activities can also be based on EU law. Hence the expression of law in Art 18 of the Austrian 
Constitutional Law was extended by European Community Law; cf. Jabloner, Clemens, 
Anwendungsvorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, in ÖJZ 1995, pp. 921 et 
seq.as well as VwSlg 15422 A/2000.  
225 however, there are exceptions – Art. 130 para. 2 governs that no illegality exists where legislation forbears 
from the establishment of a binding rule on an administrative authority’s conduct, leaving the determination 
of such conduct to the authority itself, and the authority has made use of this discretion in the spirit of the 
law. Moreover, there is also an exemption in foreign politics.  
226 The hierarchy of the sources of law (structure of the legal system) in Austria is as follows (top-down): 1. 
Guiding principles of the federal constitution, 2. Primary and secondary Community law, 3. ‘Ordinary’ 
federal constitutional law, 4. Federal legislation, 5. Regulations, 6. Orders; The more difficult legislative 
procedure gives the constitutional law greater durability. A federal constitutional provision thus normally 
requires a majority of two thirds of the votes in the National Assembly, with at least half of the members 
being present. Additionally, the provision produced in this manner must be expressly designated as a 
‘constitutional law’ or ‘constitutional provision’. A valid resolution on federal legal provisions in the 
National Assembly, on the other hand, requires the presence of at least one third of the members and an 
absolute majority of the votes cast. For further details cf. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_aus_en.htm> retrieved 23 October, 2009. 
227 according to Art 130 as well as Art 144 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law, the Constitutional as 
well as the Administration Court are empowered to review legislative as well as administrative acts.  
228 cf. Funk (2007), MN 111, p. 101. 
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various forms. For instance, fundamental provisions were incorporated in the Basic Law of 21 
December 1867 on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender, the Federal 
Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data or the Federal Constitutional Law. Further 
important sources of human rights are state treaties,229 or international treaties and 
convention230 ratified and thus applicable in Austria. In addition, Austria is a member of the 
Council of Europe and has signed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) in 1957. Concerning this 
Convention it is to note that numerous provisions in the Austrian legal system refer directly 
to, or are interpreted in the light of this international convention. Moreover, there is already a 
wide and detailed constant jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights231 which has 
to be taken into account as well. 
 
In general, an RFI constitutes a serious interference with fundamental freedoms and rights, 
more specifically with the fundamental rights of data protection, the protection of privacy232 
as well as householder’s rights.233 Moreover, if an RFI is used for surveillance purposes there 
are also interferences with the telecommunications secrecy234 and the freedom of 
communication.235 Thus, fundamental procedural rights can be infringed, such as the right to a 
fair trial236 etc, as well as an RFI can have proprietary outcomes, such as a damage of data and 
the corresponding right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions.237  
                                                          
229 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria 1920 or the Treaty for the re-
establishment of an independent and democratic Austria 1955. 
230 e.g. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; or the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
231 the court was established under the ECHR in order to monitor respect of human rights by states. For further 
information cf. the website of the court at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/Introduction/Information+documents/> retrieved 
23 October, 2009.  
232 Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
233 Law of 27 October, 1862 on Protection of the Rights of the Home, Federal Law Gazette No. 88/1862 as 
amended by: Federal Law Gazette No. 422/1974.  
234  cf. as well BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, maxim no. 3 referring to Art 10 
para. 1 Basic Law for the Republic of Germany (German: Grundgesetz). 
235 Art 10a Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender 1867; note in this 
context that not until the case of Klass and others v. Germany of 6 September, 1978, the European Court of 
Human Rights did not acknowledge Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as basis of a human right telecommunication secrecy.  
236 Art 6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
237 Art 1, Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
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Based on these fundamental, personal rights, the German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof 
established a ruling guaranteeing cardinal rights to confidentiality and integrity of 
informational systems.238 As the report of the expert group239 concerning the matter of RFI 
points out precisely, this ruling and this view of the judges can neither be transferred directly 
into the Austrian legal system nor does this ruling have any implications on the Austrian 
legislation. However, the German ruling has provided Austria with more substance in the 
ongoing discussion on RFIs and it assists as an orientation due to the fact that the 
constitutional granted fundamental rights in Austria are established similar to those in 
Germany. Primarily, it is argued that a general right similar to the newly established one in 
Germany could also be justified by the current constitutional situation Austria,240 as there are 
similarities in respect to an interference with fundamental/human rights and the correlating 
obligations of the State.241  
 
There is a lot of literature242 about the aspects of human/fundamental rights already available 
and therefore, this thesis will not go into any further details but just raise awareness in the 
respective chapters. There will be only references to the provision and some general 
statements regarding these rights. In addition, a short presentation on the reservation of 
statuary powers will be given subsequently.  
 
                                                          
238 cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, para. 201 referring to Art 2 para. 1 in 
conjunction with Art 1 para. 1 Basic Law for the Republic of Germany (German: Grundgesetz); Art 1 
German Grundgesetz reads: 'Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty 
of all state authority; whereas Art 2 para. 1 reads every person shall have the right to free development of 
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or 
the moral law. cf. official translation at <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf> retrieved 16 
December, 2009.  
239 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 64. 
240 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 64. 
241 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 65. 
242 cf. e.g. Rädler, Raphael, Die verdeckte Online-Durchsuchung als strafprozessuale Ermittlungsmaßnahme in 
Deutschland und Österreich (2009); Gudermann, Anne, Online-Durchsuchung im Lichte des 
Verfassungsrechts (2010); Buermayer, Ulf, Die „Online-Durchsuchung’ Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen des 
versteckten hoheitlichen Zugriffs auf Computersysteme, HRRS 8/2007; Schantz, Peter, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme von „Online-Durchsuchungen“, KritV 2007, 310, Sachs, Michael, Krings, 
Thomas, Das neue „Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität 
informationstechnischer Systeme“, JuS 2008, 481; Rössel, Markus, Online-Durchsuchung vs. PC-
Grundrecht, in ITRB, 2008, 75; Wilhelm, Georg, Online-Durchsuchung nur über richterlichen Befehl, 
ecolex 2008, 293 or Regenfelder, Wolfgang, Ermittlungsmaßnahmen bei neuen Informationstechnologien 
im Spannungsverhältnis zum Grundrechtsschutz (2008) 
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3.2.3 Reservation of Statuary Powers and the Principle of Proportionality 
Generally speaking, an interference with fundamental freedoms caused by authorities is only 
possible under limited circumstances. This means nothing else than fundamental rights do not 
always prevail. In regard to the most constitutional granted rights there is a reservation of 
statuary powers, meaning that federal legislation (i.e. ordinary law) can – if it is empowered 
explicitly by the Constitution – modify or limit a certain fundamental right. This method gives 
the legislator a margin in dealing with rights of the individual and the interests of the general 
public, if these interests differ. However, this indistinctness is not intended to lead to an 
extension of interference possibilities rather than the authorities’ competences to infringe 
legally human rights are to be interpreted principally in a tight way.243 The main problem in 
this context is – not surprisingly – how far the empowerment of the legislator reaches, 
because only if the legislator exceeds the margin established by the reservation, the legitimacy 
of an interference with fundamental rights is against the Constitution.244 As Walter/Mayer 
point out, there are two different forms of reservations, namely formal (general) reservations 
and substantive (special) reservations. The distinguishing aspect is that while the former does 
only look at the form of the legislative act (thus it has to be an ordinary law), the latter 
evaluates its content as well.245  
 
In order to illustrate such reservations, the author is presenting a practical example of how this 
may work in the real world. Since the importance of the right to privacy and an interference of 
such for this thesis is of utmost importance, a brief summary will be given. 
 
3.2.3.1 Example: Right to Privacy 
According to Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. These four different guarantees constitute the right to privacy and protect in 
this sense the private sphere of any citizen from illegal or arbitrary interferences of state 
                                                          
243 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 65; note in this context that there are constitutional precepts in regard to specialty and 
a non-extension of coercive measures; furthermore the principles of legality and the prohibition of analogy 
in criminal law have to mentioned at this stage as well.  
244 cf. Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 1339, p. 629. 
245 cf. Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 1339, p. 629. 
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authorities. Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
protects private life. The term of privacy is quite broad which makes it hard to define 
precisely and even causes overlapping of the different rights granted by Art 8. Despite the fact 
that all four guaranteed rights have to be distinguished clearly, even if their lines are often 
blurry, it does not mean that they have to be seen isolated from each other. Moreover, these 
four are already linked together by the common provision of Art 8 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and refer to each other contentiously 
as they are just different characteristics of the same – namely private life as such. 
Furthermore, this means that interferences can constitute a multiple interference with Art 8 so 
that the rights granted by it do not exclude each other. In addition it is to mention that some 
rights are only directed at human beings, while other rights are also granted to legal persons. 
For instance, only a human being does have the right to a family life by definition, whereas 
legal persons do also have a right to a private life246 or enjoy protection of their 
correspondence.  
 
Substantive reservations, such as that of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, allow interferences of the state with fundamental or human 
rights. The precondition for this is that the interferences are in accordance with the law and 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country. Moreover, it is allowed when it is necessary for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.247 This means that an interference with the right to 
privacy is legitimate if certain requirements are recognized.  
Concerning Art 8 para. 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms establishing this option of legitimate interference, it is to say that especially the 
term ‘necessary’ is of great importance. According to the European Court on Human Rights, 
‘the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ means that, to be compatible with the 
Convention, the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and be 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.248 Such measures could be legitimate if they 
                                                          
246 e.g. in respect to data protection etc. 
247 Art 8 para. 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; but cf. as well in 
this respect Art 9 para. 2, Art 10 para. 2 etc Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
248 cf. Case of Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March, 1983 (Application no. 
5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75), para. 97 (c). 
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are aimed to counter or prosecute serious forms of criminal activities constituting a major 
threat to the fundamentals of a State.249  
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the adjective ‘necessary’ involves the principle of 
proportionality.250 This means that the intensity of interference is compared with the interest 
of the public – both are set into relation – in order to figure out whether interference is 
allowed or not. This means that the more serious the interference, the higher the 
requirements251 that have to be fulfilled. Moreover, there is another condition which has to be 
taken into account when it comes to the principle of proportionality: The application of a 
coercive measure has to be optimized meaning that state authorities are only allowed to apply 
a method if there is no other less harsh method leading to the same results.252 
 
As it can be seen, there is a strong focus on the principle of proportionality when it comes to 
coercive means. The principle of proportionality is essential for the constitutional legitimacy 
of interferences with fundamental rights. It plays a vital role, limiting and binding authorities 
exerting their competences on the one hand, and granting certain rights and strengthening the 
position of the affected person, on the other.  
As a cornerstone of the Austrian Constitution, the principle emerged out of the jurisdiction 
and of doctrinal development. It is seen as general objectivity, as an element of equality 
before the law253 and additionally it does have elements of the freedom from 
                                                          
249 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 68. 
250 cf. Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December, 1976 (Application no. 5493/72), 
para. 58.  
251 This means nothing else than that the preconditions which have to be fulfilled are more strict – thus a 
serious interference requires a serious crime to be investigated, e.g. homicide etc; cf. in this respect as well 
the explanation in the chapter of this thesis on surveillance of data and communication. 
252 In the context of an RFI it seems or at least it could be argued that a covert investigation constitutes as less 
harsh interference with the rights of the affected person, as nobody gets knowledge of the investigation, 
nothing is taken away, no physical items have to be secured/seized etc. However, as the report of the expert 
group points out precisely there is a different benchmark applied in these circumstances and a covert 
investigation is always seen as more intensive than an open investigation; cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 69. 
253 Art 7 para. 1 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law reads: All nationals (Austrian citizens) are equal 
before the law. Privileges based upon birth, sex, estate, class or religion are excluded. No one shall be 
discriminated against because of his disability; The Republic (Federation, Laender and municipalities) 
commits itself to ensuring the equal treatment of disabled and non-disabled persons in all spheres of every-
day life; Similar to this the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Art 1: All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.  
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discrimination.254 In this respect it is to note moreover, that, as the Austrian Constitutional 
Court ruled,255 an evaluation of proportionality – thus to see whether the differences lay is a 
matter of fact – has to take into account the social development.256 Proportionality is always 
accompanied by the principle of appropriateness,257 indicating that acts, whether they are of 
legislative or executive nature,258 firstly have to be justified objectively by the public interest. 
Secondly, they have to be capable to fulfill the intended aim, and thirdly, they have to be 
modest, which includes the prohibition of excess.  
 
Illustrating a formula for the evaluation whether an interference with human rights is legal or 
not, it is to say that there has to be an examination of whether  
 the actual activity fall into the protected area of the fundamental right 
 there is an interference with this protected area of the fundamental right 
 there is a legal basis for the interference 
 there is a public interest in pursuit 
 the activity is appropriate to protect this certain interest 
 the coercive measure is proportional259 
 
What does this mean for the legitimacy of a remote forensic investigation? Frankly, nothing 
                                                          
254 cf. Art 14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stating that [t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status; furthermore the attempts by the 
European Communities in Art 12 EC Treaty, Art 13 Treaty of Amsterdam, or the Council Directives no. 
2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; no. 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation; and no. 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women 
in the access to and supply of goods and services; as well as Directive 2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.  
255 cf. the ruling in regard to the entitlement to a pension of widowers in VfSlg 8871/1980 or the decision in 
respect to an unequal pensionable age in VfSlg 12567/1990.  
256 Meaning that provisions seen originally as compliant with equality alter in a way so that they become 
inconsistent with the constitution (they become invalid); this is especially true in regard to the alteration of 
the social role model of men and women. 
257 As Funk points out, these maxims were developed by the recent jurisdiction of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court and have limited to a large extend the frame for the Austrian legislator as well as they abolished 
numerous constraints; cf. Funk (2007), MN 412, p. 351; cf. furthermore, BMJ/BMI (2008), pp. 68-69 
stating that appropriateness means the technical capability to conduct an RFI in an accurate way. 
258 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 65. 
259 cf. Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 1343, p. 633; for further details in respect to the principle of proportionality 
please cf. below, the chapter of this thesis on the surveillance of data and communication.  
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much, as it is nothing else than a coercive means and has to simply fulfill the criteria 
mentioned above. Thus, from a general point of view, if public interest is prevailing over the 
interest of a suspect – i.e. the suspect’s right to privacy – the method could be used in 
situations when all the other preconditions are also given.260  
 
3.2.4 Federation vs. Federal States (Laender) 
Due to the fact that an RFI can be established for the three different purposes and that it faces 
the requirements pointed out by the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior as illustrated 
above, the conducting of an RFI is primarily for the solution and only secondly for the 
prevention of criminal acts. According to the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law there are 
two possible basis for an RFI to be implemented successfully in order to empower the 
security agencies to conduct an RFI: the fields of criminal matters, dealing with the solution 
of a crime and security police, handling the maintenance of security.261  
Due to the already mentioned federal structure of Austria involving a division of competences 
between the federal States (Laender) and the Federation as such, it is mandatory to have a 
look who is appointed to govern this matter. In general, the division of competences in Austria 
among the different players is regulated by Art 10 to Art 15 of the Austrian Federal 
Constitutional Law.262  
 First of all there is Art 10 para. 1 no. 6 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law 
stating that the Federation has the power of legislation and execution in criminal law, 
meaning besides substantive also procedural matters in the field of criminal law.263  
 Second of all, Art 10 para. 1 no. 7 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law deals 
with the maintenance of peace, order and security including the extension of primary 
assistance in general.  
                                                          
260 Hence only for the solution or prevention of certain serious crimes (punishable by imprisonment for a 
minimum period of ten years), or targeted against criminal organizations or terrorist associations.  
261 Regarding the difference please cf. below.  
262 In order to interpret these provisions several different 'theories' were established, such as the theory of 
fossilization the theory of point of view (German: Gesichtspunkttheorie), or the theory of allowance; cf. 
Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 295-9, pp. 173-177. 
263 cf. for further clarification, the principle of adhesion concerning administrative proceedings and especially 
in respect to penal provision in administrative law, Walter, Mayer (2007), MN 259, pp. 151-152; as well as 
Mayer, Heinz, Das Österreichische Bundes-Verfassungsrecht, Kurzkommentar (2004), 4th edition, p. 32. 
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This means nothing else than the Federation is in charge for legislative acts, the performance 
in the field of criminal law and for the maintenance of inter alia security. However, that is not 
the whole truth because the Federation is not just competent in these fields, it is also liable for 
the functioning of criminal justice and the preservation of stability, order and security.  
 
The Austrian legislator’s intention is now to introduce into this framework of provisions the 
already described method of an RFI. Due to the fact that– the Federation is in charge for all 
legislative acts in this matter, the legislator could do one of two things: Firstly, it could amend 
federal codes, or secondly it could initiate a new Act in order to establish this new 
investigative method. Generally speaking, there is no difference in a qualitative sense between 
these two law-making procedures. The only thing the legislator has to do is to find and define 
the ‘right’ code into which the new provisions would fit the best. In regard to the actual 
intention of the Austrian government of implementing this method into the legal framework 
and due to the intended empowerment of law enforcement and police agencies, there are only 
two codes potentially qualified to host the new regulations, i.e. the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the Austrian Security Police Act. 
 
3.2.5 Criminal Police vs. Public Security Police  
For comprehension purposes a clarification has to be made at this stage: before illustrating the 
mentioned legal documents, the Austrian system of security agencies aka police has to be 
explained in some detail.  
 
The common use of the term ‘police’ can generally mean two different things, namely police 
in a functional or in an organizational sense. These two meanings refer in the first instance to 
the task of the averting of dangers through the exercise of direct administrative power and 
compulsion264 and in the second instance to police as all agencies and officers occupied with 
this task and consequently labeled as police by the Austrian legislator.265 Police, no matter 
which task it fulfills, is always carried out by the security agencies. This means that the 
                                                          
264 according to Art 129a Austiran Federal Constitutional Law.  
265 Wiederin, Ewald, Einführung in das Sicherheitspolizeirecht (1998), MN 71-85, pp. 16-19. 
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security agencies are dealing with the tasks of the police in the respective area of law.266  
 
When it comes to criminal law, criminal police, according to section 18 para. 1 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure, is the authority exercising duties of criminal justice especially in 
regards to the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts. Section 18 para. 2 defines 
furthermore the criminal police in its organizational sense stating that the tasks of the criminal 
police are carried out by the security authorities.267 Criminal police and its corresponding 
regional empowerment is governed by the Austrian Security Police Act. The specific 
empowerment and tasks delegated to the security agencies by the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure are carried out by the officers of the security agencies. Finally, this provision states 
that the term criminal police does not simply cover certain functions but it also involves all 
security agencies as well as their officers (according to para. 2) in the function as criminal 
police.  
 
In order to maintain public security and due to the rising awareness and grown sensitivity in 
regard to interferences with fundamental and human rights in the late 1980s, and driven by the 
fact that the Austrian legal system did not provide any regulation concerning the matter of 
public security police,268 a corresponding legal Act was established in the early 1990s. This 
Act – the Austrian Security Police Act – came into force in May 1993 and has been amended 
several times so far.269  
The Austrian Security Police Act regulates the organization of the police administration, and 
governs the exertion of the public security police according to section 3 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act. The exertion of public security police involves the maintenance of peace, 
                                                          
266 In this regard cf. as well the chapter on the relationship between criminal police and public security police 
below.  
267 according to Art. 10 para. 1 no. 6 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law. 
268 The Austrian Constitutions of 1918 and 1920 created rather a fragmentary system of regulations in respect 
to security police while the amendment of the Constitution in 1929 (Federal Law Gazetta 392) brought an 
empowerment of the States police function, as it transferred, inter alia, the competence in legislation and 
execution in this matter from the Laender to the Federation; cf. especially in this regard Art. 10 para. 1 no. 7 
Federal Constitutional Law empowering the Federation to legislation and execution in the maintenance of 
peace, order and security (version 1929); cf. especially Adamovic, Ludwig, Grundriss des österreichischen 
Staatsrechtes (1927), p. 357; However, despite two attempts for codification (1968 and 1973), there were 
no sufficient regulations either in regard to the organization or the tasks of the security police; cf. Funk, 
Bernd-Christian, Das neue Sicherheitspolizeirecht – Kodifikation und Reform einer klassischen 
Verwaltungsmaterie, JBl 1994, footnote 11. as well as Hauer, Andreas, Keplinger, Rudolf, 
Sicherheitspolizeigesetz (2005), 3rd edition, pp. 35 et seq.and Wiederin (1998), MN 1-70, pp. 1-15. 
269 For a brief but comprehensive overview please cf. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), pp. 35 et seq.  
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order and security, with the exception of the local public security police,270 but includes the 
extension of primary assistance in general.271 Police administration, in this context, refers to 
the general public security police, matters pertaining to personal status, including the 
registration of births, marriages and deaths, and change of name, aliens police and residence 
registration. Furthermore it deals with matters pertaining to weapons, ammunition and 
explosives, and the use of fire-arms, as well as press affairs and matters concerning the right 
of association and assembly.272 Security agencies working within the framework of the 
Austrian Security Police Act are called public security police.  
 
3.3 Substantive Criminal Law 
Despite the fact that this thesis is primarily concerned with (criminal) procedural law, there 
are important substantive law provisions in the Austrian legal code related to this topic as 
well. Therefore, a brief survey of the related regulations and their significance in regard to the 
aim of this dissertation will be given. Not only do these provisions deal with computer related 
criminal acts but they also show basic principles concerning the handling of such criminal 
acts. This overview is given in order to show that everybody – thus even the security agencies 
– would commit a criminal act if they would conduct an RFI without legal empowerment to 
do so.  
 
3.3.1 The Convention on Cybercrime 
The most important (international) framework occupied with computer crime is the 
Convention on Cybercrime. The Convention can be signed by the member States of the 
Council of Europe and also by non-member States having participated in its elaboration. It 
went into force in July 2004. The related preparatory work until it was signed took already 12 
                                                          
270 German: lokale Sicherheitspolizei; According to Art 15 para. 2 Federal Constitutional Law local public 
security police is that part of public security police which exclusively or preponderantly affects the interests 
of the local community personified by the municipality and which, like preservation of public decency and 
defense against the improper creation of noise, can suitably be undertaken by the community within its 
local boundaries. 
271 cf. already above and Art 10 para. 1 no. 7 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law. 
272 according to section 2 para. 2 Security Police Act 
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years273 and was characterized by massive objections of civil rights groups, especially when it 
came to human rights and data protection issues. This international treaty is the first one on 
crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks and also contains a series of 
powers and procedures. The main intention behind it is to harmonize criminal policy in regard 
to cybercrime by adopting the appropriate legislation and to foster international cooperation 
between the member and non-member States of the Council of Europe.274  
 
Chapter 1, Art 1 offers good and comprehensible definitions and use of terms of the 
convention’s activities, whereas Chapter 2, section 1 covers criminal acts against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems (Art 2 – Art 6), 
computer-related offenses (Art 7 and 8), content-related offenses (Art 9) and offenses related 
to infringements of copyright and related rights (Art 10). Furthermore, it is to state that 
special emphasis was put on securing of evidence, in particularly on traffic data (Art 14 – Art 
22). The Articles 23 to 35 are an attempted to fill potential gaps in the European Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters275 or other bilateral treaties. In this regard the 
efforts to improve the securing and transmitting of connection data should be mentioned.276  
 
The Austrian way of handling computer related crime was based on this convention. With an 
amendment of the Criminal Code in 2002,277 the Austrian Federal Council introduced inter 
alia the main substantial provisions in regard to cybercrime. Following these provisions are 
presented briefly: 
 
                                                          
273 Starting with recommendation No R (89) 9 on computer-related criminal acts which offered guidelines 
regarding the definition of certain computer crimes, the Council of Europe took several time the initiative 
for a harmonization in the field of IT-technology. However, it was not until 1996 when an international 
commission of experts was set up to elaborate a convention dealing with substantial criminal law 
concerning telecommunication and IT services. cf. further Schwarzenegger, Christian, Die internationale 
Harmonisierung des Computer- und Internetstrafrechts durch die Convention on Cybercrime vom 23. 
November 2001, in Donatsch/Forster/Schwarzenegger (Hrsg), FS Trechsel (2002), p. 309. 
274 Note, that the preparatory work for the harmonization was also joined by experts from the US, Canada and 
Japan.  
275 cf. <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=030&CL=ENG> retrieved 8 
October, 2009.  
276 cf. Schwarzenegger (2002), p. 311. 
277 Federal Law Gazette I No. 134/2002 (BGBl I 2002/134) - Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Strafgesetzbuch, die 
Strafprozessordnung 1975, das Strafvollzugsgesetz, das Suchtmittelgesetz, das Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz, 
das Waffengesetz 1996, das Fremdengesetz 1997 und das Telekommunikationsgesetz geändert werden 
(Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2002) 
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3.3.2 Penalized Behavior 
3.3.2.1 Hacking and the Austrian Criminal Code 
Illegal Access to a Computer System 
Section 118a of the Austrian Criminal Code 
There was a big discussion at governmental level regarding the relation between the harms 
and benefits of hacking attacks, especially regarding the question of whether hacking should 
be made a criminal offense. This is also true for the negotiation regarding the elaboration of 
the Convention on Cybercrime (CCC). In its Article 2, the final Convention deals with illegal 
access to computer systems. It is stated that the signing parties of this treaty (countries) shall 
adopt legislative measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability278 of 
computer systems and data. This criminal activity can be seen as the starting point for further, 
more dangerous forms of computer related offenses. Thus it was intended to cover already 
such preparatory acts under criminal law in order ‘[…] to give additional protection to the 
system and the data at such an early stage […].’279  
Important to note in this context is the requirement of illegality; this means that the act in 
question has to be committed without any legal right. This seems prima facie consequently, 
however, this implements that a person who was hired by the owner of a computer system to 
break into this system would not commit a criminal act! For instance, it would not be illegal, 
if a ‘hacker’ hacked into a system with the aim of authorized testing or protection of the 
targeted computer system.280 In addition, the Explanatory Report of the CCC declares that the 
experts who created this legal framework were aware of the problems that occurred due to the 
broad approach of Article 2 CCC. In paragraph 49 it is stated that a conviction may not 
always be appropriate281 and that the various member countries had already developed a 
narrower approach, which required supplementary qualifying circumstances. Furthermore, it 
is mentioned that Parties to the CCC can implement any or all of the following qualifying 
elements:282  
                                                          
278 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 44.  
279 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 45.  
280 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 47. 
281 e.g. if there are circumstances […] where no dangers were created by the mere intrusion or where even acts 
of hacking have led to the detection of loopholes and weaknesses of the security of systems.  
282 This means that in order to have a committed offence, all these circumstances (elements of an offence) have 
to be fulfilled.  
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 infringing security measures  
 special intent to obtain computer data  
 other dishonest intent that justifies criminal culpability or 
 the requirement that the offense is committed in relation to a computer system that is 
connected remotely to another computer system283  
Austria, as a signing member of this treaty, has implemented Article 2 into its Criminal Code 
under section 118a. When it came to defining a targeted computer system, Austrian legislator 
followed the wording of the CCC, stating in Art 1 lit a, that a ‘computer system means any 
device or a group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a 
program, performs automatic processing of data.’ Austria implemented this definition in 
section 74 para. 1 no. 8 Austrian Criminal Code. Such devices can be hardware or software, 
thus processing units, video screens as well as programs and files, developed for automatic 
processing of digital data.284 A person is already committing an illegal access if gaining only 
partly access to a computer system.285 
With respect to computer data Austria’s definition in section 74 para. 2 Criminal Code is in 
line with the CCC defining in its Art 1 lit b computer data as ‘any representation of facts, 
information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a 
program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function’.286 Thus, there are no 
restrictions to pure written data.287 
Access gaining persons do not commit a criminal act if they have exclusive authority from the 
computer’s owner/user to access a system. Hence, the act must therefore be committed 
without permission/approval.288 Note that problems may arise in circumstances where 
computer systems are not operated by one single user, but rather by more people (shared 
desktop) or within the relationship of employers and their network administrators, for instance 
if the latter gain access to their boss’ private e-mails. Hence, there is a difference between the 
power of disposition over a computer and the power of disposition over the data stored on it.
                                                          
283 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 50.  
284 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 23.  
285 cf. as well Reindl-Krauskopf, Susanne, WK-StGB section 118a, MN 8 and 9. 
286 cf. further Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 25.  
287 cf. Schwarzenegger (2002), p. 315. 
288 cf. further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 10. 
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Even though both powers may correlate that is not necessarily always the case.289 
 
In order for an action to be a criminal offense, the suspect has to actively be gaining access to 
a system.290 Thus, access means the actual entering of the whole or any part of it, such as 
hardware or stored data of the system installed, directories or content-related data. Access to a 
system is obtained as soon as the offender can operate actively within the computer system.291 
Thereby the offender has to overcome292 special security293 measures within the computer 
system. These security measures are only part of the computer system if they are in close 
relationship with the system. Examples for such measures are password detection when 
booting a computer or an installed firewall.294 Important to note in this context is that 
measures which are in no direct relation to the access to a computer system, such as the 
locking of a room in which a system is located or an alarm system, are not a specific security 
measure.295 To overcome security measures means that a person has to surmount or alter such 
a measure. In most cases this is done through the alteration of software, the removal of 
encryption or the installation of special software, such as Trojan horses etc. Unlawfully obtain 
passwords are also covered as a password scam – thus testing various passwords until the 
right is found – is regarded as overcoming of a security measure as well.296 However, a person 
using failures of the system, as for instance failures of the operation system, constituting 
general failures or gaps in the system, is not be seen as such an overcoming. This is, on the 
other hand, only true as long as an offender does not use this systematic failure in order to 
alter or manipulate a specific security measure.297 
                                                          
289 cf. in this respect as well Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 10, 12; concerning the actual 
legal status of the holder of the right of disposal please cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 
14-8. 
290 cf. further Reindl, Susanne, Computerstrafrecht im Überblick (2004), p. 14; as well as Reindl-Krauskopf, 
WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 20. 
291 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 46. 
292 Note in this context that since the latest amendment of the Austrian Criminal Code it is not necessary 
anymore to infringe security measures rather than just to overcome them; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  
section 118a, MN 26. 
293 Note in this context that only safeguarded systems are protected by section 118a of the Austrian Criminal 
Code. Persons who did not protect their systems against any illegal access are not covered; cf. Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 22. 
294 cf. further Reindl (2004), p. 15; in respect to password detection Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 
118a, MN 23. 
295 cf. Fabrizy, Ernst, Foregger, Egmont, StGB samt ausgewählten Nebengesetzen, Kurzkommentar (2006), 9th 
edition, section 118a, p. 373; EBRV 1166 BlgNR XXI GP, p. 24 
296 cf. as well Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 27 and 28. 
297 cf. as well above in the chapter of how to conduct an RFI; and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, 
MN 29. 
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Another important aspect of the Austrian solution regarding hacking is that section 118a 
Criminal Code states several special requirements regarding the offenders malice. The mental 
element of the criminal act entails that the offender acts with the intention (dolus directus 
specialis298) to spy (to gather knowledge),299 to use the gathered data300 and with the intent to 
receive profits or to harm somebody.301 Moreover, it is to state that in Austria a hacker can 
only be prosecuted if the victim authorizes the law enforcement agency to do so. This 
regulation is mentioned under para. 2 and takes into account that hacking attacks can improve 
the security of computer systems through discovering gaps and backdoors.302 Thus, section 
118a of the Austrian Criminal Code does not represent a criminal act ex officio, which means 
public prosecutors are not able to prosecute the criminal acts by themselves alone. The 
authorization of at least a second person – in most cases one of the victims – is needed in 
order to prosecute a hacker. This means that the victim of a criminal act is not a victim per se, 
rather than the person who was the target of an attack decides whether it wants the offender to 
be prosecuted. It can be easily imagined that the owners of the computer system could 
appreciate the attack (as well as the subsequent suggestion and advice), which revealed the 
security vulnerability of their system and now they are able to improve it in an appropriate 
manner. 
 
The establishment of section 118a of the Austrian Criminal Code was necessary since Austria 
had no corresponding ‘hacking provision’ in place. There have been attempts to criminalize 
such actions but the legislator always added some special requirements for the illegality. For 
instance, even prior to the introduction of the provision, it was already illegal to access a 
computer system303 without permission, but additionally a special intention had to be present. 
Sections 148a and 126a of the Austrian Criminal Code claim that besides the illegal gained 
access, the intention of the offender to enrich themselves or to harm somebody make the 
                                                          
298 according to section 5 para. 2 of the Austrian Criminal Code.  
299 cf. as well below the demanded intention for the prosecution according to section 119 of the Austrian 
Criminal Code.  
300 This means the required intention to use the gathered data implies that criminals intend to use it by 
themselves, to forward the data or to make the data publicly available; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  
section 118a, MN 36. 
301 There is the need for the actual offenders' intention to enrich themselves or anybody else; cf. Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 118a, MN 37. 
302 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 49, stating […] that the broad approach of 
criminalization in the first sentence of Article 2 is not undisputed. Opposition stems from situations where 
no dangers were created by the mere intrusion or where even acts of hacking have led to the detection of 
loopholes and weaknesses of the security of systems.  
303 cf. sections 148a and 126a of the Austrian Criminal Code.  
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action a capital offense. Furthermore, operating restrictions and business secrecy, data used 
for the commercial circle, of sections 122 – 124 Criminal Code were no real safeguard against 
hacking. This means that attacks of hackers lacking such intentions were not considered 
illegal until the adoption of this regulation. 
 
3.3.2.2 Infringement of the Telecommunication Secrecy 
Section 119 of the Austrian Criminal Code  
The old version of section 119 of the Austrian Criminal Code was devoted to old-fashioned 
telecommunication granting protection for information while it was being transmitted from 
one place to another. Section 119 is the corresponding criminal provision to the constitutional 
telecommunication secrecy304 of Art 10a Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals 1867, 
stating that ‘Telecommunications secrecy may not be infringed’. An amendment of this 
provision was necessary mainly due to advancing technologies and because of the standards 
emerging of the CCC.305 The new version covers not only messages/communication 
transmitted via customary telecommunication but also the conveyance of information in 
computer systems.306 The provision deals exclusively with content data, of a message.307 The 
criminal act contains the use of devices connected or attached to a telecommunication facility 
or a computer system. Such devices do not have to be physical, even computer programs can 
be subsumed under this expression.308 Any technical facility, capable to provide knowledge of 
the content of any communication transmitted via this telecommunication facility or this 
computer system to an outsider,309 is covered by the expression.310 It does only penalize the 
use of these devices, meaning that it is not necessary that the user of the device also installed 
it,311 or that the simple use of such devices is already the actus reus. It is therefore not 
                                                          
304 cf. also Lewisch, Peter, WK-StGB section 119, MN 5a.  
305 cf. Fabrizy, Foregger (2006), section 119, p. 374. 
306 cf. Reindl (2004), p. 28. 
307 Each content of a communication is covered, thus it is not necessary that there is a special character of 
secrecy involved. The intention of the offender has to be to gain unauthorized knowledge about the content 
of any message/communication transmitted via a telecommunication facility or computer system; cf. in this 
respect further more; cf. Lewisch, section 119, MN 9a, 9b. 
308 Computer programs designed to send copies of all in- and outgoing e-mails to the offender are covered as 
well; cf. Reindl (2004), p. 29. 
309 Meaning somebody not intended to gain unauthorized knowledge of the content of the communication. 
Thus, a person neither originator nor intended receiver of a communication.  
310 cf. furthermore the comprehensive illustration – especially also in respect to WLANs – at Lewisch, section 
119, MN 4 and 4a. 
311 cf. Lewisch, section 119, MN 2, 3, 8. 
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necessary that the offender, or somebody else312 actually gained knowledge about the content 
of the message in transmission313 but in respect to the intention, it is necessary to have such 
purposes (dolus directus specialis). Remarkable in this context is also the fact that the use of 
devices is not limited to real time use, rather than even recording devices are covered as well, 
thus penalized by section 119 of the Austrian Criminal Code.314 Contrary to the former 
wording of section 119, the simple attaching of, or the establishment of the recipient status of 
the device is not punishable anymore.315  
 
3.3.2.3 Illegal Interception of Data  
Section 119a of the Austrian Criminal Code  
This provision deals with two different offenses: 
In respect to the first offense, it is to say that if an act is not punishable according to section 
119 of the Austrian Criminal Code it might be possible that one could at least be fined 
according to section 119a of the Austrian Criminal Code. The latter is therefore something 
like a backup for the first, as the first handles only messages and information whereas the 
latter deals with any types of data. Principally, the illustrations given in the context of an 
infringement of the telecommunication secrecy apply as well in this context. Thus, offenders 
have to use any spying devices,316 enabling them to spy on communications before they can 
be punished. These spying devices have to be physically attached or connected to a foreign 
computer system317. The offenders criminal intend has to be dolus directus specialis. 
Moreover, they intentionally gain access to acquire unauthorized knowledge of the content of 
any data, or to provide such knowledge to somebody else, who is equally unauthorized. 
Unlike section 119 of the Austrian Criminal Code – which deals with verbal communication 
exclusively – section 119a of the Austrian Criminal Code handles spying attacks on any 
data.318 Furthermore, it has to be established that any illegally obtained information is used to 
                                                          
312 Meaning that there has to be the intention to spy on the message in transmission. This implements the 
intention that either offenders themselves or somebody else gain knowledge of the message. From the 
quality of the offense there is no actual difference whether offenders themselves gain it or whether they 
want to grant this knowledge to somebody else; cf. in this respect as well Lewisch, section 119, MN 2.  
313 cf. Reindl (2004), p. 29 as well as Lewisch, section 119, MN 7.  
314 cf. Lewisch, section 119, MN 5.  
315 cf. Fabrizy, Foregger (2006), section 119, p. 375. 
316 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 119a, MN 4. 
317 unlike section 119, section 119a of the Austrian Criminal Code deals only with computer systems and not 
like the former with both, telecommunication facilities and computer systems.  
318 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 119a, MN 7, 8. 
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acquire monetary profits or harm somebody financially or personally.319  
 
The second offense penalized by section 119a of the Austrian Criminal Code goes directly 
back to the CCC. The CCC in its Explanatory Report states under para. 57 that  
‘[t]he creation of an offense in relation to ‘electromagnetic emissions’ will ensure a 
more comprehensive scope. Electromagnetic emissions may be emitted by a computer 
during its operation. Such emissions are not considered as ‘data’ according to the 
definition provided in Article 1. However, data can be reconstructed from such 
emissions.’  
 
A computer system radiates electromagnetic waves while processing and it is easily possible 
to reconstruct this particular data.  If there is no transmission of any kind of data, there is also 
no infringement of any transmission secrecy. However, such behavior constitutes an 
infringement with privacy and therefore it was necessary to criminalize such behavior as well. 
While, from a technical point of view, there are numerous ways to collect and gather 
electromagnetic emissions, this is unimportant in the legal context, meaning that the 
collection is penalized no matter how the data was collected.320  
With regards to the intention (dolus directus specialis) of an offender committing this criminal 
act, the Austrian legislator governed, similar to the other provisions in this context, that the 
mental element consists of the aim to obtain knowledge and to receive a monetary gain, or 
cause a property loss of the attacked (or somebody else).321 However, as Reindl-Krauskopf 
points out, there are some additional things to keep in mind. She argues that in respect to the 
spying intention of the offender, it is not sufficient that the offender simply gathers emissions 
in order to reconstruct data the victim types into its computer and saves it afterward. On the 
contrary, it is necessary that the offender tries to gather data intended to be or already being 
transmitted.322 
                                                          
319 cf. already the illustrations in this respect in the context of section 118a of the Austrian Criminal Code, 
above. 
320 cf. in this respect and especially for the context of WLAN's Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 119a, 
MN 10. 
321 cf. already above the illustrations in this respect in the context of section 118a of the Austrian Criminal 
Code.  
322 Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 119a, MN 13. 
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In this respect and for the completeness of content, it is to say that besides section 119a there 
is another provision dealing with communication and data; section 120 (2a) of the Austrian 
Criminal Code is intended to protect the confidentiality of communications. It penalizes the 
recording of communications,323 or the granting of access to the communication to 
unauthorized persons, or the making communication publicly available. Important in this 
context is that the communication is not intended to be received by the person committing the 
criminal act. Examples are situations where a person forwards or publishes a misguided e-
mail, which he received unauthorized.324  
 
3.3.3 Offenses Following Hacking Attacks 
3.3.3.1 Damage of Data  
Section 126a of the Austrian Criminal Code  
The Austrian Criminal Code provides provision that deal with the potentially negative 
outflows of an attack. These are mainly criminal acts against property and were originally 
established to deal with criminal property damage. The newly created regulations, however, 
do not handle actual damages to physical objects but rather damage to electronic data. Thus, if 
an offender physically destroyed a disk or a CD – they would be prosecuted for criminal 
property damage. However, these disks may contain data that has a higher value than the 
actual media on which they are stored. In recognition of this value, the Austrian legislator 
implemented section 126a – damage of data – into its Criminal Code. Art 4 CCC – Data 
Interference deals with the same arguments.  
 
The cause of damage to any electronic processed data,325 already transmitted data 326 as well 
                                                          
323 Note that a desultory recording of communications would not be covered; cf. Lewisch, Peter, Reindl-
Krauskopf, Susanne, WK-StGB section 120, MN 31b. 
324 for a detailed overview on this provision, please cf. Lewisch, Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB section 120, 
MN 31a-h; as well as Reindl (2004), p. 31. 
325 According to section 4 no. 9 of the Austrian Federal Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data the 
processing of data means the collection, recording, storing, sorting, comparing, modification, interlinkage, 
reproduction, consultation, output, utilization, committing, blocking, erasure or destruction or any other 
kind of operation with data of a data application by the controller or processor except the transmission of 
data. 
326 According to section 4 no. 11 of the Austrian Federal Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data, the 
committing of data means the transfer of data from the controller to a processor. 
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as committed327 data is punishable by law. There is no difference whether this data is personal 
or not; even generic computer programs are covered by the Austrian Criminal Code as data.328 
Any data on a hard drive or any other storage device that is either processed, transmitted or 
committed,329 is protected by this provisions. Data can only be damaged by people who do 
not have the authority to do so. Thus, if somebody does have a position similar to that of an 
owner of the data, they can not commit the criminal act.330 In this respect the Explanatory 
Report under para. 62 mentions that an act is only punishable if committed ‘without right’. 
However, it is necessary that this has to be interpreted quite carefully and that certain 
activities inherent in the design of networks or commonly operating or commercial practices 
authorized by the owner or operator are ‘with right’ and therefore shall not be criminalized.331 
This means that nobody can be liable for hacking into their own computer systems, and 
nobody can be charged for destroying their own, private data. This is reasonable because there 
is no public need to criminalize such behavior.  
 
It is important to note that the damaged data must have some kind of monetary value,332 
otherwise we cannot speak of damage to data. In order to assess the value or damage of data 
one applies the same criterion as one would in the ‘real’, physical world.333 There are two 
different kinds of punishable acts when it comes to the destruction of data: the actions, which 
make data useless334 and activities concerning suppression of data. Thereby the owner of the 
data is impaired and has to bear a financial loss, constituted by the amount of money he has to 
expend in order to replace the damaged data.  
 
The Austrian Criminal Code states that the offender has to have the intention (dolus 
                                                          
327 According to section 4 no. 11 of the Austrian Federal Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data, the 
transmission of data, the transfer of data of a data application to recipients other than the data subject, the 
controller or a processor, in particular publishing of such data as well as the use of data for another 
application purpose [Aufgabengebiet] of the controller. 
328 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, Susanne et al, WK-StGB section 74, MN 63-6. 
329 Otherwise they would not be in existence; cf. Bertel, Christian, WK-StGB section 126a, MN 1. 
330 cf. Reindl (2004), p. 19; as well as Bertel, WK-StGB,  section 126a, MN 2. 
331 for example: the testing or protection of the security of a computer system, or the reconfiguration of a 
computer’s operating system that takes place when the operator of a system acquires new software (e.g., 
software permitting access to the Internet that disables similar, previously installed programs); cf. further 
Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 62. 
332 cf. for details Reindl (2004), pp. 20-23. 
333 e.g. the exchangeable value (Tauschwert), utility value (Gebrauchswert), costs of restitution 
(Wiederherstellungskosten); cf. Reindl (2004), pp. 21-22. 
334 Involving activities such as alteration or deletion.  
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eventualis)335 to alter, delete, etc data in order for the offender to face conviction.  
 
3.3.3.2 Interference of the Functionality of a Computer System  
Section 126b of the Austrian Criminal Code 
This provision deals with the extension of a damage of data, as it evaluates the range of the 
damage. While the previously discussed provision is mainly concerned with attacks on a 
limited number of computers, this one deals with large scale attacks. It was not until the CCC 
was set up that Austria implemented such a regulation. Before that, there was just partial 
protection against such ‘denial of service’ attacks, through the Austrian Telecommunications 
Act.336 A ‘denial of service’ (DoS) attack is an attack on a computer system that prevents or 
substantially slows the operation of the system, or programs that send huge quantities of 
electronic mail to a recipient in order to block the communications functions of the system.337 
The Explanatory Report names spamming explicitly as a major threat to computer systems.338  
 
Art 5 CCC criminalizes the intentional obstruction of the lawful use of computer systems.  
It protects the interest of operators and users of a computer or telecommunication system so it 
may be used accordingly. Furthermore, it punishes actions, which seriously prevent339 the 
proper functioning of such systems. The term ‘serious’ is explained in further detail under 
para. 67 in the Explanatory Report and it is up to the signing parties on how they are going to 
define it. Section 126b of the Austrian Criminal Code regulates that an attack is seriously 
hindering, if a computer system collapses completely or if its speed is so substantially reduced 
that the practical value for the user is like a complete breakdown. 
Furthermore, the duration of the impediment can be used to calculate the seriousness of the 
attack.340 Actual damage or the destruction of the computer system is not required.  
                                                          
335 according to section 5 para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal Code.  
336 The Austrian public and administrative law provided some criminal regulations and via section 104 para. 3 
no. 24 TKG (old version) it was possible to charge an attacker with ATS 500.000,-- if there has been a 
infringement against the prohibition of spam (section 101 TKG (old version); cf. further: Plöckinger, 
Oliver, Internet und materielles Strafecht – Die Convention on Cyber-Crime, in Plöckinger/Duursma/Helm 
(Hrsg), Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Internet-Recht (2002), p. 118. 
337 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 67.  
338 cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 69. 
339 Such hindering must take place by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, altering or suppressing 
computer data; cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 66. 
340 cf. Fabrizy, Foregger (2006), section 126b, pp. 392-393; in respect to the duration please cf. Reindl-
Krauskopf, Susanne, WK-StGB section 126b, MN 9-13, 18. 
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The simple obstruction of the system is already punishable.341 A person is considered breaking 
the law by simply entering data into, or transmitting data to a computer, no matter by what 
means.342  
 
Concerning the mental element of the criminal act it is governed that the offender’s intention 
(dolus eventualis) has to be focused on such hindering.  
 
3.3.3.3 Misuse of Computer Programs or Access Data  
Section 126c of the Austrian Criminal Code 
Not only was there the intention to punish actual hacking as a criminal activity but also there 
were ambitions to establish regulations concerning preparatory works for those acts. There 
was the intention to create a framework dealing with circumstances happening during the 
preliminary stages of the criminal act. 
Art 6 CCC penalizes, under its heading ‘misuse of devices’, hacking tools, or better their 
production, sale, procurement for use, their import or distribution or the otherwise making 
available of such devices. According to the Explanatory Report, Art 6 focuses mainly on tools 
with the primary objective of hacking343 and not dual-use devices. The latter are tools capable 
of conducting legal as well as illegal activities and neither their production nor their 
possession or (legal) use should be criminalized. This means that Art 6 CCC makes the 
distinction whether something is legal or not only on the basis of the criminal intentions of an 
unlawful act. The intention of the possessors or creators of these devices is the only ‘thing’, 
which makes the possession or creation of them illegal. There has been a long debate 
regarding this regulation and the final outcome is more or less a compromise and states that 
the possession or the creation of the devices has to be with the malice to commit a criminal 
act named in Art 2 – 5 of the Convention on Cybercrime.344 Programs and tools created for the 
                                                          
341 However, short term delays are not covered; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 126b, MN 9. 
342 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 126b, MN 14-6. 
343 Tools objectively designed, or adapted, primarily for the purpose of committing an offence; cf. Explanatory 
Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 73; cf. as well Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 126c, MN 
2. 
344 Thus there has to be the intention to commit an Illegal Access (Art 2), an Illegal Interception (Art 3), a Data 
Interference (Art 4) or a System Interference (Art 5); cf. Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, 
para. 73 and 76. 
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authorized testing or the protection of a computer system are not covered by Art 6.345  
When establishing section 126c of the Austrian Criminal Code, the Austrian legislator 
followed the standards of the CCC and implemented this preparatory criminal act, punishing 
in para. 1 no. 2 the production, import, sale, the distribution or the procurement of computer 
passwords, access codes or comparable data enabling the access to a computer system or a 
part of it.346 Important in this context is that section 126c of the Austrian Criminal Code does 
not only constitute an ordinary offense to criminalize preparatory works, rather than its 
application is limited to preparatory works in regard to certain offenses. The computer 
programs347 have to be capable and intended to be used to commit the criminal act indicated 
in section 118a, section 119, section 119a, section 126a and section 126c of the Austrian 
Criminal Code, thus Art 2 - 5 CCC or section 148a, thus computer fraud.  
 
Once again, the Austria legislator demands a conviction for the misuse of computer programs 
or access data, at least dolus eventualis as mens rea.  
 
3.4 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure  
3.4.1 Introduction  
As presented in chapter 1, three different fields of application can be identified for an RFI. 
First of all, a remote access for search purposes, secondly surveillance of activities and thirdly 
surveillance of telecommunication. For each of these purposes, security agencies are provided 
with a broad range of investigative tools. This following chapter will look at these tools in 
detail in order to show whether an RFI could legally be conducted already. In this context it is 
to remark that the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure offers various means of coercive. Not 
only do they differ in extend and intensity of interference with fundamental or human rights 
                                                          
345 e.g., test-devices (‘cracking-devices’) and network analysis devices designed by industry to control the 
reliability of their information technology products or to test system security are produced for legitimate 
purposes; cf. further Explanatory Report, Convention on Cybercrime, para. 77.  
346 Note in this context that the penalize activity of a simple possession was introduced later on; cf. EBRV 309 
BglNR XXII GP, p. 8.  
347 Note that not only computer programs are cover. In addition section 126c of the Austrian Criminal Code 
governs that 'other comparable devices' or 'access data' are involved as well; cf. in this context Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StGB,  section 126c, MN 8-10. 
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but also in the puzzling variety of regulations they are obliged to.348  
 
3.4.1.1 Criminal Investigation Proceedings 
Generally it can be said that a penal proceeding starts when either the criminal police349 or the 
public prosecution becomes aware of a criminal act and commences its investigation of this 
criminal act, which they are obliged to do according to section 2 para. 1 of the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure.350 This principle is called ex officio principle and it states that if 
somebody files a charge, it is not possible for this person to drop this charge. Sections 78 
para. 1 and 80 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure state that everybody has the right 
to file a charge if they have knowledge of a criminal act. This is usually done through the 
criminal police or it can also be done through the public prosecution itself.351 The purpose of 
the investigation proceedings is to examine these charges and the evidence in detail in order to 
enable the public prosecution to decide whether it should charge the offender or stay the 
proceedings.352  
 
Governed by the general principle of indictment in criminal proceedings,353 the public 
prosecution is head of the criminal investigation proceedings.354 This means that all doing 
during the investigation proceeding are supervised and directed by the public prosecution. 
However, public prosecution usually does not concern itself with the investigations very much 
until the criminal police hands over its final report. The criminal police itself has its own 
competences whereas the power to direct remains in the hands of the public prosecution.355 
                                                          
348 The Austrian legal system includes coercive measures conducted spontaneously by the criminal police, 
directed by the public prosecution and such directed by the public prosecution based on judicial approval; 
cf. for a brief overview, cf. Bertel, Christian, Venier, Andreas, Einführung in die neue StPO (2006), 2nd 
edition, MN 145, 146, p. 50.  
349 Note in this context that in criminal proceedings the security agency is called criminal police – according to 
section 18 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure this is the authority exercising duties of 
criminal justice (Art. 10 para. 1 no. 6 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law), especially concerning 
the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts in the sense of this code.  
350 Meaning that after either somebody filed a charge or the criminal police started investigations ex officio; cf. 
Seiler, Stefan, Strafprozessrecht (2009), 10th edition, MN 614 p. 168; furthermore section 1 para. 2 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
351 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 615 p. 168. 
352 cf. section 91 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
353 cf. section 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and the related Art 90 para. 2 of the Austrian 
Federal Constitutional Law stating that in criminal proceedings the procedure is by indictment. 
354 cf. sections 98 et seq. of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
355 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 623, p. 170. 
 106 
 
This means that despite having its own competence to investigate, there is also the obligation 
to follow directions not only from the public prosecution but also from the court.356 Section 
99 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure governs that investigations may be 
postponed if necessary. It could be the case, for example, that a person involved in the 
criminal act needs to be tracked down before investigations can proceed. These delays must, 
however, not result in any serious danger of life, health, physical integrity or freedom of a 
third person.357 Such circumstances are mainly given in situations where there are no actual 
victims – as for instance in respect to organized crime, illegal drug dealing, and smuggling of 
cigarettes. If, due to such instances, the criminal police decides to postpone its investigation, it 
is obliged to inform the public prosecution.358 Furthermore, the criminal police is bound to 
document its investigations and deliver its final report to the public prosecution after 
concluding them.  
The public prosecution, as head of the proceedings, does have the authority to direct 
investigations and also conduct investigations itself. The legal ramifications are mentioned in 
section 20 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and include the liability of the public 
prosecution for this stage of the criminal proceedings. Therefore the public prosecution has to 
decided how much freedom it will grant the criminal police for its investigation. 
 
Nevertheless, it is up to the criminal police of when and how a direction is enforced.359 While 
the criminal police is responsible for the conducting of a direction on site,360 it is the 
competence of the public prosecution to decide on the appropriate steps (mainly but not 
always) of the potential end of criminal investigation proceedings. This means that the public 
prosecution can always close the proceedings, if the gathered information does not constitute 
a punishable matter of fact361 or if it can bring charges against somebody because conviction 
is likely.362 The decision for each of these steps involves a careful judgment of legal and 
                                                          
356 cf. section 99 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
357 Or without a postponement there would be such threats – cf. section 99 para. 4 no. 2 of the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure. 
358 cf. for further details Pilnacek, Christian, Pleischl, Werner, Das neue Vorverfahren – Leitfaden zum 
Strafprozessreformgesetz (2005), MN 402 et seq, pp. 79-81 and Vogl, Mathias, WK-StPO section 99, MN 9 
et seq. 
359 Note that that is not true if the direction of the public prosecution is based on a warrant – thus on the 
approval of the court. cf. furthermore below.  
360 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 641, p. 173; however cf. further below.  
361 cf. section 190 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
362 cf. section 210 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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factual circumstances by the public prosecution.363 
The third entity in criminal investigation proceedings is a court (judge).364 One of its main 
tasks is the approval of coercive. According to section 105 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the court has to decide whether the public prosecution’s request involving the 
interference of constitutional protected, subjective rights of an individual is granted. If an 
intended coercive is in conflict with one of these rights, the public prosecution needs the 
approval of a court to continue its investigation. Otherwise all taken action would be illegal.  
 
This overview is a summary of the basic ideas behind the Austria way to handle investigation 
proceedings. However, it failed to state that since the amendment of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure,365 the pre-trial proceedings have changed.366 According to the new 
regulations, particularly the defendant was granted more procedural rights than previously. 
Thereby, Austria abolished a legal gap in the its legal system constituting a violation of Art 6 
para. 3 lit c Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights).367 Granting these defendants rights is the task of 
the public prosecution and furthermore, it has to ensure that the criminal police’s work is 
according to regulations. The public prosecution can now also be called a relief agency,368 
which means that the management of the proceedings was intensified as well.369  
 
To sum up, investigation proceedings involve three authorities: the public prosecution, which 
functions as head and partner of the criminal police. The court (judge) is occupied with 
questions of the investigation only on request, ex offico due to a judicial hearing of 
                                                          
363 cf. in this respect Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 168, p. 58.  
364 e.g. the court is responsible for contradictory interrogations of victims and witnesses of criminal acts 
(section 165 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure), the reconstruction of a criminal act (section 150 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure) and for the judicial review of the investigation proceedings 
(sections 106 and 108 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure) 
365 In effect since 1 January, 2008. 
366 Before the amendment of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure the investigation proceedings were 
generally dividing into criminal ‘pre-investigations’ (German: gerichtliche Vorerhebungen), ran and 
organized by the public prosecution; and judicial investigations before trial (German: gerichtliche 
Voruntersuchungen), ran and organized by the committing magistrate. However, ‘pre-investigations’ were 
conducted by the criminal police itself and the danger of suppression of evidence was used to refuse the 
defendant a contact with an attorney-at-law. This practice is now gone, meaning that defendants have the 
right to speak with a defending lawyer right from their detention. cf. concerning this special issue; cf. 
Bertel, Christian, Venier, Andreas, Strafprozessrecht (2004), 8th edition, MN 52 and 242, pp. 17, 63.  
367 cf. especially Bertel, Venier (2004), MN 52, 242 and 317, pp. 17, 63, 83.  
368 cf. section 106 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
369 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 153, p. 53.  
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evidence370 and due to section 105 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, and 
due to an appeal.371  
 
3.4.1.2 Receipt of a Warrant  
According to section 105 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the court has to decide 
whether the public prosecution’s request involving the interference of constitutionally 
protected, subjective rights of an individual is legitimate.372 The court has to approve inter alia 
seizures (section 115 para. 2), or – due to the constitutionally granted right of banking 
confidentiality – requests concerning information of bank accounts (section 116 para. 3). In 
addition, the court has to approve requests in respect to searches of houses and locations 
(section 120 para. 1) and seizures of letters, information about data of a transformation of 
information, surveillance of messages and optical and acoustical surveillance of persons 
(sections 134 - 136 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure).  
 
In approving the request of the public prosecution, the court issues the search warrant. Not 
until then the public prosecution is allowed to give direction to the criminal police.373 
However, in this respect, Bertel/Venier argue that it is possible for the public prosecution to 
give direction regarding coercive measures with reservation to the court order.374 Contrary to 
the legal situation, before the previously mentioned amendment of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the courts approval is not a writ of mandamus (German: ‘Befehl’) 
anymore, rather than an authorization to perform the requested action. The court does not 
have to consider tactical aspects of criminal procedures, hence the public prosecution is 
neither obliged to use this authorization actually nor to set a ‘contrarius actus’ if it abandons 
to use it.375  
 
                                                          
370 according to section 104 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
371 cf. section 98 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
372 cf. Fabrizy, Ernst, Die österreichische Strafprozessordnung – Kurzkommentar (2008), 10th edition, section 
105, p. 232; furthermore cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 428, p. 87. 
373 Note the related critique regarding the double occupation with the direction of the public procedure in 
Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 165, p. 57. 
374 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 166, p. 58.  
375 cf. JAB 406 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 15.  
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According to sections 101 para. 2 and para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
public prosecution has to request approval of a search etc, if this is needed. This means that 
the public prosecution and not the criminal police can forward requests to and is in contact 
with the court. Direct consultation between the court and the criminal police is not intended 
for criminal investigation proceedings.376 This also includes that the court is not empowered 
to adopt coercive measures without a corresponding request from the public prosecution.377 
The written request for approval of a direction has to involve all documents and has to be 
justified. These obligations include that the public prosecution has to present relevant grounds 
on which the intended direction is and the corresponding approval has to be based.378 Not 
only the request but also the warrant itself has to be justified. These requirements are the basis 
for some critique, as the Supreme Court ruled that a reference in the approval of the request 
(the warrant) to the justification in the request (direction to the criminal police) is sufficient.379 
Furthermore, Bertel/Venier argue that the direction can adopt the content of the court order.380  
Closely related to this is the aspect that a warrant has to say explicitly what the public 
prosecution is allowed to do – i.e. which directions it is allowed to give. In the case of a 
search warrant, for instance, this includes a detailed description of what is searched for. 381 
Moreover, it has to include a time limit,382 forcing the public prosecution and the criminal 
police to conduct the warrant within the given time frame. 
Section 101 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure further states that after the 
issuance of a warrant, it is the responsibility of the public prosecution to determine the actual 
requirement and the appropriate time for conducting the coercive measure.383 Moreover, this 
provision states that if circumstances crucial to the approval of the request disappear or alter 
in a manner so that the establishment of a coercive measure would become illegal, 
disproportionally or in-expediently, the public prosecution has to abstain from it and inform 
the court about this new situation. This means that the public prosecution is not allowed to 
                                                          
376 Besides certain cases in which the court can use the criminal police in order to conduct further 
investigations in respect to a request of the public prosecution – cf. section 105 para. 2 of the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure. 
377 Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 412, p. 83. 
378 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 101, p. 226. 
379 cf. Bertel, Christian, Venier, Andreas, Strafprozessrecht (2009), 3rd edition, MN 195, p. 62 and Seiler 
(2009), MN 644, pp. 174-175. 
380 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 165 p. 57. 
381 cf. regarding this requirement especially 13 Os 46/08a.  
382 cf. section 105 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure – after expiring of the warrant it 
becomes inoperative; Regulary the judicial search warrant sets a limit between one to three days; cf. Bertel, 
Venier (2006), MN 237, pp. 84-85; furthermore cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 105, p. 232. 
383 cf. regarding this and the corresponding problems between the public prosecution and the criminal police, 
EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 136.  
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postpone its directions correlating to the warrant . It would have to refrain from conducting a 
coercive and request a new approval. This means that a warrant is restricted by certain 
criteria. The Explanatory Report states objective criteria for such warrants, such as the manner 
of suspicion or the degree of difficulty of the investigations in general.384  
 
As shown, crucial in regard to means of coercive is that they are judicial decisions. Moreover, 
they can only be implemented if requested by the public prosecution. Concerning this, it is 
further to note that the criminal police is only empowered to ask the public prosecution 
whether the public prosecution could request a coercive at the court.385 The approval of the 
court – the warrant – establishes the basis for the coercive and defines its frame, border and 
target. In order to implement such a preventive judicial control of human rights, it is necessary 
that the court assesses the coercive and the related actual consequences.386 Only in certain 
circumstances, if there is potential danger in a delay (periculum in mora), the criminal police 
is allowed – to use coercive measures without a direction or a corresponding warrant.387  
 
3.4.1.3 Court Order 
In principal it can be said that if means of coercive have to be based on judicial approval, a 
court order according to section 86 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure is formally 
needed.388  
From a general point of view there are three different decisions a court can issue, namely 
verdicts, orders and ordinances. This tripartite division (section 35 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure) represents the forms of court decisions as well. While verdicts are 
decisions issued in an open or closed session in the ‘Name of the Republic’,389 the other two 
forms are decisions issued not in such form. The only real difference between an order and an 
ordinance lies in the difference of the appeals proceedings, according to sections 87 – 89 of 
                                                          
384 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 136.  
385 cf. section 93 para. 4, 105 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
386 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 136.  
387 cf. below. 
388 Or at least it has to be justified afterwards by a court order, if the criminal police used it due to danger in 
delay; cf. furthermore below. 
389 Art 82 para. 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law.  
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the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.390  
Section 86 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure states that, a court order has to 
include the decision, the grounds of the decision and an explanation on rights of appeal. The 
decision itself has to involve the direction, the approval or the finding of the court as well as 
the correlated legal provisions. This means that the court has to clarify exactly what it decides 
and, in the case that there has been a request, to which extend it approves this request.391 The 
explanation must state the actual findings and the legal considerations the decision is based 
on. In this context it is to remark that orders stating only the provision or reproducing only the 
legal text of the provision are illegal because they lack actual findings.392 However, there is no 
general provision – according to section 270 para. 2 no.5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure – dealing with the questions of whether and how a court order has to be justified.393 
The explanation of the rights of appeal has to include whether such rights are given, which 
formalities apply, within which deadline and where the appeal has to be brought in. The 
proceedings furthermore regulate that an order has to be issued in writing and delivered to the 
persons entitled to an appeal.  
Entitled to an appeal are the public prosecution, the defendants insofar as their interests are 
directly affected, as well as persons whose personal rights are affected.394 In addition, if the 
court order states the proceedings, it has to be delivered inter alia to the criminal police. 
Concerning the right to appeal it is to mention that an objection against every court order is 
possible as long as the law does not explicitly revoke that right. The competent instance in 
this case would be the regional appeals court.395 Above all, the public prosecution is entitled 
to appeal if its requests according to section 101 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure were not dealt with. This means that the public prosecution can appeal if a 
requested coercive was not approved by the court. A special right to appeal is granted to
                                                          
390 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 35, p. 85. 
391 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 124, p. 42. 
392 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 124, p. 42; cf. for the legal necessity of the explanation on rights of appeal 
EvBl 2008/183.  
393 cf. Harbich, Herbert, Der Beschluss im Strafprozess und seine Begründung, in Österreichische 
Richterzeitung 1977, p. 142; section 270 para. 2 no. 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure states 
regarding the grounds of the decision in a verdict that it shall be announced briefly but firmly, which facts 
the court accepted to be evident or not evident and due to which reasons the court did so. Furthermore, the 
court has to state which considerations have guided the solution of the specific legal issue. In the case of 
conviction the court has to name the found circumstances of aggravation (German: Erschwerungsumstände) 
and abatement (German: Milderungsumstände).  
394 According to section 86 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure it is not necessary to issue and 
deliver the court order, if it was proclaimed orally and the beneficiaries (persons with the right of appeal) 
abandon their right of appeal.  
395 section 87 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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 persons claiming that their subjective rights have been violated by the court during a hearing 
of evidence.396  
 
A warrant can only be issued by the court when requested by the public prosecution in form 
of a written court order. Both, the request as well as the approval – the actual warrant – have 
to be based on justifications and include the frame, the borders and the target of that specific 
warrant. In addition, it is always the public prosecution which is responsible for conducting 
and the court which is responsible for granting the subjective, personal rights of the affected 
person.  
 
3.4.2 Search of Locations and Objects 
3.4.2.1 General Aspects 
According to section 119 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure it is admissible 
to search locations and objects, if it is assumed that there is a person suspected of a criminal 
act hiding, or that there are objects or traces present to be seized or to be analyzed. A search of 
objects in the sense of section 119 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure can also be 
applied for the search of a computer, as a computer as a physical object that can be 
searched.397 In this regard section 119 para. 1 refers further to the corresponding definition in 
section 117 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure defining the term search of 
locations and objects as the search of  
a. premises, rooms, vehicles or vessels not publicly accessible, and  
b. flats or other locations protected by householder’s rights398 and of objects located in 
such.  
 
                                                          
396 These appeals are called 'Säumnisbeschwerde' in the case of an appeal of the public prosecution, and 
'Maßnahmenbeschwerde' in the latter case; cf. section 87 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure as well as Fabrizy (2008), section 87, p. 200. 
397 cf. e.g. Buermeyer, Technischer Hintergrund, p. 158.  
398 In general such locations mean premises directly used by landlords and their families, for living or even 
commercial purposes; the rights of the householder involve also parts of a house not occupied or 
inhabitable; cf. KH 834.  
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Important in this context is that publicly accessible locations like parks, streets or hallways do 
not fall under lit a and can be searched without any special documents.399 IT facilities, thus 
hardware such as external hard drives, computers, laptops etc, are subsumed under the term 
‘objects’. This means that the search of a computer, the extract of the hard drive or the 
copying of the data stored on a computer is covered by the definition of search of locations 
and objects.400 The provision of section 119 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure can be applied to data storage devices so that criminal police can search them. 
Evidence for this point of view can be found in the final report of an inter-ministerial working 
group where Kopetzky remarks in this context that the search of physical devices (personal 
computers, PDAs, servers, etc) can be conducted directly on site or in a well-equipped 
forensic laboratory.401  
 
3.4.2.2 Different Locations – Different Requirements 
Art 9 Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender in 
accordance with Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides a right for everyone that their private and family lives, as well as their 
homes and correspondences are protected.402 Only in very specific situations, an interference 
of these rights can be accepted, which guarantees that only lawful searches shall be 
conducted.403 According to the constant ruling of the Austrian Constitutional Court, 
householder’s rights secure the dignity and the independence of the flat etc holder, especially 
in regard to circumstances and facts which are customary acknowledged to be protected from 
                                                          
399 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 165.  
400 Lachinger, Edith, Die Online-Durchsuchung als Erweiterung des Ermittlungsinstrumentariums (2008), p. 
28; cf. as well Tipold, Alexander, Zerbes, Ingeborg WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 10.  
401 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 14; for Germany cf. as well Buermeyer, Technischer Hintergrund, p. 158.  
402 While Art 9 Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender does only provide 
protection against random searches conducted by national authorities, Art 8 Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms grants protection against any interference with householder's 
rights. Hence, the latter provision is much broader than the former which is mainly due to the fact that 
while the former constitutes a formal reservation the latter is seen as a substantive reservation; cf. in this 
respect already the illustrations in the context of the Austrian Constitutional Law above; moreover cf. 
VfSlg 14864/1997. 
403 If the affected person agrees with the coercive measure, meaning the entering of the criminal police is 
founded on the voluntary consent of the affected person (i.e. the search was allowed by them), the measure 
loses its coercive character. This implements even that the consent of one person out of more occupying a 
flat (e.g.: the wife consents in a search of a location occupied by herself and her husband) is sufficient, so 
that the measure looses this character; cf. in this respect especially VfSlg 5738 and 6696/1971. This fact 
implies that the measure is not an exercise of direct administrative power and compulsion; cf. VfSlg 
10.850.  
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the insight of third persons.404 This indicates that in order to conduct a legal search, a court 
order – thus a warrant – may be needed. ‘May’ because of a distinction between two different 
types of locations mentioned above has to be done: 
 A search of flats or other locations protected by householder’s rights405 and of objects 
located in such (section 117 no. 2 lit b of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure), 
does not only need a direction of the public prosecution but also judicial approval by a 
court. Thus a warrant is needed.  
 A search of premises, rooms, vehicles or vessels not publicly accessible (section 117 
no. 2 lit a of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure) can be generally conducted by 
the criminal police without a warrant. However, a search according to lit a has also to 
be based on the same concrete suspicious circumstances as a search according to lit b.  
 
The case of a search of premises, rooms, vehicles or vessels not publicly accessible406, will be 
presented subsequently.  
 
3.4.2.3 Locations Protected by Householder’s Rights 
Section 117 no. 2 lit b of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
3.4.2.3.1 Searching  
The term ‘search’ in the context of a search of locations and objects means everything going 
beyond an ordinary active inspection.407 By ordinary inspections we mean inter alia situations 
where an officer of the criminal police seeks for specific objects within specified locations 
                                                          
404 cf. KH 2285, cf. furthermore, Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 506, p. 105; they state furthermore that even a 
systematic inspection of at least a specific item (according to the Austrian Constitutional Court constant 
ruling, e.g. an armoire – cf. VfSlg 10897/1986, 11895/1988,) can be classified as a search of locations and 
objects.  
405 Independent from their usage (private or for business purposes) gardens, subleased rooms and even hotel 
rooms, surgeries, stables and barns, chambers of notaries, lawyers, or offices as well as motor homes are 
covered by this terminology besides customary houses and flats; cf. especially Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO 
[2005], section 139, MN 2. 
406 There are no householder's rights in regard to containers, cars or suitcases located outside protected areas 
(protected by householder's rights). However, as Tipold/Zerbes point out, a search of this objects would 
constitute an interference with privacy; cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 5.  
407 cf. in this respect VfSlg 11650/1988 or 12122/1989. 
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and where it is not necessary that the officer opens containers or uncovers a concealment. If 
this happens in such an area (location protected by householders’ rights), an official search is 
conducted.408 The aim of a search is to find suspects, objects or traces related to a criminal 
offense.409 While there is rather little need for further clarification in regard to the term 
‘offenders’, there is such a need for objects or traces. First of all, objects could be used as 
evidence in the further investigation and later on in the main trial. The range of possible 
objects is quite broad and includes, for instance, guns used for committing a criminal act, 
preparatory tools such as maps, the stolen property but also objects which may include further 
clues to aid the investigation (for instance a directory of a computer).410 Suspect or not, 
private persons as well as legal persons can become subjected to a search,411 if this person 
constitutes the holder of the householder’s rights of the target location.412 The properties of a 
holder involve the actual control over the location, meaning that – for instance –legal owners 
of a house are not holders of a flat, even if they are in possession of a key to it, if this flat is 
hired out. This is an important fact to consider since certain rights as well as obligations are 
closely connected with the characteristic of being holder of a location.413 
 
3.4.2.3.2 Reasonable Suspicion 
In addition to the already presented general requirements for a warrant, there has to be 
reasonable suspicions concerning a committed criminal act. This suspicion has to be present 
before a warrant can be issued and the search can be conducted.414 This means that a search 
can only be conducted if there is a concrete and reasonable assumption (based on evidence) 
                                                          
408 cf. in this respect, for further details and the related critique Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, 
MN 7-8; note in this context that a simple entering of such a location in order to determine whether a flat is 
occupied or not, does not constitute a search of locations; cf. in this respect VfSlg 14864/1997. 
409 According to the Austrian Constitutional Court, a search of locations is only given, if a search is conducted 
in order to find persons or objects whose residence is not known. Simple entering of a flat during the search 
for a person, in order to interview the persons present in that flat regarding the residence of the suspect 
person, does not constitute a search of locations and objects as defined by sections 119 et seq.of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. in this respect VfSlg 5080/1965, 6528/1971, 9766/1983, 
10547/1985, 11650/1988, 12056/1989, 12628/1991. 
410 Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 15. 
411 cf. Lohsing, Ernst, Österreichisches Strafprozeßrecht, 4th edition (1952), p. 265.  
412 Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 24. 
413 Please cf. as well below, the definition of a holder in respect to surveillance of data and communication, 
and the corresponding rights and obligations evolving from the position of a location's holder below; cf. 
furthermore Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 24-9. 
414 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 463 p. 130; however, this is also a legal requirement for an issued search warrant – 
cf. concerning this as well LG Klagenfurt 17.01.2008 7 Bl 8/08g stating that the command or authorization 
of a warrant requires the concrete suspicion of a committed criminal act; furthermore VwGH 8.9.1988, 
88/16/0093.  
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that a person/object/trace is situated within an area protected by householder’s rights.415 
Searches without such suspicion, hence searches conducted only on the basis of unspecified 
speculation or hope to gather suspicion thereby, are not allowed and will be dismissed at trial. 
This is also true for searches not indicating what is searched for.416 Moreover, the mentioned 
assumption has to be in existence already in advance – thus prior to the actual search. 
Out of section 119 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure special requirement of 
justification for an issued warrant can be drawn: it is necessary to name the essential 
circumstances on which the certain search warrant is based on. This includes especially matter 
of facts letting the criminal police assume that the item/person searched for is at the location, 
which should be searched.417 In addition, there is the requirement that a warrant has to include 
an explanation, naming the object assumed in a flat etc. and how it anticipates to assist the 
solution of a criminal act.418 This involves an illustration of the importance of the object for 
the investigation – hence a comprehensive clarification of the objects significance.419 The 
court in its function as controlling authority is obligated to guarantee that the infringement is 
proportional to the investigated criminal act.420 Proportional means that there has to be the 
right amount of balance between a coercive measure and the seriousness of a committed 
criminal act. The same word is used in regard to a committed criminal act and its punishment. 
The more serious the criminal act, the more serious is the correlating punishment. Hence, if 
the public prosecution requests a search concerning homicide, the court will approve a search 
but not if the public prosecution does so because of a minor theft.421  
 
3.4.2.3.3 Rights of Affected Persons 
Taking the principles of legality and proportionality into account, the Austrian Code of 
                                                          
415 cf. Schäfer, Karl in Löwe-Rosenberg, StPO, 25th edition, section 103 margin number (MN) 14; cf. 
furthermore, VfSlg 12267/1990. 
416 cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 30. 
417 cf. 14 Os 172/01. 
418 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 119, p. 266. 
419 cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 32. 
420 cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 510, p. 106; this involves especially that interferences are not allowed in 
circumstances where there is a voluntary participation of the affected persons. However, this does not mean 
that the investigating authorities are obliged to use a search of locations and objects as last resort, meaning 
that only if other – less intrusive investigation methods are fruitless, it is allowed to conduct an enforceable 
search. cf. Mayerhofer, Christoph, Das österreichische Strafrecht, Strafprozessordnung §§ 1 – 270 (2004), 
p. 340.  
421 In this respect cf. the further remarks in the chapter on surveillance of communication in this thesis. 
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Criminal Procedure states in section 121 para. 1 that the affected person422 has to be informed 
about the reasons for the search and what is searched for. Then, either acceptance of the 
search will be requested, or the demanded items may be handed over voluntarily. This means 
that the criminal police is, by law ,obligated to inform the affected persons about the reason 
for search and what is search, as well as about their right to object to this measure. This is a 
general rule of criminal law, stated in section 6 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure and refers directly to the already mentioned European Convention on Human 
Rights and the right to a fair trial.423 For instance, there is a provision concerning the 
reimbursement of expenses related to the compliance with the obligation.424 Only if there is a 
possible periculum in mora (danger in delay), one can refrained from this request. The 
criminal police has to grant the person in possession of the location or object (i.e. the holder) 
the opportunity to hand over the items, or to rebut the grounds for the search.425 In this 
context it is further to note that the criminal police – within the borders of proportionality – is 
even entitled to use force, in order to enforce the direction.426  
Furthermore, in the case of the securing427 of an item or data, the criminal police has to 
inform and confirm the affected person in writing about the search. This confirmation has to 
list all items secured by the criminal police, and to include legal instructions in regard to the 
affected person’s right of appeal against the securing.428 The criminal police is obliged to hand 
over this confirmation immediately or to inform the affected person within 24 hours.429  
 
In addition, it is the fundamental right of the affected person to be present while a search of 
locations and objects is conducted and a personal confidant may be brought in,430 as stated in 
section 121 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. This is not just simply a right, 
                                                          
422 An affected person is the person whose rights are affected directly by the order or the conduct of any means 
of coercive; cf. for the definition section 48 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
423 cf. Art 6 ECHR para. 3 determining civil minimum rights of an accused in criminal investigations.  
424 Persons not suspected themselves of a specific criminal act do have the right to request reimbursement of 
the costs in regard to their expenditures; however suspects do not have such rights; cf. section 111 para. 3 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
425 cf. Bertel, Venier (2009), MN 306, p. 91. 
426 cf. section 93 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; however, it is to note in this context that 
if the criminal police exceeds the warrant/court order, this can constitute an illegitimate interference of the 
constitutionally granted householder's right.  
427 cf. below in 'Additional Empowerment by a Search Warrant'. 
428 In respect to the term securing please cf. below; this right to appeal is stated in sections 106 and 115 para. 2 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 157.  
429 cf. section 111 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
430 e.g. it is allowed to bring in an attorney-at-law; in this respect it is further to note that the affected person is 
free to leave the location of the search in order to contact an attorney-at-law (for example to have an 
undisturbed phone call with the attorney-at-law); cf. Seiler (2009), MN 469, p. 132. 
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the criminal police has to ensure the affected person can take advantage of this right. The 
holder, however, does not have to be present, if he chooses not to. Provision para. 2 states 
that, if there is a possible danger in delaying the search process, the right for a personal 
confidant may be omitted if it takes too long for them to be on scene. Furthermore, the 
criminal police can deny the participation of a personal confidant, if this person is suspected 
to be involved in the investigated criminal act.431 Information about this right can be withheld 
in such cases. This does, however, not implement that the criminal police is not obliged to 
inform the affected person at all in case of danger in delay.432 Section 121 para. 2 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure further regulates that in circumstances where holders of 
the flat are not present, an adult flat mate is able to exercise these rights accordingly. In 
addition, when there is danger in delay it is possible to name two reliable, not involved 
persons in order to overcome the lack of presence of the affected person. The main reason for 
this is an indulgent conducting of the search.433 Besides the holders of the location and their 
confidants (e.g. an attorney-at-law), the public prosecution is entitled to be present during a 
search. If the affected person is not suspected of the actual criminal act, the criminal police 
does not have to postpone the conducting until the confidant, such as a attorney-at-law 
arrives.434  
 
One of the most important rights in this context is the right to avoid self incrimination. In the 
court of law nobody can be forced to testify against themselves or close relatives in criminal 
proceedings. This also applies to the compliance with court order and directions that suspects 
and their close relatives do not have to follow. The criminal police can, however, secure and 
seize objects from suspects. The principle of ‘nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare’ does not apply 
in this context.435  
 
Section 122 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure states another fundamental 
right of affected persons: they have to be informed about the circumstance of a search, 
immediately or within the first 24 hours. This written confirmation has to include information 
that a search has been conducted, the corresponding results and – where applicable – 
directions of the public prosecution including the approval of the court. Issuing authority of 
                                                          
431 cf. section 160 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
432 In respect to danger in delay please cf. the illustration below.  
433 cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 142, MN 6. 
434 cf. further Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 142, MN 7. 
435 Nevertheless, as Pilnacek/Pleischl point out precisely, it is especially not allowed to use coercive detention 
against suspects; cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 474, p. 99.  
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this confirmation can only be the criminal police, as they conduct a search. The confirmation 
has to include a directory of the secured and seized items and documents.436 
 
Unlike the confirmation, an explanation on rights of appeal has to already be handed over at 
the time of the actual search on site.437  
 
3.4.2.3.4 Excursus: Particular Professions and Confidentiality 
For professionals who swore an oath of confidentiality, such as attorneys-at-law, notaries, 
repositories, physicians, media editors etc438, this provision includes a special regulation. 
When the criminal police wants to search a location, which is used exclusively by such 
professionals, a representative of the legal entity representing the interests of that profession 
has to be present. This representative has to be brought in ex officio. These representatives are 
to ensure the confidential relationship between these certain professions and their clients 
remain intact. A professional’s obligation of confidentiality towards his client cannot be 
breached by such search warrants.439 Only in circumstances where these professionals 
themselves are suspected of having committed a criminal act, is it possible for the criminal 
police to (legally) search their premises.440 section 60 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, further states that defense lawyers have to be excluded of the proceedings if they 
are inter alia suspected of the involvement of the same criminal act as their client.441 It is 
illegal to search the office of defense lawyers as long as they are not yet excluded from the 
proceedings. Section 60 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the proceedings 
intended to clarify whether a defending lawyer is under suspicion or not.442  
                                                          
436 cf. below in 'Additional Empowerment by a Search Warrant'; and Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 247, p. 88. 
437 cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 522, p. 109.  
438 cf. section 157 para. 1 no. 2 – no.4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
439 cf. section 144 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. furthermore Tipold, Zerbes, WK-
StPO [2005], section 142, MN 8. 
440 cf. section 144 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and OGH 31.1.1992, 16 Os 15/91. 
441 Another situation mentioned in section 60 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure is where the 
defending lawyer uses the association with the detained suspected to commit criminal acts or to endanger 
the security and order of a penal institution, e.g. by transporting illegal items or messages. para. 2 offers the 
actual proceeding for the exclusion of a defending lawyer; further circumstances leading to an exclusion are 
provided by section 10 para. 1 of the Austrian Lawyer's Act.  
442 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 246, pp. 87-88. 
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3.4.2.3.5 Additional Empowerment by a Search Warrant 
Securing and Seizure 
The warrant empowers the criminal police to search all objects situated in the stated area. 
Hence, the investigators are allowed to search all furniture, bags, boxes etc.443 In addition to 
this and according to section 110 para. 1 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, a 
warrant empowers the conducting agency to secure all items searched for.444 In order for these 
secured items to be seized, the public prosecution has to request the seizure at court. If the 
requirements for a seizure are not given, the securing has to be overturned and the item 
returned to the owner.445 The difference between securing and seizure is that the actual 
securing of an item is the establishment of the authority to dispose of it and that securing is 
only a temporary/provisional measure intended to secure evidence. Contrary to this, seizure 
presumes already an actual securing and represents a judicial decision intended to establish 
and perpetuate legally the authority to dispose.446  
 
3.4.2.3.6 Obligation to Comply with a Warrant? 
While criminal police has the right to secure items during a search, the person in possession 
of an item of interest has the duty to hand it over if asked to do so. Items subject to securing 
have to either be handed to the criminal police or the access to these items has to be granted. 
This has to be done by the person who has the item at his/her disposal. In order to establish 
the duty to hand the item searched for to the criminal police, it is to say that the criminal 
police has only to assume that somebody has the item at his/her disposal. This person is 
obliged to hand it to the criminal police.447 If the presumed person does not comply with 
his/her obligation,448 this compliance can be enforced. These coercive means are listed in 
section 93 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and include, amongst others, 
monetary penalties of up to Euro 10,000 and possible imprisonment for up to six weeks. 
Additionally, section 111 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure points explicitly 
                                                          
443 cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 32. 
444 cf. in this respect the ruling of the Austrian Constitutional Court, VfSlg. 2990/1956, 7067/1973.  
445 according to sections 113 para. 3, 115 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
446 cf. the definitions given in section 109 no. 1 and no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; further 
cf. Bertel, Venier, (2006), pp. 72-79; as well as Seiler (2009), pp. 126-128. 
447 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 215, p. 77. 
448 Concerning the actual obligations cf. section 93 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
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to the provisions dealing with the search of locations and objects in this matter.  
 
Another important aspect, mentioned in section 111 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure is that if data stored on data carriers have to be secured. This means that the holder 
of the data carrier449 with access information has – on request – to grant criminal police access 
to this data. As electronic sets of data are immaterial objects, they need physical embodiment 
for their existence. A search for electronic data is therefore indivisible connected to the search 
for the related data carrier.450 Access can be enabled by providing a password or a code.451 
The obligation to provide access includes moreover that the holder of the demanded data 
(carrier) has to hand over the electronic data carrier or a copy of it in a customary file format, 
or to produce such a file format. In addition, the person has to accept the production of a 
backup copy of the data stored on that data carrier.452  
 
3.4.2.3.7 Accidental Discoveries 
In this respect it is moreover to remark that if the criminal police finds items suspected to be 
of matter in other criminal cases than a warrant was issued, the criminal police is allowed to 
secure these items as well.453 In this circumstance it is mandatory that the criminal police 
enters these findings into the records of the proceedings and informs the public prosecution. 
The public prosecution then evaluates whether it wants to request the seizure of these items at 
the criminal court. If the public prosecution comes to the solution that the securing was not 
legitimate – thus the circumstances under which a securing and thereafter a seizure can be 
conducted, are not given, or are cancelled – it has to suspend the securing process.454 
Moreover, the criminal police can secure items if danger in delay is given. At this juncture, 
the criminal police is obligated to request approval from the public prosecution (section 99 
                                                          
449 cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 217, p. 77. 
450 cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 475, p. 99 who refer especially to the problems regarding huge computer 
networks and state that data could be hidden in such networks rather than be stored just on a computer. 
Hence it would be advantageous to know the 'architecture' of a network.  
451 cf. Bertel, Venier, (2006), MN 217, p. 77. 
452 According to the Explanatory Report to this provision (section 111 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure), its establishment is mainly due to Austria's signing of the Convention on Cybercrime; cf. 
EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 156; cf. in this regard as well the subchapter on encryption and decryption.  
453 Accidental discoveries: e.g. a search warrant was issued in order to seize illegal drugs and the criminal 
police finds suspected stolen goods; cf. e.g. Seiler (2009), MN 468 p. 132. 
454 cf. sections 113 para. 3, 122 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
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para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure) whereas the public prosecution has to 
request judicial seizure of the items (section 113 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure). However, there are no exact specification in the Austrian legal system stating the 
time frame for the public prosecution to evaluate the legitimacy of a securing.  
 
3.4.2.3.8 Danger in Delay (periculum in mora) 
A search of locations and objects is allowed even without a warrant if a periculum in mora 
(danger in delay) is present. This means that it was not possible for the criminal police to 
obtain directions from the public prosecution and the regular needed judicial approval without 
endangering the success of a search, or as Bertel/Venier put it, the taken action is so urgent 
that it is not even possible to receive an oral command from the public prosecution.455 An 
evaluation whether danger in delay was present when the criminal police conducted the 
search is subject to a rigorous benchmark.456 Such situations are given where even a slight 
delay would destroy an object searched for, or if it would enable the escape of a suspect.457 
The latter is especially true if, for example, the suspect was caught in the act of committing a 
crime or his involvement in the crime is evident.458 
 
As mentioned previously, the criminal police has to inform the affected person and to request 
an acceptance of the search.459 However, in situations of danger in delay, the criminal police 
can refrain from its obligation to inform and to request acceptance of the search. Note in this 
regard that, as Bertel/Venier point out, there can never be the danger of a rough delay, if the 
affected persons are informed about the main causes for the search and about their right to be 
present. On the contrary, only an informed person is able to contribute to the search and hand 
over the item searched for.460 
                                                          
455  cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 211, p. 75; furthermore the rulings of the Austrian Constitutional Court 
VfSlg 9210/1981, 12513/1990 or 12657/1991.  
456 cf. concerning this benchmark of danger in delay e.g. VfSlg 12701/1991 or 13043/1992 in the context of 
detentions.  
457 cf. VfSlg 1890/1949, 1980, 2861/1955 or 5083/1965; however, Seiler argues that in respect to this aspect of 
danger in delay it is to remark that a simple, potential loss of evidence does not constitute such a situation; 
cf. Seiler (2009), MN 468 p. 132; contrary to this Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 141, MN 1. 
458 In regard to obviousness it is to say that this can be if a person is trapped with the loot or the weapon used 
in a criminal activity by an organ of the security agency (and not by a 'private person'). 
459 cf. already above and section 121 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
460 cf. Bertel, Venier (2009), MN 306, p. 91. 
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According to section 122 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the criminal 
police is obliged to report immediately if it conducted a search of flats or other locations 
protected by householder’s rights and of objects located in such (section 117 no. 2 lit b of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure) when there was danger in delay if there was no warrant 
for a conducted search at all. This special report is called ‘Anlassbericht’461 and has to include 
a detailed description of the circumstances leading to the urgency of a search in this specific 
case. This means that the criminal police has to justify the taken action in a formal report. 
Simple speculations, hypothetical considerations or even assumptions based on every day 
criminal investigation experience, regardless of the case, are therefore not sufficient as basis 
for danger in delay. Periculum in mora has to be founded on supporting evidences of the 
specific case.462 The simple potential loss of evidence, for example, does not constitute a 
situation of danger in delay. Furthermore, the report has to include a justification why the 
notification of the public prosecution was not possible. The public prosecution has to get a 
well-founded report on which it can base their also well-justified request for approval of the 
search. If this approval is denied by the court, both the criminal police as well as the public 
prosecution are constrained to re-establish the appropriate legal situation. This means, that 
data and traces gathered during an illegal search have to be dismissed and secured items have 
to be returned.463  
 
In every case of periculum in mora the affected person is entitled to be informed either 
immediately or within a 24-hour-time-span. This written confirmation has to include the 
information that a search has been conducted, the corresponding results and – where 
applicable – the direction of the public prosecution including the approval of the court.464 
 
3.4.2.3.9 Accidental Discoveries vs. Danger in Delay  
Periculum in mora and accidental discoveries deal with a somewhat similar issue. The main 
difference between this two regulations and the way situations of danger in delay are handled, 
                                                          
461 cf. section 100 para. 2 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure stating that such a report has to be 
conducted in circumstances where the criminal police considers a direction or an approval of the public 
prosecution or a decision of the court as necessary or suitable; or if the public prosecution requests a report.  
462 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 169.  
463 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 169.  
464 cf. section 122 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
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is that the former assumes an issued warrant while the latter expects that there is none while a 
search is taking place. Moreover, the former deals with accidental discoveries during a search 
approved by a specific warrant regarding another criminal act, while the latter deals with 
searches conducted completely without any warrant. Accidental discoveries do not only just 
involve the securing of an item but the infringement is also less serious due to the issued 
warrant for the search. Periculum in mora represent circumstances without any prior judicial 
control. However, both regulations provide fast and appropriate action and a broad and 
unrestrained a posteriori judicial control does not contravene.  
In principle, both regulations deal with the problem of ‘imperfect’ warrants in the same way 
with the slight distinction that the public prosecution must not necessarily inform the court 
about the securing of items in danger in delay case. It is allowed to direct the criminal police 
to return items not believed to be of any concern in other criminal matters to the rightful 
owner. Only if the public prosecution comes to the conclusion that the secured items are 
needed in another criminal trial, it has to request judicial seizure of these things. In the latter 
case, where there is no warrant at all and the criminal police conducted a search due to 
periculum in mora, it is mandatory that judicial approval is requested afterward.465  
Hence, any interference with householder’s rights is always subject to judicial control.466  
 
3.4.2.4 Search of Locations not Publicly Accessible  
Section 117 no. 2 lit a of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure  
As mentioned above, there is a distinction between a search of locations and objects protected 
by householder’s rights and a search of premises, rooms, vehicles or vessels not publicly 
accessible. While it is necessary for the former to be based on a warrant – or, as presented as 
well, to be justified by a corresponding judicial decision afterwards – the latter kind of search 
can be conducted without any special (formal) requirement or approval, either before or after 
                                                          
465 Note in this context the critique of Bertel/Venier who argue that the search according to section 117 no. 2 lit 
b of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure in circumstances of danger in delay is unconstitutional 
because there is a clear dissent to section 2 HausRG (Art 9 Basic Law of 21 December, 1867 on the 
General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender, Art 8 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); cf. Bertel, Venier (2009), MN 305, p. 91. 
466 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 120, p. 268; furthermore the extensive illustration in this respect in EBRV 25 
BlgNR XXII GP, pp. 168-169.  
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a search.467 However, this does not mean that there are no requirements at all for a search of 
these locations. First of all, and most importantly, is the precondition that the criminal police 
assumes a person suspected of a criminal act hiding at the specific location, or a certain object 
or trace of interest to criminal proceedings are located at this certain location. And second of 
all, these items (object or trace) need to be seized or analyzed due to their importance in 
criminal proceedings. The demanded assumptions are identical to those needed before a 
search according to lit b. Furthermore it is – again identical to lit b – required that this 
suspicion is based on facts and evidence, thus it has to be justified.  
 
If such a situation is given, the criminal police is free to search the corresponding locations 
and does not need a special formal direction or approval from the prosecution/court. The 
criminal police is, however, still obligated to inform the affected person about the search and 
the reasons for it. Moreover, it has to request, for instance, the voluntary handing over of the 
searched items and it has to grant the affected person the same rights in regard to having a 
third party present, as shown in the presentation of lit b. The confirmation and the results of 
the search are formalities, identical to the one in the search of location protected by 
householder’s rights.468 Just like with other warrants, the criminal police is empowered – 
within the framework of a legal search – to secure found items. Similar to the proceeding 
under lit b, the criminal police has to inform the public prosecution about the securing.469 
Additionally, it is to mention that the affected person of such a search has the right to appeal 
against the acts of the criminal police.470 Thereby, the control by the public prosecution and 
the judicial protection of human rights can be accomplished.471  
 
3.4.3 Conclusion: Realization of an RFI  
Having examined the procedural provisions governing the search of a computer, a new 
question arises: Can an RFI be conducted legitimately? Thus, can it be based soundly onto the 
                                                          
467 Publicly accessible locations like parks, streets or hallways do not fall under lit a and can be searched 
without any special requirements; cf. above.  
468 cf. above and Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 251, p. 89. 
469 Remarkable in this context is that section 122 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
concerning the handling of accidental discoveries is not applicable because this regulation is referring only 
to warrant based searches; cf. Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 252, p. 89.  
470 section 106 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure – cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 106, pp. 233-236. 
471 cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 519, p. 109.  
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presented and already existing provisions of a search of locations and objects? As already 
defined at the beginning of this thesis, the author is examining the legitimacy of an RFI in 
regard to its three purposes:  
 Remote Access for Search Purposes 
 Surveillance of Activities 
 Surveillance of Telecommunication 
 
Further requirements established by the Ministry of Justice and of the Interior472 have to be 
taken into account. These preconditions involve that an RFI could be conducted in situations 
where it is necessary for the solution of a criminal act punishable by imprisonment for a 
minimum period of ten years, a criminal organization or a terrorist association according to 
sections 278a and 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code, the solution or prevention of a 
criminal act committed, or planed by such an organization or association. In addition, an RFI 
could be legally conducted if a person is strongly suspected for preparatory works in relation 
to a Criminal Organization or a Terrorist Association (section 278a, 278b of the Austrian 
Criminal Code). Hence, contrary to a customary search of locations and objects, these formal 
preconditions have to be given. If they are not, the court will not approve the request of the 
public prosecution and therefore not issue a warrant for an RFI. In such cases, however, the 
public prosecution could request a customary search of locations, thus the search cannot be 
conducted remotely.  
 
Beforehand, it is to mention that due to the nature of a search of locations and Objects 
according to sections 119 et seq. of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure in this sense, 
this provision can only deal with one task, namely the implementation of an RFI for search 
purposes. The other two purposes are – already literally – rather illogical. 
 
The question of whether a method could be subsumed under a certain provision of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal procedure has to be evaluated independently of the physical 
condition of the item searched for. This means that it does not make any difference whether 
                                                          
472 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich of 17 October, 2007.  
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the target object of a search is an electronic device respectively the data stored on it, or 
whether the criminal police is searching for any other physical objects. Moreover, as 
mentioned IT facilities are covered by the term objects and can therefore be searched as well.  
 
Generally, a search of locations and objects is an open investigation method, meaning that the 
conducting officers of the criminal police are physically present on site. As shown in this 
context, the affected persons as well as the criminal police do have not only obligations but 
also rights when a search is conducted lawfully. For instance, the criminal police has to 
inform the affected person about the reasons for the search and what is searched for. The 
affected person itself has to be requested for acceptance of the search, or to hand over the 
demanded items voluntarily.473 Moreover, the affected persons are entitled to be present or to 
bring in a personal confidant, while a search is conducted and they have to be informed about 
the circumstance of a search, immediately or within 24 hours.474 The rights of the affected 
person are fundamental procedural rights guaranteed by Art 6 ECHR and can therefore not be 
ignored. This guarantee of a fair trial does, however, not comply with an RFI as this 
investigation method is intended to be done secretively, meaning that the affected person does 
not have any knowledge about the ongoing investigation. An application of sections 119 et 
seq. of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure in respect to an RFI would lead to an evasion 
of constitutional granted rights of the affected person.  
 
Moreover, the principle of an openly conducted search is prevailing in order to limit the 
competences of undercover agents, leading thereby to an equalization of ‘arms’475 in a 
criminal trial.476 Despite the fact that a computer can be subsumed under the term ‘object’, 
according to this provision477, the actual search of a computer can only be conducted in an 
open and direct manner, meaning that the remote access to stored data on a computer is not 
granted by sections 119 et seq. of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. The same is true 
for the securing (and the seizure afterwards) of items found on a computer prior to the 
                                                          
473 cf. already above and section 121 para. 1 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
474 cf. already above and sections 121 para. 2, para. 3 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
475 A principle emerging from the principle to a fair trial (Art 6 ECHR).  
476 cf. in this respect Jahn, Matthias, Kudlich, Hans, Die strafprozessuale Zulässigkeit der Online-
Durchsuchung, in JR 2/2007, pp. 57-61 furthermore, in respect to the German point of view cf. BGH 
Beschluss of 31 January, 2007, StB 18/08, in JZ 15/16/2007, pp. 796-800, including further remarks of 
Cornelius, Kai. 
477 cf. above and Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2005], section 139, MN 10.  
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computer’s official seizing. It is necessary that the investigation authorities conduct a search. 
Without a search, the criminal police is not entitled to secure evidence.478  
 
This view is also supported by a report of an expert group, stating that a search of locations 
and objects, as well as the securing and seizure of items implies the physical contact with a 
physical location, thus the physical appearance of the investigation authorities at this 
location.479 As it is exactly the intention of the investigation authorities to avoid physical 
presence on site, contentions stating that an RFI could be conducted legitimately via these 
procedural provision are not knock down arguments. Hence, an RFI in the form of a remote 
examination of a computer cannot be based on these provisions. 
 
3.4.4 Surveillance of Communication 
3.4.4.1 General Aspects 
The amendment of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002,480 which went into 
effect in 2008, brought some important alterations and extensions. It was clearly stated that 
the new regulations dealing with the surveillance of communication in chapter 5 involve 
every kind of communication, no matter how it is transmitted. While the former regulations 
were limited to communication transmitted via means of telecommunication, the new 
provisions include all means of transmission. Hence, surveillance in a wider sense – i.e. the 
seizure of letters,481 the disclosure of transmission data, the surveillance of communication as 
well as the optical and acoustical surveillance of persons – are all included, independent of 
technology.482 This also included now particularly communication conveyed via a computer 
system.483 
                                                          
478 There are, however, exceptions of this principle – cf. section 110 para. 3 Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  
479 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 33. 
480 Federal Law Gazetta 134/2002. 
481 Note in this respect that a seizure of a letter cannot be involved as these a physical items and are not 
conveyed electronically rather than they are handed over physically from one person to another; cf. Tipold, 
Alexander, Zerbes, Ingeborg, WK-StPO section 134, MN 1 et seq. 
482 cf. Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 584, p. 121.  
483 The Explanatory Report states explicitly that this includes as well that a communication can be transferred 
via a customary telecommunication network before entering into a computer system and vice versa; cf. 
EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 187.  
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The procedure for every surveillance method is governed by sections 137 – 140 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. While sections 137 and 138 deal directly with the 
execution of surveillance, sections 139 and 140 handle the obligations of the investigating 
authorities and rights of the affected person after a conducted surveillance. As these 
regulations apply to all forms of surveillance, this chapter is going to commence with a brief 
presentation of these rules, which will be followed by an overview on further cornerstones 
and principles in this context. Thereafter, the actual surveillance methods will be illustrated in 
detail, including further information on procedural requirements and specifics. 
 
3.4.4.2 Common Regulations according to  
Section 137 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and 
Section 138 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
According to these provisions, an optical and acoustical surveillance due to hostage-takings 
does not need the approval of the public prosecution or a court, rather than it can be 
conducted by criminal police itself. This is the only case where the criminal police is allowed 
to take actions without directions mainly due to the urgency in such circumstances. For all 
other investigation measures according to sections 135 and 136 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the criminal police needs a direction from the public prosecution, which, 
for itself, needs judicial approval for every surveillance activity.484 The entering of locations 
protected by householder’s rights – according to section 136 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure – demands, in every single case, the explicit judicial approval.485 For a 
temporal frame for surveillance measures,486 section 137 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure governs that directions have to be made for future periods – only in the 
case of a disclosure of transmission data487 past periods can be covered as well. A renewal of a 
direction is possible, if certain facts indicate– that a continued execution of surveillance 
would be fruitful. Important to note in this context is that an ongoing surveillance has to end, 
if the requirements, on which it was based, are no longer given.  
 
                                                          
484 cf. already above in the context of a search of locations and objects.  
485 cf. below.  
486 Measures according to sections 135 and 136 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
487 section 135 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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3.4.4.2.1 Formal Requirements 
From a formal point of view section 138 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure sets out 
the requirements for the directions of the public prosecution as well as the judicial approvals 
(court orders). Each of them have to include  
 the designation of the proceeding,  
 the name of the defendant,  
 the committed criminal act the defendant is suspected for, and its legal term, as well as 
 the facts justifying the necessity and proportionality488 of the measure for the solution 
of the specific criminal act.  
 
Further, special requirements are mentioned relating to the disclosure of transmission data, the 
surveillance of communication as well as the optical and acoustical surveillance of persons. 
Directions as well as the corresponding court orders have to mention  
 name or other identification criterion of the technical facility holder,489 or the person 
to monitor,  
  the relevant location, 
 type of the communication conveyance, the technical facility and the terminal device 
or the type of technical device (potentially) used for an optical and acoustical 
surveillance, 
 start and end time of a measure,  
 rooms subject to legitimate entering,490 
 facts stating possible danger for public security.491 
                                                          
488 cf. regarding the proportionality below.  
489 cf. below concerning the surveillance of communication.  
490 according to section 136 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
491 In the case of section 136 para. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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The further content of the written directions/approvals is governed by section 86 and section 
105 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure – thus there has to be a justification 
(the grounds of the decision) and an explanation on rights of appeal.492 Section 138 para. 2 of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure obliges the operators of mail as well as 
telecommunication services to assist in criminal investigations. For instance it is stated that 
providers (according to section 92 para. 1 no.3 of the Austrian Telecommunications Act 
2003)493 and other service providers (according to sections 13, 16 and 18 para. 2 of the 
Austrian E-Commerce Act – namely host, service, and access providers) have the obligation 
to provide specific information and to contribute to the investigation on request of the public 
prosecution. This obligation has to be stated explicitly via a separate direction mentioning the 
original direction (to the criminal police).494  
 
3.4.4.2.2 Evaluation of Surveillance 
It is the public prosecution’s duty to evaluate the findings,495 to organize the transformation of 
the relevant evidence into written form and to file it. In this respect, special attention has to be 
drawn to sections 140 para. 1,496 144497 and 157 para. 2498 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure concerning the exclusionary rule. Moreover, at the end of surveillance measure, 
according to sections 135 para. 2 and para. 3, as well as 136 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the public prosecution is bound to deliver its direction including the corresponding 
judicial approval to the defendant and any other affected person.499 However, the delivery can 
be postponed if this is necessary and desirable not only for the ongoing but also for any other 
investigation proceedings.500  
                                                          
492 cf. already above the comments made in relation to the court order.  
493 Stating that ‘provider’ means an operator of public communications services; However, obviously by 
mistake section 134 para. 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure mentions section 92 para. 1 no. 3 
of the Austrian Telecommunications Act 2003 meaning in fact section 92 para. 3 no. 1 of the Austrian 
Telecommunications Act 2003; cf. as well Reindl-Krauskopf, Susanne, WK-StPO sections 137, 138, MN 
38.  
494 cf. section 137 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
495 according to section 134 no. 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
496 cf. below. 
497 religious official secrecy and profession sworn to confidentiality. 
498 denial of evidence.  
499 Regarding the corresponding rights of the defendants and other affected persons please cf. below.  
500 e.g. because there is an investigation going on in relating organized crime.  
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3.4.4.2.3 Principles of Surveillance 
The principles of legality and proportionality, two of the main principles of law, are important 
in the context of coercive measures and all surveillance activities performed by investigation 
authorities. Based on this fact – stated explicitly in section 5 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure – the activities of the criminal police, the public prosecution and the 
courts shall be based on law.501 No activities are allowed to interfere with the rights of 
persons, except in cases where there is explicitly a regulation and the interference is necessary 
for the criminal police to fulfill its tasks – i.e. the solution of crimes.502 Every activity 
performed by investigation authorities has to be based on legal regulations. Prohibition of 
analogy503 concerning interferences with human rights has to be taken into account. By 
implication this means, however, that measures dedicated to the fulfillment of the tasks which 
do not interfere with such rights, are always allowed.504 Moreover, it is pointed out that each 
interference with the rights of persons has to be in an appropriate and reasonable505 balance to 
the seriousness of the criminal act, to the level of suspicion and to the intended result. In 
circumstances where there are a number of target-aimed investigation methods of coercive 
measures, only the less effective506 method or measure can be applied.507 This includes that 
the investigating authorities have to exercise their competences in a preferably gentle, and the 
integrity of the affected person respecting manner.508  
 
Legality and proportionality have to be taken into consideration and then pointed out 
explicitly. Furthermore, there has to be a system of decision making and judicial review, 
adjusted to the intensity of interference in order to point out that the ECHR is not just 
implemented theoretically but that these rights are concrete and enforceable. Moreover, on 
grounds of the principle of proportionality it can be concluded that there has to be judicial 
approval in regard to certain coercive as well as surveillance measures. This is particularly 
                                                          
501 cf. already above and Art. 18 para. 1 Federal Constitutional Law. 
502 Thus a strict tie to its tasks – hence only measures taken in order to fulfill tasks are covered by the 
provisions of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 5, p. 36. 
503 However, there is no such prohibition of analogy of criminal procedure provisions, if there is no explicit 
regulation of a question (cf. e.g. EvBl 1958/295); a corresponding prohibition like in substantive criminal 
law (ex post facto) does not exist; cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 5, p. 35. 
504 cf. EBRV25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 29 as well as Fabrizy (2008), section 5, p. 35. 
505 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 5, p. 36. 
506 For the affected person; cf. section 48 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
507 section 5 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
508 section 5 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, cf. further Fabrizy (2008), section 5, p. 36. 
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true since the European Court of Human Rights sees the engagement of courts – thus of 
independent institutions – in regard to the approval of legitimacy of an activity, as a method 
capable to avoid misuse of authority.509  
Coercive surveillance measures can pose a threat to the rights of innocent people due to the 
impact these investigations can have. Hence, prior to the surveillance measures, there has to 
be an evaluation to whether there is a balance between the interference and the seriousness of 
the criminal act, to even the suspicion and the intended result of this surveillance. This means 
that only in cases of serious criminal acts (for instance homicide) right of non-involved 
persons may legally be interfered with.510 
In addition, the Austrian legislator brought about a relief commissioner under section 146 of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure who has to be involved in the investigations. The 
agendas of the commissioner include inter alia the evaluation and control of the direction, the 
approval and conducting of covert investigations, the optical and acoustical surveillance of 
persons, as well as the surveillance of data and communication and the disclosure of 
transmission data.511 This position is intended to protect the legal interests of affected persons 
on behalf of these persons. Since human/fundamental rights or problems in respect to legal 
protection/relief are not part of this thesis, there will be no further analysis of this matter.512 
 
3.4.5 Surveillance of Data and Communication  
3.4.5.1 Introduction 
Sections 135 para. 3 and 134 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure deal with 
communication and data transmitted between two or more persons, thus these provisions 
handle the surveillance of communication. This includes all forms of new technology as well 
as all standard types of communication.513 In order to clarify the statement in the opening 
paragraph of this chapter it is necessary to present some of definitions concerning this 
                                                          
509 EBRV25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 30; cf. as well Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 26, p. 6. 
510 Reindl-Krauskopf, Susanne, WK-StPO section 135, MN 26.  
511 section 147 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
512 Please cf. for a detailed illustration of the relief commissioner Vogl, Mathias, Der Rechtschutzbeauftragte in 
Österreich (2004).  
513 Originally only the surveillance of the content of telecommunication – thus customary telephone 
conversations – were covered by the respective provision in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
(section 149 a-c); cf. further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 20. 
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context.  
 ‘Surveillance of Communication’ means  
the determination of the content of communications transmitted or forwarded over a 
communications network or via an information society service.514  
 
 ‘Communication’ means  
any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite numbers of parties by means 
of a publicly available communications service. This does not include any information 
conveyed as part of a broadcasting service to the public over a communications 
network except to the extent that the information can be related to the identifiable 
subscriber or user receiving the information.515  
 
 ‘Communications Network’ means  
transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other 
resources which permit the electronic conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by 
optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- 
and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity 
cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, 
networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, 
irrespective of the type of information conveyed.516 
It is to mention, however, that due to the fact that communication is exchanged or conveyed 
by means of a publicly available communications service (cf. above), a communication 
conducted via a local area network (LAN) or via an intercom is not covered. This means that, 
for instance, e-mails sent within a LAN or phone calls via house telephone networks cannot 
be subject on surveillance, because this communication does not happen via a public 
network.517 
                                                          
514 section 134 no. 3 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
515 section 92 para. 3 no. 7 of the Austrian Telecommunications Act 2003. 
516 section 3 no. 11 of the Austrian Telecommunications Act 2003. 
517 Such 'non-public' communication could only be monitored via an optical and acoustical surveillance of 
persons according to sections 134 no. 4 in conjuction with 136 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; 
for that cf. below and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 43. 
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 ‘Information Society Service’ means  
any service, normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means 
and at the individual request of a recipient of services.518  
Similar to communication networks, electronic transmissions can be conducted via wires, 
radio, optical or electromagnetic means. Examples for such services are inter alia various 
online services such as web shops, database services (access) and services of access and host 
providers, i.e. convey information over, granting of access to and storage of information in a 
network. The latter three are the most important out of a great variety of different services.519  
Thus, surveillance of communication can be conducted in various forms, namely by listening, 
eavesdropping, recording, intercepting or any other surveillance of the content of a 
communication.520 It is, however, not surveillance of communication if the communication is 
blocked, thus the communication does not pass the network and arrive at the receiver (no 
communication stop).521 Important in this context is that this surveillance has to be conducted 
when communication is conveyed in the respective communication networks or via an 
information society service. Not only does this provision cover customary circuit-switched 
telephone calls, fax messages or wireless messages but also packet-switched communication 
such as e-mails, Internet phone calls or SMS. The aim of surveillance of communication is to 
determine the written or spoken content of a communication transmitted over a network.522  
 
In this respect, and especially regarding the above presented search of locations and objects, a 
major question evolves, namely the question about the relationship between the surveillance 
of communication and the securing followed by the seizure of evidence (according to sections 
109 no. 1 and no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). The former constitutes the 
gathering of potential evidence in real-time, while the latter secures stored, not live, 
communication. Such communication can exists in various forms, such as a SMS on a mobile 
phone, stored e-mails on a hard drive or on the e-mail account hosted by a provider. Due to 
                                                          
518 cf. section 1 para. 1 no. 2 des Notifications Act 1999.  
519 Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 44. 
520 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 134 no. 3, p. 302; furthermore Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 
47. 
521 Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 48. 
522 cf. as well section 135 no. 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
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the fact that the former is conducted in real time an actual securing is not possible.523 The line 
between these two investigation methods can be drawn at the point where a communication 
ends – thus the point of time when the receiver actually received and recognized the content. 
Before that point of time, there is a stronger requirement for protection, meaning that no 
securing is possible and special criteria have to be given in order to conduct surveillance of 
communication. This means that, if the investigation authorities want to get knowledge about 
the content of a communication, they can do so directly via the (secured or seized) cell phone 
(SMS) or computer of one of either the receiver or the sender of the communication. This 
requires that the communication is stored on a communication device. The other possibility 
would be to rely on a provider and gather the information there. Depending where the 
information is conducted, the different rules of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
apply, namely the provisions concerning a simple securing if data are gathered directly from 
the affected person, whereas the special provisions of surveillance of data and communication 
apply if data are gathered at the provider.524  
 
Section 135 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure regulates situation where data 
and communication are monitored. Generally there are three different situations possible 
allowing the investigation authorities to monitor communication:  
 surveillance with consent – section 135 para. 3 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure 
 surveillance without consent – section 135 para. 3 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure 
 surveillance due to hostage-takings – section 135 para. 3 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure 
 
                                                          
523 Recording would be the only potential solution, however, as this term is already covered by surveillance 
and as a record of surveillance is produced by the conducting agency, it does not have to be either secured 
or even seized afterwards. Furthermore, the agency is already in possession of the evidence which legally 
belongs to nobody else than the agency.  
524 cf. in this context especially Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 49 et seq.; regarding the 
question whether it does constitute already surveillance of communication when persons enable voluntarily 
the criminal police to listen to their phone calls, cf. ibid MN 56-8. 
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3.4.5.2 Surveillance with Consent 
Section 135 para. 3 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure regulates that 
surveillance can be conducted in situations where this measure is anticipated to encourage the 
solution of a criminal act committed with criminal intent, punishable by a term of more than 6 
month imprisonment and the holder of a technical facility having been, or intended to become 
the origin or destination of a communication agrees explicitly to this investigation. The most 
prominent reason for the consent to surveillance is to aid the police in investigating the 
creator of a message and to document the content of this message, to, for instance, capture the 
originator of a death threat etc.525  
Anticipation in this context means that there is a high level of likeliness to obtain helpful 
evidence via surveillance in order to solve a potential criminal act and/or charge a suspect.526 
Nevertheless, there has to be real suspicion concerning a particular criminal act, comparable 
to the above presented suspicion concerning the search of locations and objects.527 Committed 
criminal acts are not only subject to punishment according to the Austrian Criminal Code 
alone, but rather than to all penal provisions of the Austrian legal system, if these provisions 
are punishable by a term of more than 6 months imprisonment.528  
 
The holder of a technical facility is the person who has the actual authority to decide who is 
allowed to use the facility, when, how, and under which circumstances, also referred to as the 
empowered person to dispose. Under normal circumstances, this person is in a contractual 
relationship with an operator of telecommunication services – such as host or access 
providers. The providers offer their services such as e-mail addresses or (mobile) phone 
numbers and a connection to a communication network. Thereby, they establish the 
possibility for the holder of the facility to communicate over the network, for instance via e-
mail, Internet phone calls, SMS or MMS. This situation can cause a problem if the contractual 
partner of the provider and the actual holder of the technical facility are not the same person. 
For instance, there are several people living in one household sharing one land line, or a 
company equips his employees with cell phones or separate e-mail addresses. This means that 
                                                          
525 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 499, p. 139 or Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 591, p. 122. 
526 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 135, p. 306. 
527 cf. above and especially LG Klagenfurt 17.01.2008 7 Bl 8/08g stating that the command or authorization of 
a warrant requires the concrete suspicion of a committed criminal act.  
528 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 24 referring to the Addictive Drug Act and the 
Financial Penal Act.  
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a) the holder is not the same person as the contractual relation to a provider, or b) no (single) 
holder exists, as numerous persons share the facility with the provider’s contract partner. 
However, the actual authority to dispose is needed in order to give an official declaration of 
consent. Therefore, the holder of the technical facility has to be verified and separated from 
contract partners.529 This is particularly important since the demanded consent has to be 
expressed explicitly and conclusively. Presumed consents are not satisfactory nor are consents 
given after surveillance took place.530  
If a partner to a communication agrees to a monitoring of this communication, the 
‘interference’ is legitimate. Moreover, it does not constitute an illegal interference with 
human/fundamental rights either if an investigation authority gathers knowledge of any 
communication accessible publicly (e.g. online chats or verbal communication on the 
street).531 This principle can be applied to all investigation methods to be examined.  
 
3.4.5.3 Surveillance without Consent  
According to section 135 para. 3 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
surveillance of data and communication can be conducted if this measure appears to be 
necessary  
 for the solution of criminal act committed with criminal intend, punishable by a term 
of more than one year imprisonment; 
 or for the solution or prevention of a criminal act, planed or committed in the context 
of a Criminal Organization or a Terrorist Association according to sections 278a and 
278b of the Austrian Criminal Code, or if this would be complicated otherwise, and  
a) the holder of the technical facility, having been, or intended to become the 
origin  or destination of a communication, is suspected urgently of a criminal 
                                                          
529 Furthermore and especially in regards to public accessible telecommunication facilities and pay phones cf. 
Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 27-32.  
530 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 135, p. 306; further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 33.  
531  cf. as well to BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, maxim no. 4: Verschafft der 
Staat sich Kenntnis von Inhalten der Internetkommunikation auf dem dafür technisch vorgesehenen Weg, 
so liegt darin nur dann ein Eingriff in Art. 10 Abs. 1 GG, wenn die staatliche Stelle nicht durch 
Kommunikationsbeteiligte zur Kenntnisnahme autorisiert ist. Nimmt der Staat im Internet öffentlich 
zugängliche Kommunikationsinhalte wahr oder beteiligt er sich an öffentlich zugänglichen 
Kommunikationsvorgängen, greift er grundsätzlich nicht in Grundrechte ein. 
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act committed with criminal intend, punishable by a term of more than one 
year imprisonment or of a criminal act according to sections 278a and 278b  
of the Austrian Criminal Code, or 
b) due to certain facts it is anticipated that a person suspected of a criminal act 
according to lit a, will use this technical facility or establish a connection to it.  
Surveillance procedures have generally two aims: Firstly, surveillance can be conducted in 
order to solve a criminal act and secondly it can be used to investigate criminal acts 
committed in the context of a criminal organization or a terrorist association. Since no consent 
at all is needed for such investigations, the requirements to monitor have to be consequently 
severer than in situation where there a consent is required.  
 
3.4.5.3.1 Prosecution of a Criminal Act  
In order for surveillance to be used to investigate, the particular criminal act has to be 
punishable by a term of more than one year imprisonment and carried out with criminal 
intend (dolus). Moreover, as stated in lit a, the holders of the technical facility has to be 
suspects themselves, or as stated in lit b, it is assumed that the suspects intend to use this 
technical facility or establish a connection to it.532 Another important aspect in this context is 
the phrase: ‘the appearance of necessity’; this means that surveillance is necessary in order to 
solve a criminal act, thus to establish the truth. In addition, if evidence can be gathered by less 
invasive measures than surveillance, these methods have to be implemented, because 
surveillance can only be used as a last resort (ultima ratio).533  
 
In order to conduct surveillance of data and communication, the law enforcement agencies 
must have strong suspicions about the affected person. This strong suspicion has to be based 
on both, the objective (actus reus) and subjective (mens rea) matters of fact of the actual 
criminal act.534 Strong suspicion is given in particular, if there is a high level of probability 
that the suspected person is the offender of a certain criminal act. This corresponds to the 
                                                          
532 cf. for more clarification of the term holder and the range of penal acts above under chapter 'Surveillance 
with Consent'.  
533 Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 36. 
534 cf. Fuchs, Helmut, Festschrift für Winfried Platzgummer (1995), p. 434.  
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suspicion needed to remand a person in custody.535  
 
If, according to lit b, the investigating authority assumes that the suspected offender will use 
or establish a connection to the technical facility, there has to be corresponding evidence to 
back up these assumptions. In this respect it is to say that the terms ‘use or establish a 
connection to the technical facility’ implies an active act of the suspect. The main questions in 
this context is, whether it is allowed to monitor data and communication of not suspected 
persons, if it is assumed that the suspect will contact them536  
 
3.4.5.3.2 Surveillance and Organized Crime 
Section 135 para. 3 no. 3 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the investigation 
authorities to conduct surveillance if there would be complications in regard to the solution or 
prevention of criminal acts intended to or committed in the context of the organized crime 
(sections 278 - 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code). As mentioned above, the holder of a 
technical facility has to be strongly suspicious, or the use or the establishment of a connection 
to the facility by a strongly suspected person has to be present. Contrary to the use of 
surveillance for the solution of a criminal act, it is not necessary that this investigating method 
is ultima ratio (the last resort). It can be implemented if other methods would be harder to 
conduct, cause delays, or higher financial costs.537 Furthermore, in comparison to the above 
presented surveillance situation, it is to note that it is not necessary that the committed 
criminal act is punishable by a term of more than one year imprisonment and carried out with 
criminal intend. Due to the fact that this provision deals with organized crime, suspicion in 
regard to the formation of a criminal organization or a terrorist association alone is sufficient 
for conducting surveillance. This can be seen as an extension of criminal investigation 
methods, as even criminal acts punishable by a term of less than one year imprisonment can 
be investigated by surveillance of data and communication.538 In circumstances where there is 
already suspicion regarding the foundation of a criminal organization, the criminal police is 
allowed to postpone its investigation in order to solve or prevent criminal acts about to be 
                                                          
535 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 37. 
536 cf. as well the practical example and the critique in Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 39-40, 
referring to 12 Os 152/00.  
537 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 42. 
538 cf. the extensive examination of this problem in Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 43.  
 141 
 
committed by the organization. This possibility in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, 
as mentioned above, involves another extension of the surveillance. However, as Reindl-
Krauskopf argues, there are two limitations to that: firstly there has to be strong suspicion in 
regard to the organizational aspect and secondly there has to be suspicion concerning the 
organization’s committed or planned criminal acts.539  
 
3.4.5.3.3 Surveillance due to Hostage-Takings  
Section 135 para. 3 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the criminal 
police with an important tool in regard to investigations of hostage-takings. As this provision 
deals with a variety (of different methods, which have to presented first, the detailed 
description of surveillance due to hostage takings will be illustrated subsequently 
afterwards.540  
 
3.4.6 Conclusion: Realization of an RFI  
Contrary to a search of locations and objects, Surveillance of Data and Communication 
according to sections 135 para. 3 in conjunction with 134 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure is capable to deal with the latter two task of an RFI, the surveillance of 
activities and the surveillance of telecommunication. This is especially true since these 
provisions are not dealing with data stored in a communication system, but they rather govern 
the handling of communication.541  
 
Due to the very nature of an RFI as a covert investigation method, the surveillance of data and 
communication seems to be more appropriate in this case, since this method is also a covert 
investigation. Moreover, the physical as well as mental elements of the criminal act for the 
conduction of surveillance are similar to that put forward by the Austria Federal Ministry of 
                                                          
539 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 44; cf. furthermore below in the context of a major 
electronic eavesdropping operation.  
540 cf. the presentation in the chapter on surveillance of persons; however, cf. as well the critique of Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 46. 
541 cf. below.  
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Justice and of the Interior.542 The elements of the criminal activity require certain seriousness 
as well as there has to be a certain level of criminal intend. This is important, especially in 
view of the principle of proportionality, which has to always be kept in mind when dealing 
with covert investigations. Furthermore, as already stated above, surveillance of 
communication involves every kind of communication, no matter how it is transmitted. 
Hence, there are no specific technological requirements, meaning that it applies to 
communication conveyed via a computer system as well.543  
The surveillance of data and communication regulates the handling of communication and 
deal thereby on the on hand with the outer communication data – thus who communicated 
with whom and when – and on the other hand with the surveillance of the communication’s 
content, as long as this specific communication is transmitted. There is, however, no 
extension to data stored in a communication system.544 Only if communication or data is 
conveyed or exchanged over a communication system, the criminal police is allowed to 
intercept and use it. Surveillance of communication constitutes the gathering of information in 
real-time. At the point where a communication ends, meaning the point when the receiver 
recognizes the content, the monitoring of the communication ends as well. Hence, from that 
point in time on, only a disclosure of transmission data can be conducted.545 Important to note 
in this context is that stored communications on electronic storage devices etc. is not covered 
by this provision.  
 
3.4.6.1 Surveillance of Telecommunication 
When it comes to surveillance of data and communication, an RFI, in the sense of 
surveillance of telecommunication, is not possible. Hence it cannot be subsumed under 
sections 135 para. 3 in conjunction with 134 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, surveillance of data and communication. Due to the fact that these provisions deal 
with an interception of communication, there is need for clarification of the term 
‘interception’. Interception, in this context, refers to the points in time when a communication 
is sent out and when it is received. Only between these two points in time is it possible to 
intercept – everything else would legally not constitute an interception. As already mentioned 
                                                          
542 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich, of 17 October, 2007.  
543 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 187.  
544 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 38. 
545 cf. below. 
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above, it is not difficult to define when a communication is received, i.e. the point of time 
when the receiver actually recognizes the content. However, it is more complex to define 
when a communication is sent: 
  
First of all, it is necessary that a statement is made in either oral or written form, because it is 
only possible to monitor observable things. Thus, the monitored persons have to express their 
thoughts willingly, as mind control in the sense of reading someone’s thoughts is not possible, 
or legally viable.546  
Second of all, depending on the form of communication, there are different limitations. When 
writing a letter, e-mail, SMS or an instant message, the originator express him/herself 
indirectly, as they have the power to refrain from sending the communication to the receiver. 
For instance, the originator wants to confess his love to his beloved neighbor via a letter – not 
until he posts it, any communication happened between the two. Before posting a letter or 
pressing the corresponding button to send the message, the designated sender just transformed 
his/her inner intellectual world into electronic data. However, until the information is sent, 
these thoughts are still highly intimate.547 Only after the communication has left the 
originators sphere of influence, is it transmitted – thus ready to become intercepted.  
 
An oral communication, in this context, is somewhat different since the originator of a 
communication does not have to press a certain button for it to be sent and received. It is 
transmitted on the spot to the receiver. However, there does not seem to be an unequal 
treatment of both means of communication by the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. Why 
should an oral conversation be treated differently than a written one? Is the former less worth 
being protected? Further problem can occur in one way communication where the message is 
not immediately received by the person it is directed to, i.e. message on an answering 
machine etc.  
 
However, in both cases – the oral and the written communication – there is the need for 
                                                          
546  cf. as well BMJ/BMI (2008), pp. 26 and 96-97. 
547 In this respect just think about the question whether it is loud if you are alone shouting in a deep forest and 
nobody can hear you …??? 
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something additional in order to have a communication sent. In the first case, the send button 
has to be pushed; and in the second case, a connection to the communication partner has to be 
established, thus a number has to be dialed. Problems might occur in situations where a 
computer or a mobile phone is not logged onto a communication network, such as the Internet 
or there is a signal-free zone with no connection at all. In these circumstances it is not 
possible to communicate at all, meaning furthermore that an interception cannot be 
conducted. 
An interception, by definition, cannot be conducted on a technical device.548 The use of any 
bugs, Trojan horses, key loggers etc. on communication devices does not constitute an 
interception of a communication rather than a search of an electronic device, thereby 
interfering massively with the most private and intimate affairs of a person. The usage of such 
devices is more or less similar to a remote access for search purposes – the shared 
characteristics are evident. There is, however, no difference between the surveillance of data 
and communication done in this way and the remote access to a digital diary on a computer.549  
 
3.4.6.2 Surveillance of Activities 
In respect to the second potential task of an RFI – the surveillance of activities – it can be 
argued that when a user browses, a different form of communication is present. The electronic 
device sends requests to specific homepages/servers and receives, as reply, a copy of the 
demanded information, which are then stored on a server. The viewed data, such as images, 
text, sounds, are then copied from the host server to the user’s own computer and stored there. 
Hence, there is communication when ‘surfing the web’. However, as just presented above – 
this information can only be gathered via an interception and as the use of any technical 
device on a computer does not constitute an interception, surveillance of activities cannot be 
based on surveillance of communication and data according to sections 135 para. 3 in 
conjunction with 134 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 
                                                          
548 Note in this context that, as already presented in the chapter of this thesis on the technical aspects of a RFI, 
due to the modus operandi of modern communication networks, an interception is rather unlike fruitful 
because of its digital packet-switched transmission; cf. already above.  
549 A non-communication or message related data processing does not constitute a expression in the wider 
sense as stated in BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 26. 
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In addition, for both tasks of an RFI the criminal polices depends on the assistance of 
providers. In this respect there is no provision empowering the criminal police to store or 
monitor communication on their own, meaning that the investigation authorities and the 
providers have to cooperate in order to conduct surveillance of data and communication.550 
This is reasonable since providers have a contractual relationship with their clients, i.e. the 
user whose communications the criminal police wants to monitor, and thus all communication 
related information is accessible by the provider. 
 
3.4.7 Disclosure of Transmission Data 
3.4.7.1 Introduction 
A disclosure of transmission data is, according to section 134 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, a disclosure of traffic date, access data and location data of a 
telecommunication service or an information society service.551 The definitions of these 
different kinds of data can be found in the Austrian Telecommunications Act 2003 stating that  
 ‘Traffic data’ means  
any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on a 
communications network or for the billing thereof. 
This definition originates from the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council.552 As the Explanatory Memorandum to the Telecommunications Act 2003 points 
out, traffic data […]’consist of data referring to the routing, duration, time or volume of a 
communication, to the protocol used, to the location of the terminal equipment of the sender 
or recipient, to the network on which the communication originates or terminates, to the 
beginning, end or duration of a connection. They may also consist of the format in which the 
communication is conveyed by the network.’553 In respect to criminal proceedings, especially 
the active and passive participants of a telecommunication (respectively their numbers) and 
                                                          
550 Regenfelder (2008). p. 106. 
551 section 134 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
552 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July, 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive 
on privacy and electronic communications).  
553 cf. (15) of Explanatory Memorandum of Directive 2002/58 EC. 
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the time and duration are of great interest.554  
 
 ‘Access data’ means  
the traffic data created at the operator during access by a subscriber to a public 
communications network and required for assignment to the subscriber of the network 
addresses used for a communication at a specific point of time. 
This type of data describes the part of traffic data necessary for the identification of a 
participant of an Internet communication. Hence, as such access data are only a subarea of 
traffic data.555 
 
 ‘Location data’ means  
any data processed within a communications network, indicating the geographic 
location of the telecommunications terminal equipment of a user of a publicly 
available communications service. 
This definition goes back to the above mentioned EC Directive and […]’refers to the latitude, 
longitude and altitude of the user’s terminal equipment, to the direction of travel, to the level 
of accuracy of the location information, to the identification of the network cell in which the 
terminal equipment is located at a certain point in time and to the time the location 
information was recorded.’556 This refers at least data arising during a communication.557 
However, even data from outside a conducted communication is covered by the definition. 
Such data arises, for instance, when a mobile phone is switched on and logged into a 
network.558  
 
As previously mentioned, the term information society service refers to any service, normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of 
                                                          
554 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 32. 
555 cf. AB 184 BglNR XX GP, p. 3 as well as Singer, Christian, in Stratil, Alfred (ed), TKG – 
Telekommunikationsgesetz (2003), 3rd edition, section 92, p. 292.  
556 cf. (14) of Explanatory Memorandum of Directive 2002/58 EC. 
557 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 34. 
558 In this respect, please cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 35. 
 147 
 
a recipient of services.559 
 
Section 134 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure states which data has to be 
disclosed in specific circumstances. Providers are obligated to disclose particular data bound 
to a telecommunication (traffic data) or independent of a telecommunication (location 
data).560 The disclosure of transmission can be used to capture call data and for a location 
analysis. While the capturing of call data deals with the detection of terminals that are or were 
the origin and destination of a telecommunication, the assessment of location deals with the 
definition of the local area the terminal device is or was situated.561  
 
Important to note in this context is that phone numbers are double functional – as the personal 
number of a user it is ‘master data’ according to section 92 para. 3 no. 3 of the Austrian 
Telecommunications Act 2003, and in case of a telecommunications it is considered traffic 
data as well. This circumstance raises the question to whether data may be disclosed by the 
investigating authorities.562 Moreover, there is a difference between the disclosure by a 
provider – thus the contractual partner of a user – and the securing (and later seizure) of 
mobile phones of computers directly from their users. As modern electronic devices store a 
massive amount of data, both methods (disclosure or seizure of the device) would be equally 
fruitful. However, there are different provisions applicable for the two methods.563  
Similar to the surveillance of data and communication564 the disclosure of transmission data is 
allowed in circumstances where there is  
 disclosure with consent – section 135 para. 2 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure
                                                          
559 cf. section 1 para. 1 no. 2 des Notifications Act 1999 and above concerning surveillance of data and 
communication.  
560 cf. EBRV 25 BlgNR XXII GP, p. 187. 
561 Fabrizy (2008), section 134, p. 301. 
562 cf. for further details Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 38. 
563 i.e. a search of locations or objects (cf. above) and a disclosure of transmission data; cf. furthermore cf. for 
further details Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 40.  
564 This is mainly due to the fact that surveillance of data and communication is historically seen the prototype 
of an interference with the content of a communication; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 
21. 
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 disclosure without consent – section 135 para. 2 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure 
 disclosure due to hostage-takings – section 135 para. 2 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure  
 
3.4.7.2 Disclosure with Consent 
Section 135 para. 2 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure governs that 
surveillance can be conducted in situations where this measure is anticipated to encourage the 
solution of a criminal act committed with criminal intent, punishable by a term of more than 6 
month imprisonment and if the holder of a technical facility, who has been, or intends to 
become the origin or destination of a communication, agrees explicitly to this surveillance.  
 
The solution of a criminal act is of utmost importance in these cases, meaning that it has to be 
highly likely that a disclosure will provide the necessary evidence needed to solve a criminal 
act and/or to charge a suspect.565 A limitation to the Austrian Criminal Code is not given.  
 
3.4.7.3 Disclosure without Consent  
According to section 135 para. 2 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, a 
disclosure of transmission data can take place if it is anticipated that the solution of a criminal 
act committed with criminal intend, punishable by a term of more than one year imprisonment 
is encouraged. In addition, it may be expected that data of the defendant can be detected. In 
comparison to a disclosure with consent, the requirements for a disclosure without consent 
have to be consequently severer. However, both methods have the aim to encourage the 
solution of a criminal act in the sense already stated above.  
 
Again, this provision of disclosure without consent is quite similar to the surveillance without 
                                                          
565 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 135, p. 306.  
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consent. The main difference is that the disclosure is only allowed for the solution of a 
criminal act punishable by a term of more than one year imprisonment and not, as in the 
above presented case of surveillance, also explicitly in regard to organized crime. The 
similarities of surveillance of data a communication without consent and a disclosure of 
transmission data without consent are evident. However, there are also some differences. 
While a disclosure has to simply encourage the solution of a criminal act,566 the conducting of 
surveillance has to be the last resort (ultima ratio) for a criminal investigation.567 Furthermore, 
a simple suspicion of a criminal act is enough for a disclosure, whereas there has to be strong 
suspicion before surveillance can be conducted. The different requirements for both 
investigation methods are mainly due to the less invasive character of a disclosure in 
comparison to surveillance without consent.568 
 
The gathering of a defendant’s data is to be anticipated. For instance, a defendant’s telephone 
number can be disclosed if it is assumed that a specific person of interest has phoned the 
defendant. This means that out of a known person’s data, data, such as a telephone number, of 
a defendant is gathered. However, as Reindl-Krauskopf points out, ‘data of the defendant’ is a 
rather broad term and can involve numerous things and situations.569 For instance, it is 
allowed to conduct a disclosure of the victim’s transmission data (e.g. of homicide), if it is 
anticipated that he/she has or was contacted his/her by the murderer.570  
 
3.4.7.4 Disclosure due to Hostage-Takings  
Section 135 para. 2 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the criminal 
police with an important tool for investigations in hostage-takings. A disclosure is allowed if 
and as long as there is strong suspicion in regard to a hostage-taking, and a disclosure is 
                                                          
566 Meaning that there is a certain presumption that a disclosure will result in useful evidence; cf. Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 61. 
567 Meaning that if evidence thought to be gathered via a disclosure could be gathered by other (less invasive) 
investigation methods, its conducting is not allowed; cf. already above and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  
section 135, MN 36. 
568 Note that a disclosure presents only isolated and temporal limited data of conducted communications, 
whereas surveillance includes the content of these communications; cf. in this context especially the 
critique in Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 135, MN 61. 
569 For an extensive examination of the borderline and the related problems cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  
section 135, MN 62. 
570 cf. OGH 18.1.2001, 12 Os 152/00 and 12 Os 153/00 regarding a disclosure of data of pay phones in the 
context of homicide.  
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limited to instances and statements accomplished at the time and location of the deprivation 
of liberty.  
Similar to the below presented surveillance of persons in a hostage-taking, there are 
limitations for the disclosure of transmission data. Strong suspicions571 and the limitation to 
the time and the location of the deprivation of liberty, according to section 99 of the Austrian 
Criminal Code are needed.  
 
3.4.8 Conclusion: Realization of an RFI  
Similar to surveillance of data and communication, a disclosure of transmission data 
according to sections 134 no. 2 in conjunction with 135 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure seems to be potentially able to deal with the latter two task of an RFI, the 
surveillance of activities and the surveillance of telecommunication. However, due to the 
reasons already presented in the context of the surveillance of data and communication it is 
not working. The reasons for this are the same as just presented in the context of surveillance 
of data and communication (according to sections 135 para. 3 in conjunction with 134 no. 3 of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure). The fact that there is cooperation between 
providers and the criminal police is a strong argument against an application of a RFI based 
on a disclosure of transmission data. Apart from that, investigation authorities are rather 
interested in content data than in other things.572 
                                                          
571 Regarding the requirement of strong suspicion please cf. above in the chapter about surveillance of data and 
communication without the consent; further Fuchs (1995), p. 434;and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  
section 136, MN 4,5. 
572 cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 4. 
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3.4.9 Surveillance of Persons 
3.4.9.1 Introduction 
Section 134 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure defines the phrase of ‘optical 
and acoustic surveillance of persons’ as surveillance of  
 the conduct of persons – by interference with their right to privacy – and  
 the statements of persons – privileged information 
by the use of technical means for an image and audio transmission, and for an image and 
audio recording, without the affected person’s noticing .573  
As it is with all coercive measures, surveillance of persons interferes with the rights of the 
affected person. However, in this case the provision states precisely which right it infringes, 
namely Art 8 ECHR – the right to privacy. Furthermore, other infringements, such as with the 
right to data protection or the householder’s rights, are also highly likely. 
 
Since surveillance is carried out without the knowledge of the affected person – surveillance 
of data and communication is a pure covert investigation. In fact, the main intention behind a 
covert investigation is that observed persons continue to do everything as they normally 
would and not change their behavior because they know they are being monitored.574  
 
The Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure distinguishes between pure optical operations, 
using only technical means to transmit or record images, and electronic eavesdropping 
operations. The latter can be divided into two different options of surveillance: First of all it is 
possible that nobody but the monitoring person knows of this particular surveillance. This 
means that only technical tools are use in order to observe the conduct or statements of 
persons. This special form of surveillance is called a major electronic eavesdropping 
                                                          
573 section 134 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
574 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 109; in this respect it has to be mentioned that the 
relation between section 134 no. 4 and section 131 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure is that the 
former deals with an electronic 'observation' while the latter constitutes only the work of undercover agents 
leaving technical means aside; cf. furthermore below and ibid MN 113. 
 152 
 
operation. On the contrary to this, a minor electronic eavesdropping operation involves also 
technical facilities for monitoring, but in addition a well-informed person – such as an 
undercover agent – is present on site.  
The main difference between these two forms is that while the former in conducted with the 
means of technical equipment only, such as bugs established in private rooms – the latter 
involves, besides technical equipment, a person that is physically present. A detailed 
presentation follows.  
 
3.4.9.2 Conduct of Persons  
Privacy means everything not intended to be known by a larger undefined group of persons. 
Thus an interference with the right to privacy is given when the affected person is monitored 
unknowingly – as for instance when they are at home. However, this does not constitute that 
privacy is only given if a certain location is not publicly accessible, as for example in the case 
of a publicly accessible toilet.575  
 
3.4.9.3 Statements of Persons 
Besides the conduct of persons, the second goal of surveillance is the monitoring of people’s 
verbal statements. Here, only statements not directly intended for the public or a third person 
are covered. Hence, there is not explicitly an interference with the right to privacy involved. 
Overall the two aims of surveillance of persons are similar: in both cases a monitored person 
trusts that nobody else than the persons directly present knows about statements made or 
behavior brought forth. Generally, these statements are made in self-contained locations, 
familiar to the monitored persons (in their flats, in their cars, etc). The only difference when it 
comes to the conduct of persons is, that statements are made in publicly accessible places, 
which does not necessarily constitute that the persons expect to be monitored or over-heard by 
a third party.576  
                                                          
575 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO, section 134, MN 110; regarding this, special attention has to be drawn to 
an observation according to section 130 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. ibid MN 110  
576 e.g., persons may reckon that their conduct can be monitored when having a chat in a cafe; however the 
discussing they are having with somebody else in this cafe is not intended to be noticed by third person – 
thus it is conducted in an appropriate manner; cf. ibid MN 112. 
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3.4.9.4 Use of Technical Means  
Only if technical facilities are used for surveillance is it regulated by sections 134 et seq. of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.577 Generally, any technical devices capable to 
convey or store images and sounds are included and can be used for monitoring purposes. 
According to the government bill introducing this provision, it means any technical device 
capable to intensify and transfer impressions or audios, or to record impressions or audios.578 
Examples for such devices are cassette tape or video recorders, listening devices, mini 
microphones, or bugs but also digital devices such as CD- or DVD burners.579 
Section 136 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure defines the requirements under 
which an optical and acoustical surveillance can be (legally) conducted. Overall there are five 
different options of surveillance laid out in this provision, each with different requirements for 
its execution: 
Para. 1 states the three main situations in which optical and acoustical surveillance may be 
applied: no. 1 includes surveillance in hostage-taking situations, no. 2 deals with the minor 
electronic eavesdropping operation, and major electronic eavesdropping operation are 
summarized in no. 3. Furthermore, para. 3 mentions two situations limited to optical 
surveillance only, namely surveillance outside of flats or other locations protected by 
householder’s rights in no. 1 and surveillance inside of such locations in no. 2. 
 
3.4.9.5 Surveillance due to Hostage-Takings 
Para. 1 no. 1: if and as long as there is strong suspicion in regard to a hostage-taking, and 
surveillance is limited to instances and statements accomplished at the time and location of 
the deprivation of liberty; 
Section 136 para. 1 no. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the possibility 
                                                          
577 Surveillance without the use of nearly any technical means constitutes an observation according to section 
130 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; only technical means for the assignment of a person's 
position are allowed in this respect; cf. ibid MN 113. 
578 cf. EBRV49 BlgNR XX GP, p. 16; Hence binoculars or similar tools are not covered as they establish or 
guarantee only actual impressions, rather than installing a transmission; the same is true for tracking 
devices or for devices used for wiretapping.  
579 cf. Leukauf, Otto, Steininger, Herbert, Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, (1992), 3rd edition, MN 4 et seq, 
p.714; furthermore Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 113. 
 154 
 
for the investigating authorities to conduct an optical and acoustical surveillance if and as 
long as there is strong suspicion580 that a person – subject to this surveillance – abducted and 
confines another person. Furthermore, it is to note that such surveillance is limited to the time 
and the location of the deprivation of liberty, according to section 99 of the Austrian Criminal 
Code.  
 
Regarding the temporary limitation in such cases, it is to say that whenever surveillance is 
conducted, there has to be strong suspicion concerning a hostage-taking. As soon as this 
suspicion is gone (for instance – it becomes apparent that there is/was no hostage-taking, or 
the hostage was released), the corresponding surveillance has to be abandoned. This also 
means that law enforcement is not allowed to keep on monitoring in order to investigate 
whether there were backers or partners in crime. Thus, strong suspicion in respect to a 
hostage-taking has to be given throughout the whole surveillance in order for it to continue.581 
Local limitation in hostage situations indicate that only the actual location of the hostages – 
respectively their assumed location – can be monitored, meaning once again that there is no 
possibility to observe (potential) backers etc.  
 
Due to these strong limitations, it is, however, not necessary for the criminal police to obtain a 
warrant prior to exercising surveillance. This is stated explicitly in section 137 para. 1 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 
3.4.9.6 Minor Electronic Eavesdropping Operation 
Para. 1 no. 2: if surveillance is limited to instances and statements intended to be noticed by 
an undercover agent (or alike), or if these things could be noticed directly by an undercover 
agent, and this evidence appears to be necessary for the solution of a crime according to 
section 17 para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal Code;582  
                                                          
580 Regarding the requirement of strong suspicion please cf. above in the chapter about surveillance of data and 
communication without the consent; further Fuchs (1995), p. 434; and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  
section 136, MN 4,5. 
581 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 6. 
582 Note in this context that the difference between an offense and a crime is that the latter is punishable by a 
term of more than three year imprisonment.  
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Section 136 para. 1 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the regulations 
of a minor electronic eavesdropping operation. This surveillance method is limited to 
processes and statements either meant to be noticed by a person involved with the 
surveillance, or accessible to this person. Hence, this form requires the employment of an 
undercover agent or alike.583 The undercover agent tries to win the trust of the unsuspecting 
affected person in order to gather evidence. Thereby the agent is subject to a certain risk of 
detection  
 
There are two different ways to gather evidence in minor electronic eavesdropping operations: 
On the one hand, the undercover agent gets involved or informed directly by the affected 
person who is known to the undercover agents,584 or on the other hand the undercover agent 
can observe statements or processes not addressed directly to him.585 Surveillance conducted 
in this manner constitutes only a minor interference, since the well-informed person gathers 
information based on what he would have noticed or heard anyway.586 It is only a reliable way 
to secure evidence in order to solve a crime.587  
 
A minor electronic eavesdropping operation is only permitted if necessary and conducted in 
relation to the solution of a crime according to section 17 para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal 
Code, meaning criminal acts punishable by a term of more than three year imprisonment. 
Please refer to the previous chapter of the surveillance of data and communication.588 Here 
again necessity (‘appears to be necessary’) is the key to an approved surveillance, meaning 
that surveillance has to be necessary in order to solve a criminal act. In addition, the 
requirement of surveillance is ultima ratio, meaning that if evidence could be gathered by less 
invasive investigation methods, a minor electronic eavesdropping operation is prohibited.  
 
                                                          
583 As Reindl-Krauskopf points out, such surveillance can be conducted by an undercover agent or other well-
informed person – thus a minor electronic eavesdropping operation can be conducted by a staff of the 
criminal police or other personnel, cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 12. 
584 Such statements are e.g. messages, information and alike directly addressed to the undercover agent, 
meaning that the affected person is intended to tell etc the undercover these things explicitly.  
585 This means e.g. that the undercover agent achieves knowledge of something said to a third person while the 
agent was nearby a conversation; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 11. 
586 cf. EBRV49 BlgNR XX GP, p. 17. 
587 cf. Seiler (2009), MN 506, p. 141. 
588 cf. above as well as EBRV49 BlgNR XX GP, p. 17. 
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The concrete suspicion against a person needed for the execution of surveillance does not 
have to be explicit. For surveillance to be permitted, it has to assist the solution of a crime. 
Suspicion similar to that required for the search of locations and objects is needed in order for 
one to be warranted. The only things necessary are a suspicion that a crime has been 
committed and that a person capable to give relevant information can be monitored. 
Otherwise surveillance would not be relevant for the solution of that crime.589  
 
3.4.9.7 Major Electronic Eavesdropping Operation 
Para. 1 no. 3: if the solution of a criminal act punishable by imprisonment for a minimum 
period of ten years, or of a Criminal Organization or a Terrorist Association according to 
sections 278a and 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code, or for the solution or prevention of a 
criminal act committed, or planed by such an organization or association; or if the 
investigation regarding the residence of a person suspected of such crimes would be 
desperate or complicated otherwise and  
a) the affected person is strongly suspected of having committed one of the mentioned 
crimes or 
b) due to facts it is assumed that the affected person will established a connection 
which such a person  
 
Section 136 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure deals with major 
electronic eavesdropping operations. The main difference between a minor and a major 
operation is that while the former involves at least one well-informed, involved person, the 
latter is conducted entirely electronically, meaning that none of the monitored persons knows 
about the surveillance. Hence, the barriers for an execution are higher. Moreover, major 
electronic eavesdropping operations have three different goals: the solution of a crime, 
prevention of a criminal act of a criminal organization or terrorist association, and the 
investigation of a suspect’s residence.  
 
                                                          
589 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 14. 
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3.4.9.7.1 Solution of a Crime 
The limitations for a major electronic eavesdropping operation require that a person is 
strongly suspicious of having committed a serious felony, one that is punishable by an 
imprisonment for a minimum of 10 years.590 In addition, further aspects have to be taken into 
consideration when it comes to criminal organizations or a terrorist association. When it 
comes to organized crime, for example, strong suspicion in regard to the organizing aspect of 
it has to be present. Hence, there needs to be suspicion against long run establishments of a 
business-like cooperation operated by a number of people for the purpose of committing 
certain criminal acts, gather influence or to corrupt other person etc. In addition, strong 
suspicion must be given that the suspect has founded the organization or participates in it.591 
As Reindl points out in this respect, an occasional participation in criminal acts is too little to 
justify surveillance, there has to be a direct involvement in the organization as such.592 The 
same is true – with the relating modifications593 – for a terrorist association. If these 
requirements are given, investigators are allowed to conduct surveillance – either of the 
strongly suspected person (lit a), or of a person assumed to be contacted by the strongly 
suspected person (lit b) – thus of a contact person.594  
 
3.4.9.7.2 Prevention or Solution of a Crime 
As already stated in the context of the surveillance of communication, due to the fact that this 
provision deals with organized crime, suspicion in regard to the formation of a criminal 
organization or a terrorist association alone is sufficient for conducting a major electronic 
eavesdropping operation.  
Most importantly, there has to be suspicion in regard to the organizational aspect – thus 
suspicion that a criminal organization or a terrorist association is established.595 Furthermore, 
the target person of such surveillance has to be, according to lit a, suspicious of a crime, that 
is punishable by imprisonment for a minimum period of ten years, or of having committed or 
                                                          
590 cf. above and Fuchs (1995), p. 434.  
591 cf. section 278a para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal Code.  
592 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 16. 
593 according to section 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code.  
594 e.g. it is allowed to monitor the flat of the strongly suspected person’s girlfriend, if there are reasons to 
believe that this person is going to visit her and evidence could be gathered by this surveillance; cf. Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 18. 
595 cf. as well the illustrations subsequently. 
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planned criminal acts within such organizations, or according to lit b, a contact person of such 
a suspect. This means that in both cases it is necessary that surveillance is directed against the 
specific person directly. Note in this context that the suspicion of a membership in a criminal 
organization is sufficient for the conduction of surveillance, if it is assumed that surveillance 
is enough to prevent or solve criminal acts committed by the organization or association, and 
this goal could otherwise only be achieved with substantially greater effort.596 This indicates 
that a major electronic eavesdropping operation is only legal if dual suspicion is present: for 
one there has to be a strong suspicion that a specific crime (even below a maximum 
imprisonment of then years) was or is being committed, and second of all this crime was/is 
committed by a criminal organization. 
 
3.4.9.7.3 Residence of a Suspect  
If a person is suspected for the criminal acts mentioned in section 136 para. 1 no. 3 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, it is possible to conduct a major electronic 
eavesdropping operation in the residence of the suspect, if all other requirements are fulfilled 
as well. Once again, strong suspicion is needed before the suspects themselves (lit a) or their 
contact partners (lit b) can be monitored.  
 
A major electronic eavesdropping operation can, furthermore, only be conducted if certain 
requirements regarding its necessity and proportionality are met. First of all, this method of 
surveillance has to be necessary in order to solve or prevent crimes stated in the provision. 
The provision governs that it is allowed a) if the solution or prevention of the crimes would be 
despairing, and b) if the solution or prevention of the crimes, or the investigation concerning 
the residence of a person would be complicated otherwise. The latter requirement somewhat 
softens the demands for a conduct because it means that a major electronic eavesdropping 
operation can be allowed even if there are other measures at disposal. This method is not the 
last resort (ultima ratio).597 In addition to this, section 136 para. 4 2nd sentence of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure states that there has to be the assumption that the planned 
criminal acts constitute a great danger for public security. This threat is given, if planned 
                                                          
596 cf. EBRV49 BlgNR XX GP, p. 18. 
597 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 21.  
 159 
 
crimes are every different to regular, ordinary crimes. The simple suspicion concerning the 
application of a major electronic eavesdropping operation cannot be justified by a simple 
hunch that it may be prevented.598  
 
Section 136 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure offers another, not less 
significant possibility for the investigating authorities. It states that to the extent that 
surveillance is unavoidable according to para. 1 no. 3, it is allowed to invade a flat or 
another location protected by householder’s rights, if due to facts it is assumed that a 
suspected person will use the affected location.  
Hence, this provision allows in circumstances where a legal (judicial approved) major 
electronic eavesdropping operation cannot be conducted successfully without the installation 
of technical devices in flats or other locations protected by householder’s rights, the entering 
of such premises can be allowed as well. However, there has to be reasonable suspicion in 
regard to the use of the location by the suspected person.599 The installation or de-installation 
of surveillance devices (e.g. bugs etc) has to be granted by a separate judicial approval (thus a 
second warrant) because this action constitutes an autonomous interference with fundamental 
rights.600 The same principles as in the search of location and objects apply in this context as 
well – hence, only if the location is protected by householder’s rights, judicial approval is 
necessary. Other locations (for instance vehicles etc) can be entered in order to install 
surveillance devices without a second, separate and explicit warrant. Nevertheless, the rights 
of affected persons are restrained because there is an interference with their privacy according 
to Art 8 ECHR.601  
 
3.4.9.8 Optical Surveillance602  
Section 136 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure regulates pure optical 
surveillance. As already mentioned, there are two possible forms:  
An optical surveillance of persons in order to solve a criminal act is allowed 
                                                          
598 cf. ibid MN 20, 22 and JAB 812 BlgNR XX GP 6. 
599 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 19.  
600 cf. section 137 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
601 cf. concerning further information in this context Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 19.  
602 cf. e.g. Fabrizy (2008), section 136, p. 310 or Pilnacek, Pleischl (2005), MN 593 et seq, p. 123. 
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 if it is limited to processes outside homes or other locations protected by 
householder’s rights and if it is intended to observe items or locations in order to 
monitor the conduct of persons having contact with these items or visiting these 
locations, or  
 with consent of the holder, if it is solely for the purpose mentioned in no. 1, in a flat or 
other locations protected by householder’s rights, intended to solve a criminal act 
punishable by imprisonment for a minimum period of one year and if the solution 
would be complicated otherwise.  
 
As with a search of locations and objects, there is a division between locations protected by 
householder’s rights and such which are not. In the latter case surveillance can be conducted 
in order to solve any criminal act. The only requirements are suspicion in regard to a 
committed criminal act and that surveillance is only intended to monitor objects or locations 
in order to gather information about persons entering. In addition, an evaluation according to 
section 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure has to be conducted – thus 
proportionality has to be given. Regarding the phrase ‘outside areas protected by 
householder’s rights’, a distinction has to be made: on the one hand there are premises, rooms, 
vehicles or vessels not publicly accessible603 and on the other hand there are locations 
publicly accessible, such as parks, streets or hallways.604  
 
A pure optical surveillance of locations protected by householder’s rights demands further and 
more difficult criteria before it can be conducted. First of all, it has to have the intention to 
solve a criminal act punishable by imprisonment for a minimum period of one year. Second of 
all, the solving of that specific criminal act would be complicated otherwise, meaning that an 
optical surveillance is allowed even if there are other investigation methods available. 
However, the other methods have to require substantial greater effort to achieve the same 
result. Third of all, proportionality has to be evaluated and lastly the most important 
requirement, the consent of the location’s holder is needed. The consent has to be expressed 
explicitly and has to be declared before the actual surveillance takes place.605  
 
                                                          
603 cf. the comments regarding a search of locations and objects.  
604 cf. regarding this difference especially Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 136, MN 26-9.  
605 cf. concerning the consent the comments made in regard to surveillance of data and communication – 
surveillance with consent.  
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As it is with other procedural provisions, the public prosecution has to report its intended 
direction (after a judicial approval) to the agency of the public prosecution.606 However, there 
is an exception to this, namely in the case of surveillance due to hostage-takings. In such 
situations, where an actual dangerous situation is present, no such requirement has to be met. 
Concerning the temporary frame of an optical and an acoustical surveillance it is to say that it 
depends on necessity, better, the length of time it takes to accomplish the task.607 Both the 
public prosecution’s direction and the judicial approval have to include all relevant data 
mentioned above.608  
 
3.4.9.9 Rights and Obligations  
As mentioned above, sections 139 and 140 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
handle the investigating authorities’ obligations towards the affected person, as well as the 
affected persons’ rights after a conducted surveillance/disclosure. These regulations apply for 
all three of the above illustrated methods, namely for the disclosure of transmission data, the 
surveillance of communication as well as the optical and acoustical surveillance of persons 
and will be presented hereafter. Before going into any detail it is to mention that while section 
139 deals with the procedural rights of the affected person, section 140 treats procedural 
question in regard to the use of gathered evidence in a criminal trial. Thus, both regulations 
deal simultaneously on the one hand with the rights of the affected person and on the other 
hand with the obligations of the (three) criminal investigation authorities. 
 
Section 139 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure states clearly that defendants are 
allowed to have insight to all corresponding results, meaning that the right to inspect collected 
evidence has to be granted. This is not only true during the main trial, but also during trial 
                                                          
606 according to section 10a Public Prosecution Act. 
607 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  sections 137, 138, MN 54-5 especially in regard to the former (monthly) 
time limit which was not implemented in the new Code rather than the legislator established a simple 
evaluation of proportionality.  
608 Thus the designation of the proceeding, the name of the defendant, the committed criminal act the 
defendant is suspected for, and its legal term, as well as the facts justifying the necessity and proportionality 
of the measure for the solution of the specific criminal act; the name or other identification criterion of the 
technical facility holder, or the person to monitor, where a measure is applied (the relevant location), type 
of the communication conveyance, the technical facility and the terminal device or the type of technical 
device (potentially) used for an optical and acoustical surveillance, time of a measure's begin and ending, 
rooms subject to legal entering, facts stating the danger for public security; However, not every information 
is mandatory as it is possible, e.g., that the name of the defendant is not yet known – cf. as well EBRV49 
BlgNR XX GP, p. 20. 
 162 
 
preparation.609 However, the public prosecution is allowed to withhold (parts of the) results, if 
there is legitimate interest of any third person in them and these (parts of) results are of no 
concern in the main trial. Information cannot be withheld if is being used in the main trial 
because the defendant has the right to have insight into all evidence against him. This right of 
the defendant does not require any justification.610 Besides the right to have access to all 
information, defendants are entitled to request the transformation of results into written form 
respectively image format. Again, there is the requirement that the results are of concern and 
this is not violating the exclusionary rules of sections 140 para. 1, 144611 and 157 para. 2612 of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. This opportunity for the defendant means a safe 
guard against claims for the prosecution (in the main trial) stating that relevant, exculpatory 
documents etc have been destroyed etc.613 Furthermore, it is to note that results of no concern 
or irrelevant for the main trial have to be destroyed on request of the defendant or ex officio. 
However, this request does only constitute a suggestion614 of the defendant. If the public 
prosecution, in its function as head of the proceedings, does not comply, an appeal to the court 
can be made (according to section 106 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure).615  
 
Defendants also have the right to request the discontinuation of any measures against their 
person whenever they learn about any surveillance activities against themselves.616 As Reindl-
Krauskopf points out precisely, the reason for this right – which is not stated explicitly in the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure – is the secrecy of these measures.617 As already stated 
above in the context of an optical and acoustical surveillance of person, the investigation 
methods are pure covert ones. A covert investigation is characterized by the fact that the 
affected persons are not aware of a conducted surveillance – they behave as if they were 
unobserved. Consequently, if these people find out that they are being monitored, they would 
change their behavior accordingly. In addition, defendants are entitled to object to the judicial 
                                                          
609 cf. JAB 812 BlgNR XX GP 8; further OGH 24.6.2004, 15 Os 13/04.  
610 In respect to an optical and acoustical surveillance of person as well as an surveillance of data and 
communication, cf. OGH 21.11.2000, 11Os 108/00 and OGH 11 Os 109/00.  
611 Religious official secrecy and profession sworn to confidentiality. 
612 Denial of evidence.  
613 cf. Fabrizy (2008), section 135, p. 316-7.  
614 according to Bertel, Venier (2006), MN 322, p. 113.  
615 cf. ibid MN 322, p. 113.  
616 Regularly the suspected – later the defendant or affected – persons should get informed about the 
conducting of surveillance method after the end of it. However, if they figure it out earlier there has to be a 
right to request the ending of such privacy affecting activities; according to section 137 para. 3 of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure the public prosecution has to terminate surveillance if the correlating 
requirements disappear (cf. already above); cf. further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 139, MN 4. 
617 cf. ibid, MN 4. 
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approval empowering the investigation measure at the regional appeal court,618 and 
furthermore, they are allowed to appeal against the direction of the public prosecution and the 
actual conduction by the criminal police at the court.619  
Due to the public prosecution’s obligation to deliver its direction including the corresponding 
judicial approval to the defendant and any other affected person as stated in section 138 para. 
5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be concluded that the latter group of 
persons do have similar rights as the defendant. This is true, as according to section 139 para. 
2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure affected persons620 are in general entitled to 
have insight into the results of surveillance, since their privacy was interfered with. 
Furthermore, affected persons can request the destruction of documents etc concerning them, 
similar to the rights of defendants as illustrated above. Important in this respect is further that 
the public prosecution is obliged to inform all affected persons if their identities are known or 
they are identifiable without special effort.621 The rights to appeal and to raise an objection are 
similar to the rights of the defendant mentioned above.  
 
Section 140 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure deals with procedural question in 
regard to the use of gathered information. This provision governs the utilization of the 
results622 of a disclosure of transmission data, surveillance of data and communication as well 
as an optical and acoustical surveillance of persons.623 Thereby the provision divides the 
gathered information into three possible findings, namely para. 1 the use of evidence in 
respect to the specific criminal act the warrant was issued for (the original criminal act), para. 
2 the use of accidental discoveries, and para. 3 the legal use of these results in other, unrelated 
proceedings. Important in this context is that, irrespective of the investigation method, 
utilization is only allowed in accordance with the following rules – otherwise the results are 
invalid. 
                                                          
618 section 87 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. already above.  
619 according to section 106 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
620 Affected person are entitled for insight as far as their data of a communication, communication intended for 
them or steaming from them, conversations conducted by them, or images with their picture on it, are 
concerned. 
621 Without special effort (German: ohne besonderen Verfahrensaufwand) means further, easily conducted 
inquiries; the effort depends on the seriousness of interference with the affected person's privacy; cf. 
Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 139, MN 8. 
622 according to section 134 para. 5 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
623 Note in this respect, as already mentioned above, that a seizure of a letter cannot be involved as this is a 
physical item and not conveyed electronically; cf. Tipold, Zerbes, WK-StPO , section 134, MN 1 et seq. 
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3.4.9.10 Rights and Obligations In Respect to  
Surveillance of Data and Communication, 
Disclosure of Transmission Data 
Usage of information gathered by these two investigation methods in respect to the original 
criminal act it the same. The use is allowed if the public prosecution gave legal direction, 
which was followed by a corresponding judicial approval. This is pointed out explicitly by 
section 140 para. 1 no. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition to these 
formal requirements, there are for sure substantial ones. Hence, it is necessary that the 
preconditions mentioned in sections 135 para. 2 and para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure are given, which include: Actual or strong suspicion, the necessary consent for 
conducted surveillance or disclosures which was also directed and approved. Only if both, the 
formal as well as the substantial requirements are fulfilled, the gathered information is 
allowed as evidence in trial.  
Notable in this context are the provisions in regard to confessional secrets, profession sworn 
to confidentiality624 and the regulations concerning a denial of evidence.625 There can either 
be a legitimate direction or a legitimate judicial approval, if theses protection mechanisms are 
being invaded by surveillance of data and communication/disclosure of transmission data. 
This implicates that even if the direction and the approval were legitimate, and information 
infringing with these principles are gathered, the information cannot be used.626 Problems 
such as these occur regularly, for instance, in situations where there is surveillance of data and 
communication and facilities of a third person are monitored because it is believed that a 
strongly suspected person will contact this person.627 Note in this context the right to a fair 
trial (access to legal representation) as guaranteed by the ECHR. 
 
Accidental discoveries are treated almost identical as the circumstances described in the 
context of a search of location and objects. These discoveries may be used in other criminal 
proceedings if the following conditions apply. First of all, this information has to emerge from 
a legitimately directed and approved investigation measure. Second of all, the results can only 
                                                          
624 according to section 144 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. in this respect already the 
illustration to an exclusion of a lawyer in section 60 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
625 according to section 157 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
626 cf. in this respect further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 9. 
627 according to section 135 para. 3 no. 3 lit b of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. already above 
and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 10. 
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be used as evidence for other criminal activities, if the investigation of those criminal acts 
surveillance of data and communication, respectively a disclosure of transmission data would 
have been implemented.628 Only if the other criminal act (i.e. not the initial criminal act 
causing the investigation) is punishable by imprisonment of a minimum period of one year, 
the use of accidental discoveries is legitimate.629 This limitation arises due to the fact that in 
the case of accidental discoveries the affected person does not know anything of 
surveillance/disclosure. Hence, the same requirements as for surveillance/disclosure without 
consent have to apply for the use of accidental discoveries. Again, the provisions in regard to 
confessional secrets and professions sworn to confidentiality as well as the regulations 
concerning a denial of evidence have also to be notified at this stage.630  
Different treatment is given to results originating from surveillance/disclosure due to hostage-
takings. Despite the fact that there has to be in accordance with the above mentioned 
regulations, a legitimate direction and approval and the special regard to the specific 
regulations of sections 144 and 157 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure there 
are no further limitations imposed on to the use of surveillance results.631 
 
3.4.9.11 Rights and Obligations in Respect to 
Optical and Acoustical Surveillance of Persons  
The results of both, a major as well as a minor electronic eavesdropping operation, can only 
be used if there were legal directions set forth by the public prosecution and corresponding 
judicial approvals. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is mandatory that the use of the 
results is limited to the solution of a crime, thus a criminal act punishable by a term of more 
than three years of imprisonment. There are, however, special regulations to deal with 
possible problems with this investigation method and profession sworn to confidentiality, 
especially if these persons are suspects in the crime.632  
Accidental discoveries during an optical and acoustical surveillance of persons have to be 
                                                          
628 according to section 140 para. 1 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
629 cf. Reindl [2005], section 149c, MN 16; as well OGH 27.5.2004, 12 Os 44/04, SSt 2004/39.  
630 cf. in this respect further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 13-5. 
631 cf. regarding this and the related critique ibid MN 16. 
632 cf. in this respect ibid MN 18 et seq. 
 166 
 
documented separately from all other findings.633 Once again, if it is intended to evade the 
protective purposes of section 144 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the gathered 
information cannot be used in the main trial, meaning that the results are invalid.634 The use of 
accidental discoveries in trial proceedings is limited to the solving of a crime as illustrated 
above. Legal directions from the public prosecution’s office as well as the corresponding 
judicial approval are mandatory. 
The same is true when it comes to a pure optical surveillance, according to section 136 para. 3 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. However, there is one fundamental difference 
since accidental discoveries from an optical surveillance can be used for the solution of any 
criminal act, not only just for crimes.635 But, as Reindl-Krauskopf points out correctly, there 
has been an editorial mistake and the legislator created a legal gap when legalizing these 
principle/or similar. She argues that there has to be an analogy to section 140 para. 1 no. 4 of 
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure in order to close this particular legal gap. Hence, 
this means that accidental discoveries gathered by a pure optical surveillance outside flats or 
other locations protected by householder’s rights, can be used to solve any criminal act, while 
discoveries achieved by an optical surveillance conducted within flats etc can only be used to 
solve criminal acts punishable by imprisonment of a minimum period of one year.636  
Accidental discoveries obtained during an optical and acoustical surveillance of persons due 
to hostage-takings are treated similar. The mentioned principles concerning the prohibition of 
evasions apply as well as since all requirements are cited in the substantial provisions. 
However, due to section 137 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, stating that 
there is no need to obtain a warrant (i.e. no direction or judicial approval prior to the hostage-
taking),637 this requirement does not apply. This implements – not unopposed – that there are 
no limitations in respect to the use of accidental discoveries.638  
 
                                                          
633 with respect to the exclusionary rules of sections 140 para. 1, 144 and 157 para. 2 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure; cf. furthermore already above.  
634 Note in this context that the difference between an offense and a crime is that the latter is punishable by a 
term of more than three year imprisonment; cf. already above and Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 
140, MN 21; in respect to profession sworn to confidentiality please cf. ibid, MN 23-4. 
635 at least according to the wording of section 140 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
636 cf. further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 25. 
637 in regard to the strong limitations cf. already above. 
638 cf. further Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 26. 
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3.4.9.12 Usage of Result in Other Proceedings 
According to section 140 para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the use of 
results gathered by the above illustrated investigation methods is also allowed in other judicial 
and administrative proceedings, if their use in criminal proceedings was or would have been 
legitimate.639  
 
3.4.10 Conclusion: Realization of an RFI  
The optical and acoustical surveillance of a person according to sections 136 in conjunction 
with 134 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure appears to be the most likely 
possibility to be the basis for an RFI. This is especially true since the requirements for an RFI 
set out by the Ministry of Justice and of the Interior640 are equal to that of the optical and 
acoustical surveillance of persons. 
By definition it is not possible to conduct surveillance of a person in order to get remote 
access to a computer for search purposes as a task of an RFI. Sections 136 in conjunction with 
134 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure are just concerned with the surveillance 
and not with any search purposes, meaning that the aim is to gather information about a 
person by monitoring his/her behavior and oral statements. However, a distinction has to be 
made when it comes to the other two task of an RFI, namely surveillance of activities and 
surveillance of telecommunication, in order to examine any potential applications: 
 
3.4.10.1 Minor Electronic Eavesdropping Operation  
A minor electronic eavesdropping operation can never be a foundation for an RFI. The minor 
‘case’ of an optical and acoustical surveillance of persons deals with the listing and recording 
of privately made statements while an undercover agent is present. This agent or any other 
person informed about the surveillance – is the crucial requirement. In the case of an RFI, the 
only thing present would be a technical device in the form of a Trojan horse etc. Thus an 
application of a minor electronic eavesdropping operation as surveillance of activities (RFI) is 
not working due to the absence of a well-informed person. Not surprising, this is also true for 
                                                          
639 cf. the extensive illustration at Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 140, MN 28-36. 
640 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich of 17 October, 2007.  
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the surveillance of telecommunication. 
 
3.4.10.2 Major Electronic Eavesdropping Operation  
During a major electronic eavesdropping operation the presence of an undercover agent is not 
required. However, an RFI is not intended to monitor a specific person, but it is rather used 
for the surveillance of the conduct of programs and how they are applied by a (specific) user. 
Contrary to this, the optical and acoustical surveillance of persons is directed to the optical 
surveillance of the person itself and the statements this person has made with the use of 
technical devices. This is done with the assistance of video cameras, mini microphones and 
similar, thus tools to transmit and record images and audio files. Surveillance of persons 
constitutes surveillance of the conduct and behavior of persons and not just the performance 
of a computer program.641 Hence, surveillance of activities cannot be based on a major 
electronic eavesdropping operation. Concerning the surveillance of telecommunication 
Reindl-Krauskopf argues that this would be possible and covered by an optical and acoustical 
surveillance.642 However, from the author’s point of view a major electronic eavesdropping 
operation does not legitimate an RFI because communication does always involve an 
expression to the external world. Only after the communication has left the originators sphere 
of influence, is it transmitted – thus ready to become intercepted and monitored.643  
 
Despite these circumstances, the optical and acoustical surveillance of persons in their private 
rooms in order to listen to telephone calls conducted via the Internet (Voice over IP) and/or to 
monitor keystrokes with a video camera, are, from a criminal procedural, thus legal point of 
view, allowed644 and can be quite successful as well. Such handling,645 however, shows that 
                                                          
641 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 115; as well as BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 26. 
642 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 116. 
643 cf. already above in the context of surveillance of data and communication; Note concerning this that the 
report of an expert group support the view that there is currently no legal basis for a covert electronic 
surveillance of a computer; cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 33. 
644 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 26. 
645 During investigations concerning an online published video constituting a menace for Austria in 2007, the 
criminal police (Federal Departement for the Protection of the Constitution and the Combat of Terrorism – 
BVT) conducted surveillance of data and communication. According to the officers, the BVT contacted the 
provider of the suspect and arranged that data of this person, before it enter the internet are copied and sent 
to surveillance device (what ever this may mean?). In the following, experts examined the content of the 
data. Due to the fact that the suspect used a proxy server in Malaysia and decoded this data, it was not 
possible to gather knowledge of about 35 % of the data. Therefore a major electronic eavesdropping 
operation was conducted legally. Bugs as well as two cameras were installed in order to monitor the 
conduct and the statements made by the suspect (especially during Internet phone calls); cf. report at 
<http://futurezone.orf.at/stories/261511/> retrieved 4 December, 2009.  
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there is still a gray area within the Austrian legal system, as the investigation authority used, 
because an optical surveillance within the suspect’s flat was not possible, a technical device to 
send screen shots established on the suspect’s computer. According to the conducting officers, 
every 60 seconds a picture of the screen was sent to an officer sitting next door. With these 
images and with the assistance of the recorded keystrokes646 the police was able to reconstruct 
what happen within this minute. 
 
In accordance with the already above stated, the author does not consider these proceeding as 
a legitimate use of electronic devices. From his point of view, there is no real and legal 
problem with the bugging of the suspect’s flat or to listen to telephone calls or other 
conversations. However, the use of screen shots and video cameras in order to monitor a 
screen and what is written on it does not constitute a communication and can therefore not be 
intercepted. A similar problem would occur if bugs were used as acoustical key logging 
devices. There has to be a clear differentiation between a verbal communication and a simple 
written form of communication,647 illustration of purely internal thoughts and the most private 
and intimate affairs of a person.648  
 
3.5 Security Police Law 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Task and Competences of the Public Security Police 
A complete list of all three tasks of the public security police can be found in part two of the 
Austrian Security Police Act (i.e. sections 19 to 27a). Part three of the same Act, i.e. sections 
28 to 50 handles the capacities of the public security police. According to section 28a para. 2 
and para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act the public security police is allowed, in order 
to fulfill its tasks, to use all legitimate resources not interfering with any rights of persons. 
Only if the legitimacy of a provision evolves or if there is no less intrusive method available, 
                                                          
646 The article does not say which kind of key logging devices was used.  
647 private video files, 'oral diary', photos ... 
648 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 26. 
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the empowerment to interfere with the rights of persons is given.649 Important in the context 
of the capacities is furthermore section 29 of the Austrian Security Police Act, stating that the 
public security police has to bear in mind the principle of proportionality at all times. This 
means – similar to the requirement of proportionality in the context of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure and in general in that of the Austrian Constitution – that every action of 
the public security police has to be balanced in respect to its outcome.650 For instance, an 
action is not allowed if it can cause more damage than the danger they try to avoid with this 
action.651 Furthermore, an action does not only have to be proportional but also it is required 
that it is necessary, suitable and appropriate.652  
 
According to the sections 28 and 29 of the Austrian Security Police Act, the public security 
police is only allowed to interfere with the rights of persons if 
 the Austrian Security Act provides a competence, 
 there is no other (i.e. milder and suitable) method for the accomplishment of the task 
(principle of ultima-ration), and  
 the relation between occasion (the actual task) and the intended aim is proportional.  
                                                          
649 Remark in this context that the Austrian Security Police Act does not only grant competences to the security 
agencies but also it establishes procedural rights for the affected persons of a public security police activity. 
The rights are similar to that set out by the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure however they are not 
stated in a clear and proper manner. Due to this fact, section 30 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act 
introduced a minimum standard of rights: on request, the affected person has to be informed about the 
reason and aim of the activity as well as about the personal number (German: Dienstnummer) of the 
officer; moreover, an affected person does have the right to bring in a confidant and to submit important 
facts and demand their treatment as findings. However, as long as the aim of the activity – i.e. to achieve a 
certain goal – is endangered, these rights are not guaranteed, according to section 30 para. 2 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act. Please note in this respect that the Federal Ministry of the Interior has to issue a 
regulation including guidelines for the activities of the security agencies' officers (section 31 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act). This competence of the Ministry of the Interior is based on Art 10 para. 1 no. 14 of the 
Austrian Federal Constitutional Law.  
650 Demmelbauer/Hauer explain it as a principle of prudence or rationality, meaning that the use of excessive 
measures to achieve the same aims (public security, public order, etc) is not allowed. They argue that there 
is the obligation for the security agency to weight all possible measures in situations where there are more 
than just one. This evaluation must be conducted in a prudent, rational, non-random, hasty or excessive 
manner. cf. Demmelbauer, Josef, Hauer Andreas, Grundriss des österreichischen Sicherheitsrechts unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sicherheitsverwaltung (2002), MN 66, p. 31.  
651 Similar to the above presented evaluation in regard to proportionality, there has to be an evaluation of the 
capability, the necessity and the appropriateness of the interference. As Pürstl/Zirnsack point out, the public 
security police has to choose – if possible – a method directed against the originator of the threat 
(dangerous aggression, etc), the most flexible competence to handle and it is only allowed to apply its 
competences as short as possible. Furthermore, only the least intrusive method of more than one is allowed 
to be applied. Pürstl, Gerhard, Zirnsack, Manfred, Sicherheitspolizeigesetz (2005), pp. 116-117. 
652 cf. in respect to the principle of proportionality the chapter on the Austrian Constitution, the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure as well as Hauer, Keplinger (2005), pp. 305-308; Lepuschitz, Michael, Schindler, 
Thomas, Das österreichischen Sicherheitspolizeigesetz (2008), 5th edition, pp. 80-81; cf. Demmelbauer, 
Hauer (2002), MN 66-8, pp. 31-32.  
 171 
 
3.5.2 Tasks 
The various tasks can be subdivided into  
 maintenance of public order 
 primary assistance, and  
 maintenance of public security 
 
3.5.2.1 Maintenance of Public Order 
According to the rulings of the Austrian Administration Court, public order is the entirety of 
unwritten rules of behavior in public, whose compliance is seen as an essential requirement 
for a harmonious social coexistence of human beings.653 This means that the task of 
maintaining public order is based on no legal (hence only social) provisions, which help to 
enforce these rules. Furthermore, it is to remark that while maintaining public order, the 
interest of every single individual to exercise his/her fundamental rights and freedoms has to 
be kept in mind by the public security police.654 This indicates that disturbances of the public 
order affecting other people in their exercising of fundamental rights and freedoms, have to be 
prevented. This is also true if the disturbance itself is the exercise of a fundamental right, such 
as the right to the freedom of association.655  
 
Overall, it can be said that two social preconditions are required before an intervention by 
public security police is possible. Firstly, the required social provision has to be recognized by 
the society, meaning that a simple acceptance (of this provision) by a majority is not 
sufficient. This requirement can be further explained by the restriction to the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Secondly, the required recognition is based on the overall 
belief that the compliance with the social provision is necessary for an established order to be 
maintained. 
                                                          
653 cf. VwSlg 543 A/1948; or the judgments of 13 February, 1984 Z 82/10/0178 respectively of 9 July, 1984 Z 
84/10/0080)  
654 cf. section 27 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act, second sentence. 
655 cf. Art 11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as Art 12 
Basic Law of 21 December, 1867 on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Laender; in this 
respect especially the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court VfSlg 16054/2000. 
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The task of maintaining public order is intended to create the conditions for a peaceful social 
coexistence in circumstances where there is no threat of a harmful aggression,656 as presented 
in the chapter on the averting of danger and as illustrated subsequently.  
 
3.5.2.2 Primary Assistance 
Section 19 of the Austrian Security Police Act  
In a high number of cases, primary assistance is the start for the activities of the public 
security police.657 By law, the police has an obligation to assistance if an actual threat to life, 
health, liberty or property of persons exists, or such threat is imminent.658 It is therefore the 
duty of the public security police to verify whether such a threat is given, and to take 
appropriate steps, if necessary. These actions can be qualified as simple provisional and 
subsidiary tasks.659 Important to note in this context is that a simple task – such as primary 
assistance – does not constitute any competences. Such competences can be found in sections 
32 et seq. of the Austrian Security Police Act660 and will be presented subsequently.  
 
3.5.2.3 Maintenance of Public Security 
Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act starting with section 20 deals with the 
maintenance of public security. This chapter includes the tasks of averting of danger,661 the 
precautionary protection of legally protected interests,662 tracing and search activities,663 
consultations by the criminal police664 and dispute settlements.665 These tasks show that there 
                                                          
656 e.g. a threat arising from a massive gathering of people etc.  
657 Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 239. 
658 cf. in this respect as well Art 78a para. 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law. 
659 Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 239; as well as BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 39; note furthermore that primary 
assistance of security agencies is therefore a subsidiary emergency competence for all cases of 
administration police as well as the local public security police which try to protect the mentioned legally 
protected goods (German: Schutzgüter) or life health, liberty and property of persons – cf. in this respect 
Art 15 para. 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law; moreover, it is to state that primary assistance 
means the averting of danger not limited to a certain administrative region rather than the danger is not 
connected to a certain branch of administration; cf. in this respect especially Mayer (2004), p. 36.  
660 Part 3, Chapter 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
661 according to section 21 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
662 according to section 22 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
663 according to section 24 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
664 according to section 25 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
665 according to section 26 of the Austrian Security Police Act.  
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is a strong focus of the combat of judicial punishable activities, i.e. criminal activities.666 In 
this context and especially in connection with this thesis, the averting of danger is of great 
importance. Hence, a detailed illustration of this special task performed by the public security 
police will be given.  
 
3.5.2.4 Averting of Danger  
Section 21 of the Austrian Security Police Act  
Generally speaking, the averting of danger is one of the key tasks of the public security 
police,667 according to section 16 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act. A dangerous 
situation constitutes a situation, which is most likely leading – according to the customary 
experiences – to a harmful outcome. If after evaluation of the whole situation no intervening 
steps are taken, the likelihood of a harmful outcome (damage) is objectively given.668 Hence, 
there has to be an ex ante evaluation of the situation in order to assess the potentiality of 
danger.669  
A general danger is the umbrella term putting together two narrower terms. Namely, danger is 
given  
 in the case of a dangerous aggression according to no. 1, and  
 in the case of criminal associations according to no. 2.  
 
3.5.2.4.1 Dangerous Aggression 
A dangerous aggression is, according to sections 16 para. 2 and para. 3 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act, typically given when a criminal activity is conducted and it is carried out 
with criminal intend, hence, in situations where there is already a dangerous aggression or 
                                                          
666 cf. in this respect Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 240, stating that there is a difference between the definition 
of public security in the Austrian Security Police Act and the corresponding definition in public 
administration provisions.  
667 Next to primary assistance; cf. as well Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 241. 
668 Wiederin (1998), MN 203, p. 51. 
669 This has to be taken into account if there is a review of the public security police's activities; cf. in this 
respect the explanation of Leo, Andreas, Prävention und Repression im Rahmen der Sicherheitspolizei 
(2005), p. 83-86.  
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where such an aggression is imminent.670 In this respect, the definition of general dangers 
includes the actual threatening of legally protected interests through executing of certain 
criminal activity671 as well as the threatening of these interests by preparatory works.672 The 
second case refers, as stated, to activities of criminal associations, or as section 16 para. 1 no. 
2 of the Austrian Security Police Act puts it, if there are three or more persons associate with 
the criminal intent to exercise criminal activities.673 In this respect it is to mention that – 
unlike the shown preconditions in the case of a dangerous aggression – no specific criminal 
activity is required. This means that a criminal association as such is already a criminal 
activity and therefore punishable. Properties of an association are, for instance, a consolidated 
structure, which is based on the specific division of labor. Furthermore, the association’s 
intent has to be directed towards to commit criminal activities in a continued way. This is 
done by an use of its ‘personnel’ and funds674 However, as Wiederin points out, there are no 
real essentialia; on the contrary, a coalition of several persons bound together by the intend to 
commit undefined criminal acts is sufficient to be branded as criminal association.675  
 
General danger, which is generally counteracted by the public security police is closely 
connected with criminal activities676 and can be seen as defined accessory to criminal law.677 
The main difference between these two areas of law – i.e. criminal law and public security 
                                                          
670 section 16 para. 1, para. 2 and para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
671 These offenses and crimes include all acts punishable according to the Austrian Criminal Code with the 
exception of sections 278, 278a, 278b, and any acts committed by carelessness or criminal acts for whose 
prosecution the consent of the affected person is needed or in instances where the affected person has to 
claim punishment itself; furthermore offenses and crimes include acts punishable according to Prohibition 
Act 1947, acts punishable according to the Aliens Police Act 2005 and acts punishable according to the 
Illegal Drug Act.  
672 Funk, Bernd-Christian, Das neue Sicherheitspolizeirecht – Kodifikation und Reform einer klassischen 
Verwaltungsmaterie, JBl 1994, foot note 5. 
673 Note in this context that the definition of section 16 para. 1 no. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act was 
cloned of the old version of section 278 of the Austrian Criminal Code dealing with the foundation of gangs 
(German: Bandenbildung); the current version of sections 278a et seq.of the Austrian Criminal Code do not 
correlate with that of a criminal association according to the Austrian Security Police Act; cf. in this respect 
especially Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 213; and EBRV 81 BlgNR XXI GP, pp. 5 et seq. 
674 cf. Brenner, Franz, et al, Kriminalpolizei und Strafprozessreform – Konzept der Arbeitsgruppe StPO-
Reform des Bundesministeriums für Inneres zu einem sicherheitsbehördlichen Ermittlungsverfahren 
(1995), p. 62.  
675 Wiederin (1998), MN 282, pp. 66-7. 
676 cf. in this respect especially section 16 of the Austrian Security Police Act and its definitions of averting of 
danger, dangerous aggression and danger investigation; furthermore Wiederin (1998), MN 203-40, pp. 51-
58; in addition, these tasks reside generally with the security agencies as Hauer/Keplinger point out 
precisely – cf. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 241. 
677 cf. e.g. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 215; Wiederin (1998), MN 272, p. 65; or Fanari, Linda, Befugnisse der 
Sicherheitsorgane nach dem Strafprozessreformgesetz im Verhältnis zu jenen des Sicherheitspolizeigesetzes 
(2005), p. 49. 
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police law – is that the latter does not demand any culpability678 of the activity. This is due to 
the fact that the public security police is obliged to protect the legally protected interests of 
the victims, whereas in criminal law cases the focus of interest lies on the person who 
committed a criminal act.679 For a closer examination of the difference between both, please 
cf. the corresponding chapter subsequently.  
 
3.5.2.4.2 Danger Investigation 
In addition to the presented definitions of general danger, section 16 para. 4 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act regulates the so-called ‘danger investigation’, stating that this means the 
detection of a source of danger and matters of fact in regard to a potential danger. Such 
detections, and in a wider sense, verifications of such dangers, are essential before any 
competence can be used by the public security police. This principle can also be drawn out of 
the principle of proportionality and means that before the public security police is using any 
of its competences, it is mandated to evaluate the actual (dangerous) situation and to make its 
decision to act based on the criterion of necessity and appropriateness. Hence, any averting of 
danger is always preceded by a corresponding evaluation of the situation.680  
 
Section 21 of the Austrian Security Police Act states that the security agencies are engaged 
with the task of averting of general dangers (thus dangerous aggression and criminal 
associations).681. Moreover, it is to say at this stage that it is the obligation of the public 
security police to put immediately682 an end to a dangerous aggression,683 implicating that the 
public security police is not allowed to wait until danger becomes real, rather than it is forced 
to intervene already in the – regularly not subject to prosecution – preparatory stages of a 
criminal activity.684 This rule applies also, if there is already a person suspected of this 
criminal activity, meaning that the Austrian Security Police Act is still applicable and the 
                                                          
678 cf. e.g. Leo (2005), p. 93. 
679 cf. Dearing, Albin, Sicherheitspolizei und Strafrechtspflege – Versuch einer Bestimmung des Verhältnisses 
zweier benachbarter Rechtsgebiete, in Festschrift Platzgummer (1995), p. 231.  
680 cf. ibid p. 236; this principle is also mentioned explicitly in section 21 para. 3 of the Austrian Security 
Police Act.  
681 section 21 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
682 However, there is the possibility for the public security police to postpone this if another criminal activity 
could be solved so; cf. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), 3rd edition, pp. 243-244. 
683 section 21 para. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act is therefore illustrating para. 1 in a further sense.  
684 cf. EBRV 148 BlgNR XVIII GP, p. 36; as well as section 22 para. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
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further proceeding is not governed by the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.685 
Furthermore, the public security police is entitled by para. 3 to an extended danger 
investigation, meaning an averting of danger in the context of serious threats. It is governed 
that the security agencies has the task of monitoring groups which – due to their structure and 
the ongoing development in their environment – are expected to represent a serious threat to 
public security, especially in the context of ideological and religious motivated aggression.686 
This provision was intended to allow the observation of extremist groups already in a point of 
time when they have not yet committed any criminal activities but when it is assumed that 
they will do so in the near future. The legislator pointed out that experiences have shown that 
tendencies towards radicalism establish over time. This is especially true if foreign 
developments and experiences are taken into account of the analysis.687  
 
3.5.3 Competence Regarding Averting of Danger 
Similar to the already above stated, the task of averting of danger does not come with any 
competences. The competences concerning the averting of danger are the same as those in 
respect to primary assistance and can be found in sections 32 et seq. of the Austrian Security 
Police Act. As not all of these competences are of concern in the context of this thesis, only 
the key competences of the public security police in regard to an RFI will be presented: 
 
3.5.3.1 Competence to Enter and Search of Premises, Rooms and Vehicles 
Section 39 of the Austrian Security Police Act 
In order to get access to a communication system, it may be necessary to enter premises or 
other locations. Section 39 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act constitutes a 
competence of the public security police, within the scope of its task of primary assistance or 
averting of a dangerous aggression. The public security police does have the competence to 
                                                          
685 In respect to the relationship between these two legal acts, please cf. below.  
686 Lepuschitz, Schindler (2008), pp. 67-68. 
687 cf. for further details concerning the intention behind the establishment of that provision EBRV 81 BlgNR 
XXI GP, p. 5. 
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enter premises, rooms and vehicles.688 In addition to the authorization of entry, the public 
security police can also search689 these locations if this has to be done:  
 in order to find a person whose life or health is threatened immediately,690  
 in order to find a person initiating an actual dangerous aggression,691 
 in order to find an object intended to be used for a dangerous aggression.692 
 
The public security police’s competence includes also the opening of containers located in 
rooms if the preconditions of para. 1 are fulfilled and the search is conducted for one of the 
purposes expressed explicitly by section 39 para. 5 of the Austrian Security Police Act. A 
general reference to the well-known principles of proportionality in section 29 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act and to the principles in regard to confessional secrets and profession 
sworn to confidentiality.693 Furthermore, it is to mention that para. 7 governs that the 
provisions of sections 121, 122 para. 2 and para. 3 as well as section 96 of the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure apply mutatis mutandis.694  
In this context it is to remark that after the end of a dangerous aggression, a search of 
premises, rooms, vehicles and containers cannot be based on the Austrian Security Police Act, 
                                                          
688 cf. section 39 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act; this means nothing else that an entry is only 
allowed for legitimate purposes; however, it is to note that – as already remarked above – danger 
investigations according to section 16 para. 4 of the Austrian Security Police Act can be conducted as well; 
cf. already above and especially (Einführungs-) Erlass des BMI of 19 April, 1993, 94.762/15-GD/93.  
689 cf. section 39 para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act; note in this context that an inspection granted 
voluntary by the holder of the premise etc is qualified as a non-interfering method according to section 28a 
para. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act and is allowed even if the preconditions of an entry and search 
of premises, rooms and vehicles are not given. However, if these preconditions are present, a conducting by 
force (as a coercive measure) is allowed; cf. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 448; furthermore, please note that 
according to the Austrian Constitutional Court, a search of locations is only given, if a search is conducted 
in order to find persons or objects whose residence is not known. Simple entering of a flat during the search 
for a person, in order to interview the persons present in that flat regarding the residence of the suspect 
person, does not constitute a search of locations and objects as defined by sections 119 et seq.of the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; cf. in this respect VfSlg 5080/1965, 6528/1971, 9766/1983, 
10547/1985, 11650/1988, 12056/1989, 12628/1991; cf. already the illustrations in regard to a search of 
locations and objects in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure above.  
690 e.g. the victim of hostage-takings, or a person announced to commit suicide; cf. furthermore Hauer, 
Keplinger (2005), pp. 448-449.  
691 e.g. a sniper, cf. furthermore Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 449.  
692 e.g. explosives hidden in a building etc, cf. Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 449.  
693 cf. section 39 para. 7 of the Austrian Security Police Act; cf. moreover the illustrations in the chapter of this 
thesis on the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
694 Concerning the procedures rights of an affected person respectively the obligation of the conducting 
authority; e.g. the issuance of a confirmation etc.; however, as Lepuschitz/Schindler argue the public 
security police has to comply with these formalities only and in so far as this is possible, cf. Lepuschitz, 
Schindler (2008), p.117-118; cf. moreover, already above and the mentioned provisions. 
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but a search of locations and objects according to the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
has to be conducted.695  
 
Part 4 of the Austrian Security Police Act deals with the handling of personal data by the 
public security police. Again there are some provisions included which might be relevant in 
the context to be used as basis of a RFI. There will be a short illustration focusing on these 
provisions.  
 
3.5.3.2 Legitimacy of Processing of Personal Data 
Section 53 of the Austrian Security Police Act 
Before going into details of this provision, it is important to note that surveillance of 
communication, or better the content of a communication, is not possible under section 53 of 
the Austrian Security Police Act, as there is a constitutional manifested obligation for the 
investigating authorities to obtain judicial approval. Such an approval is only provided by the 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and not by the Austrian Security Police Act.696 Hence, 
the regulation in the Austrian Security Police Act can only deal with data other than content 
data.697  
 
Section 53 para. 3a of the Austrian Security Police Act governs that the security agencies are 
entitled to request certain information from telecommunication providers698 (according to 
section 92 para. 3 no. 1 of the Austrian Telecommunications Act 2003) or service providers699 
(according to section 3 no. 2 of the Austrian E-Commerce Act). They are obliged to provide 
the following information as soon as possible and free of charge: 
 No. 1 – the name, address and participants number of a specified termination, 
                                                          
695 cf. section 39 para. 8 Austrian Security Police Act. 
696 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 60. 
697 Despite the fact that there is the possibility to use an IMSI catcher (cf. below) for the interception of 
communication and to obtain thereby the content of the communication, it is not allowed for the public 
security police to do so; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 67. 
698 provider means an operator of public communications services 
699 Service provider means a natural or legal person or other institution with legal capacity which provides an 
information society service; cf. already above in this thesis in the chapter on surveillance of communication 
and data.  
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 No. 2 – the Internet protocol address (IP address) belonging to a certain 
communication and its time of transmission, as well as 
 No. 3 – the name and address of the user whom a certain IP address was assigned to at 
a specific time, 
if there is – due to certain facts – an assumption of a concrete dangerous situation and the 
security police needs this information in order to fulfill its tasks.700 The information of no. 1 
can be requested for primary assistance purposes as well as for the averting of a dangerous 
aggression,701 and the passive number of a participant.702 This means that telecommunication 
providers are obliged to provide the public security policy with demanded information in case 
of a concrete dangerous situation when the public security police is in need of this 
information in order to be capable to fulfill its tasks according to the Austrian Security Police 
Act.703 Regularly, this provision is used in order to obtain master data (no. 1), which are in a 
reciprocal correlation to each other, meaning that if the telephone number is known, the name 
and address of the participant can be requested.704 Despite the fact that the provisions sound 
like they would only deal with telephone numbers and customary telecommunication, as 
Reindl-Krauskopf points out precisely, it can be used for IP addresses as well. Depending on 
the actual circumstances, it might be possible to draw conclusions from master data directly to 
an IP address of the user, or vice versa. However, if there has to be an inquiry regarding a 
dynamic IP address beforehand, than a request for master data is not given, according to 
section 53 para. 3a no. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act.705 In this respect, it is further to 
note that both, dynamic (no. 3) as well as static (no. 2) IP addresses are covered by this 
provision. 
 
In this context, one could criticize that the legitimacy of a request depends on the precondition 
                                                          
700 Not only is it mandatory that this information has to be essential for the fulfilling of the tasks of the public 
security police, but also is there the legal requirement of a justification, meaning that there is the 
assumption – based on certain facts – of a concrete dangerous situation; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  
section 134, MN 66. 
701 cf. the example of a phone call of a few minutes taking place at around 11:00am and the time frame would 
be from 11:00 to 11:15am: cf. regarding the requirement of accuracy and the implications Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 63.  
702 meaning that the public security police is empowered to ask the name, address and participants number by 
providing a time frame and the number of the communication's participant who was contacted; cf. Hauer, 
Keplinger (2005), 3rd edition, p. 601.  
703 cf. Regenfelder, Wolfgang, Ermittlungsmaßnahmen bei neuen Informationstechnologien im 
Spannungsverhältnis zum Grundrechtsschutz (2008), p. 78.  
704 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 61. 
705 cf. ibid MN 61. 
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of a concrete dangerous situation, meaning nothing else than periculum in mora – danger in 
delay – in connection with the absence of any judicial approval. Since a concrete dangerous 
situation or periculum in mora leave a broad margin for interpretation, huge criticism in 
respect to fundamental rights may arise.706 Due to the fact that it is possible to conduct a 
complete evaluation of connection data within the scope of the Austrian Security Police Act 
without any judicial approval, any judicial control after the investigation is of great 
importance for a potential criminal trial.707  
 
Section 53 para. 3b of the Austrian Security Police Act708 grants the public security police the 
option to obtain the location data of a terminal device, if there are reasons to assume that there 
is a contemporary danger to life or health of a person709. In this respect it is to note that the 
providers are obliged, not only to provide information concerning the location of a certain 
terminal device to the public security police immediately, but they also have to provide 
information about the IMSI.710 The position of a terminal device can then be conducted via a 
IMSI catcher and is directed to mobile phones, respectively their SIM cards. Via such IMSI 
catchers it is possible to track – depending on the quality of the network – an accident victim 
more or less precisely. However, this provision does not mandate the releasing of any further 
information by the providers. Especially are they not obliged to provide the IMSI catchers 
themselves.711 The public security police is accountable for the legitimacy of the request and 
has to obtain documentation for the request within 24 hours. In the context of para. 3b it is 
further to note that contrary to para. 3a the telecommunication providers are entitled to 
reimbursement of arisen costs, according to the Surveillance Cost Ordinance 2004.712 Reindl-
Krauskopf raised the question whether such a regulation should also apply to para. 3a. The 
                                                          
706 cf. e.g. as danger in delay was stressed in January 2008 in order to obtain an IP address of July 2007; cf. 
Moechel, Erich, Wirtschaft: „Misstrauen gegen SPG bleibt’ in <http://futurezone.orf.at/stories/256683> 
retrieved 2 December, 2009; furthermore please cf. <http://www.bigbrotherawards.at/2008/Preistraeger> 
retrieved 2 December, 2009.  
707 cf. in this respect especially section 140 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and Reindl-Krauskopf, 
WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 64. 
708 The interesting topic of IMSI catchers and their use by police was highly debated in Austria and there is 
still some discussion going on; cf. e.g. the references in Regenfelder (2008), pp. 46 et seq.and pp. 75 et seq; 
furthermore Fox, Dirk, Der IMSI-Catcher, in Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (2002), p. 212; and Reindl-
Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 75. 
709 e.g. the, in Austria, often stressed lost or injured backcountry skier; however such a danger could also be 
given in situations of a dangerous aggression (e.g. in the case of a hostage-taking) as Reindl-Krauskopf 
points out precisely; cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 69.  
710 IMSI stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identification and means a number of identification 
corresponding to a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card. 
711 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 70. 
712 Federal Law Gazetta II 322/2004.  
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argument is that the public security police has to provide certain information concerning its 
request to the providers in order to enable the latter to provide the requested data. 
Furthermore, there is the requirement for the security agency to state, in detail, the concrete 
dangerous situation, the legal basis of its request etc. Overall, there is no real difference 
between para. 3a and para. 3b except that para. 3b demands a formal documentation of the 
request to be forwarded to the providers within 24 hours.713  
 
3.5.3.3 Special Regulations for Investigation 
Section 54 Austrian Security Police Act 
Section 53 para. 4 of the Austrian Security Police Act states that the public security police is 
principally entitled – within the Austrian legal framework – to gather information and 
personal data via all appropriate means and process it.714 Not surprisingly, out of this 
provision, a broad range of methods evolve that can be used by the public security police. 
However, section 54 of the Austrian Security Police Act provides the corresponding 
limitations, which are special regulations concerning the investigation of personal data, its 
limitations and boundaries. Certain aspects of paragraph 54, such as para. 2, para. 4 and para. 
4a are of general interest to this thesis since they deal with items applicable to an RFI. 
 
Section 54 para. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act handles the investigation of personal 
data through observations715 - thus with a covert investigation method – and governs that this 
method is only allowed in the following instances:  
 No. 1 to conduct an extended danger investigation,716  
                                                          
713 cf. Reindl-Krauskopf, WK-StPO,  section 134, MN 73. 
714 Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 608.  
715 Observation in this context means more than just simple accidental watching of a person, it is rather a 
structured, systematical awareness of optical or acoustical information (i.e. a specified person), over a 
longer (not specified in advance) period of time, which is connected with a specific dedicated personal and 
impersonal effort. This means nothing else than the accidental awareness during patrolling cannot be 
qualified as an observation; cf. in this regard especially Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 610; as well as 
Wiederin, Ewald, Privatsphäre und Überwachungsstaat - Sicherheitspolizeiliche und 
Nachrichtendienstliche Datenermittlungen im Lichte des Art 8 EMRK und der Art 9-10a StGG (2003), pp. 
110 et seq; moreover, Pürstl, Zirnsack (2005), p. 211. 
716 according to section 21 para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
 182 
 
 No. 2 to be able to prevent a punishable activity of a certain person against life, 
health, morality, freedom, assets of a third person, or the environment717 
 No. 3 if the averting of dangerous aggressions or criminal associations718 would be 
endangered or complicated otherwise.  
According to Hauer/Keplinger it is unclear why the legislator used the expression ‘punishable 
activities’ in this section, especially since throughout the whole Act it is normally referred as 
dangerous aggressions. A simple literal construction would consequently lead to the 
conclusion that even regulatory offenses would be covered. It is argued that this cannot have 
been the intention of the legislator; hence they are in favor of a reduction to judicial 
punishable criminal activities.719  
 
An observation can be conducted as soon as the public security police gets knowledge about a 
certain person’s plan to commit a penal activity. It is not necessary for the security authority 
to have enough information on that criminal activity that it can undertake preventive steps.720 
As Pürstl/Zirnsack point out, the public security police has to evaluate whether it is better to 
prevent a criminal activity by observation or by confronting the (not yet chargeable) 
‘offender’.721 
 
Section 54 para. 4 of the Austrian Security Police Act deals with the investigation of data of 
persons conducted with visual and audio recording devices. These types of investigations are 
only allowed in connection with the averting of a dangerous aggression or a criminal 
association, or in the context of an extended investigation of danger. Furthermore, this can be 
done undercover; if an averting of a dangerous aggression or a criminal association would be 
endangered or complicated otherwise.722 However, there are also some limitations to the 
gathering of personal data. First of all, according to no. 1, the use of audio recording devices 
                                                          
717 Meaning that the criminal activity is still on the preparatory level and the penal outcome is not yet present; 
this has to be seen in the light of section 16 para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
718 according to section 21 para. 1 of the Austrian Security Police Act. 
719 Hauer, Keplinger (2005), pp. 610-611. 
720 Such as warning the potential victims, etc. 
721 cf. Pürstl, Zirnsack (2005), p. 211. 
722 according to section 54 para. 4 of the Austrian Security Police Act referring to para. 3.  
 183 
 
in order to record private723 statements where there is not at least one undercover agent 
present is illegal,724 and second of all, according to no. 2, it is equally not allowed to use 
image recording devices in order to record the private conduct of person if there is not at least 
one informed person present.725 However, entire public conduct/behavior or statements can be 
recorded, and the recording of situations where an undercover agent, is present, is also 
permitted.726 The telecommunication secrecy727 is not affected by this provision. 
 
Section 54 para. 4a of the Austrian Security Police Act handles the use of image and audio 
recording devices in connection with an averting of criminal associations. It governs that the 
public security police is only allowed to use such techniques, if there is the assumption that a 
crime728 will be committed and that special attention has to be put on the principle of 
proportionality, as stated in section 29 Austrian Security Police Act.729  
 
3.5.4 Conclusion: Realization of an RFI  
The public security police’s task of maintaining public order, can never constitute a sound 
basis for an RFI. This is due to the fact that this agency only deals with rules for public 
behavior whose compliance is essential for a peacefully existing society that embraces 
morality, customs and civility. However, there are some other competences, which are capable 
to handle this matter. 
 
                                                          
723 private is seen as the opposite of publicly – thus everything spoken and done which is not intended to be 
noticed by a larger undefined group of persons; cf. already the chapter on surveillance of persons.  
724 This constitutes a prohibition of a major electronic eavesdropping operation; cf. already the illustration 
concerning this in the corresponding chapter of this thesis on surveillance of persons; cf. moreover Hauer, 
Keplinger, (2005), p. 612. 
725 This constitutes the prohibition of a major optical surveillance; cf. already the illustration concerning this in 
the corresponding chapter of this thesis on surveillance of persons; cf. moreover Hauer, Keplinger (2005), 
3rd edition, p. 612; and Leo (2005), pp. 156-157. 
726 Hence, a minor electronic eavesdropping operation can be conducted; cf. already the illustration concerning 
this in the corresponding chapter of this thesis on surveillance of persons; cf. moreover Hauer, Keplinger 
(2005), 3rd edition, p. 613. 
727 according to Art 10a Basic Law of 21 December, 1867 on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms 
and Laender; stating that the 'telecommunications secrecy may not be infringed'. 
728 Note in this context that according to section 17 para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal Code the difference 
between an offense and a crime is that the latter is punishable by a term of more than three year 
imprisonment.  
729 cf. already above. 
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3.5.4.1 Primary Assistance and Maintenance of Public Security  
Section 19 and 21 of the Austrian Security Police Act  
Due to the fact that it is the obligation of the public security police to assist in the case of an 
actual threat to life, health, liberty or property of person or an imminent threat thereof, an RFI 
can be conducted under these provisions. The same is true for the maintenance of public 
security in the form of an averting of danger. Both tasks involve several competences, as 
illustrated in the corresponding chapters of this thesis. 
 
3.5.4.1.1 Remote Access for Search Purposes 
According to section 39 of the Austrian Security Police Act the public security police is only 
allowed to enter and search premises, rooms and vehicles if there is an actual or imminent 
threat to life, health etc.730 Here, the wording of the provisions for primary assistance 
contradicts the potential use of an RFI. The same is true in respect to an averting of a danger, 
as the competence to enter and search potential locations is limited to the search for 
objects/persons constituting the basis/originator of a dangerous aggression.731  
 
3.5.4.1.2 Surveillance of Activities 
As presented above, section 54 para. 2 of the Austrian Security Police Act deals with special 
regulations concerning the investigation of personal data and sets out the limits in regard to 
observations made by the public security police. However, this provision does not mention 
anything in regard to the use of electronic devices. This means that it handles customary 
observations where officers of the public security police follow a suspect from one place to 
another, thereby gathering information about the person.732 Therefore, this provision cannot 
be used as a sound basis for an RFI.  
                                                          
730 cf. section 39 para. 3 no. 1 Austrian Security Police Act. 
731 cf. sections 39 para. 3 no. 2, no. 3 Austrian Security Police Act; note in this context, as it was already 
illustrated that after the end of a dangerous aggression or an actual/imminent threat to life etc. a search can 
only be conducted in accordance with the regulations set out by the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; 
cf. already above and section 39 para. 8 Austrian Security Police Act. 
732 cf. in this regard especially Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 610 
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Besides classical police work in the form of an observation, section 54 para. 4 of the Austrian 
Security Police Act covers the use of image and audio recording devices and the 
corresponding limitations, prohibiting not only a major electronic eavesdropping operation, 
but also a major optical surveillance by the public security police. The Austrian Security 
Police Act restricts preventive measures733 to minor electronic eavesdropping operations or 
minor optical surveillances.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the inclusion of a minor electronic eavesdropping operation 
into an RFI is not possible under, either the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure or under the 
Austrian Security Police Act. 
 
3.5.4.1.3 Surveillance of Telecommunication 
Section 53 of the Austrian Security Police Act constitutes an equal situation as the one 
illustrated above in the context of surveillance of data and communication, and a disclosure of 
transmission data. Besides the fact that the possibilities of this provision can constitute a 
(more or less) important piece of a jigsaw puzzle in an RFI,734 they would both735 not be used 
legitimately as there is again the requirement of a dangerous aggression or a primary 
assistance. Furthermore, in conformity with the provisions in the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the public security police depends on the assistance of providers and the fact that 
content data is covered by these provisions. Hence, there is no provision empowering the 
criminal police to store or monitor communication on their own.  
 
In summary it can be said that in the Austrian Security Police Act no legal basis for 
surveillance of telecommunication as a task of an RFI can be found. Considering that all 
investigations, preventive tasks and competences are similar to the regulations dealing with 
criminal procedures, it should not come as a surprise that the Austrian Security Police Act 
cannot be used as a basis for conducting an RFI. 
                                                          
733 cf. section 54 para. 4 Austrian Security Police Act governs that such devices can only be legally use in 
order to an averting of a dangerous aggression or a criminal association, or in the context of an extended 
danger investigation. 
734 BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 43. 
735 Disclosure of certain data and the option for the use of an IMSI catcher; cf. already above and sections 53 
para. 3a and para. 3b Austrian Security Police Act. 
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Denying the application of an RFI under one of the above illustrated procedural provisions of 
the Austrian legal order implements that currently no RFI can be legally conducted, 
consequently, it is necessary to establish new provisions in order to empower the security 
agencies to apply such investigation methods. This can either be done in the form of new 
provisions incorporated into one of the two legal Acts – i.e. the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, or the Security Police Act – or by setting up a new legal Act handling remote 
forensic investigations. Generally, there are no qualitative differences between these options. 
However, due to the preventive character of the investigation method, certain issues have to 
be kept in mind. Constitutional and structural problems occur, as do questions in regard to 
prevention and procedural law in principal.  
 
This brings us the fourth and last chapter of this thesis, which deals with the prevention of 
crime and criminal procedural law. Included in this chapter are the main difficulties that arise 
when the RFI provision would be established either in the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure or in the Austrian Security Police Act.  
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4 Prevention and Criminal (Procedural) Law 
The Austrian legislator’s intentions behind the establishment of an RFI are not only focused 
on the solution of already committed criminal acts but also for the prevention of such.736 
Hence, an RFI has to be conducted legitimately in order to prevent a criminal act from 
happening.  
True, prevention is better than cure and to hinder somebody from hurting anybody else should 
be a maxim to act on. Therefore, the Austrian legislator provides already different tasks and 
competences for the security agencies: for instance, as presented above public security police 
is entitled to the averting of danger in the cases of a dangerous aggression or of criminal 
associations. Hence, it is possible (within the limits of the law) to prevent criminal incidents. 
This means, however, that the security agencies are allowed to interfere at a very early stage 
of a (potential) criminal act. That is the crucial point: while repressive measures generally 
start after a criminal activity happened preventive measures are taken already before such 
direct criminal activities are even conducted. The critiques regarding an RFI are all about the 
aspect of prevention. The Austrian legislator fully aware of this delicate situation therefore 
created certain minimum standards. These standards were established within the framework 
of procedural law. On the one hand, the competences of the security agencies are limited and 
on the other hand, citizens are guaranteed certain freedoms as the authorities have to have a 
certain degree of suspicion based on facts.737 However, there are further points of critique in 
the context of prevention via RFIs and the potential incorporation of this investigation method 
into the Austrian legal framework.  
 
In the following chapter on RFI and the prevention of criminal activities, especially the 
prevention of terrorist attacks, the problematic relationship between criminal procedural law 
and the frustration of incidents will be analyzed. In order to give a comprehensive impression 
on the whole matter, this chapter starts with a brief historic overview on the development of 
states and their philosophical basis. Understanding this development is important in this 
context as it shows the evolution from a state of nature to a state of law and in a further step to 
                                                          
736 The Austria Federal Ministers of Justice and of the Interior pointed out that an RFI should be conducted in 
situations where it is necessary for the solution or prevention of a criminal act committed, or planed by a 
criminal organization or a terrorist association; cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich of 17 
October, 2007.  
737 cf. already above in the chapter on Criminal Procedural Law and on Security Police Law.  
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a potential state of prevention. While the principles of these three ‘states’ are not alike they 
are linked and refer to each other to a certain extend. The author points out the key principles 
a state of law is based on and why the concept of a state of prevention is diametrically 
opposed. Furthermore, it will be illustrated how and why states of law did emerge and how 
states of law try to handle terrorist threats and are thereby moving towards a state of 
prevention. Subsequently, the main issues accompanying the question of prevention within 
the regime of criminal law are presented.  
The challenges for the Austrian legal order when dealing with RFIs include especially the 
confronting tasks between the public security police and the criminal police: The entire 
Austrian legal order does not provide any provisions authorizing anything like an RFI. Hence, 
the relationship between the tasks is essential to decide whether a provision establishing that 
investigation method has to be based in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure or in the 
Austrian Security Police Act. For the author of this thesis, the conclusions drawn out of this 
relationship (i.e. how the ‘task of prevention’ could be handled) lead consequently to a 
notorious systematic failure within the Austrian legal order.  
Another challenge is a problematic provision within the Austrian Criminal Code, thus it is of 
substantive criminal law origin. This provision implies already some tricky preventive aspects 
and is therefore highly debatable, as it deals inter alia with the membership in a criminal 
organization or a terrorist association. The provision constitutes a shift of the boundary of 
penal relevant behavior into the direction of prevention. 
Fundamental and human rights are the last challenge the author will examine. The principle of 
proportionality as a cornerstone of the Austrian Constitution contains elements of the freedom 
from discrimination. In order to maintain the freedom from discrimination, the legislator has 
established some benchmarks: for each investigation method, certain and predefined levels of 
suspicion have to be given. Whether and how these levels can be taken into account is the 
subject of the latter subchapter.  
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4.1 General Aspects of Prevention 
4.1.1 From A State of Nature to a State of Prevention 
Historically, the emergence of national states as well as the development of its tasks is closely 
connected to the relationship between security and freedom. Prevailing at the beginning of 
this evolution was security. The creation of nation states as warrantors for peace and security 
was in fact the answer to the (mostly confessional induced) civil wars. The social contract 
theory, established by Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) in his famous book 'Leviathan' is the 
main basis for Western political philosophy. For Hobbes, a political philosopher, in a state of 
nature, there is a war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes), where man is a wolf to 
man (homo homini lupus). A supreme political authority does not exist. Therefore an authority 
of absolute power has to be established, i.e. by a contract. This contract is an agreement 
between individuals who renounce the individual right to govern themselves and transfer this 
right to the sovereign. However, contrary to the system of absolutism claiming its absolute 
power directly from god, the concept of Hobbes is based on a rational solution. For Hobbes it 
is a rational solution for all parties, because (civil) society submits itself under the power of 
the sovereign who in exchange establishes security and peace as well as it ends the situation 
of uncertainty in a state of nature. Despite the fact that the 'Leviathan' was published 1651, 
this point of view is still present in modern days, as for instance the German Constitutional 
Court underlines.738 However, due to the absolutist rulers (governments) following this 
conception the situation for the civil society was rather unsatisfactory, as absolutist power was 
not restricted to anything.  
In a further evolutionary step the power of the sovereign was not only based on law but also 
was limited by law. The law set out the framework within the sovereign was able to reign. The 
concept of a state of law binds sovereign activities in a formal (to the provisions established 
by the civil society) and in a substantive (to the freedom of the individual) sense. The 
relationship between freedom and security is clearly defined and involves that an interference 
with the freedom of an individual is only permitted when and insofar as it is mandatory to 
maintain security and peace. A state of law is therefore a model based on the assumptions that 
                                                          
738 cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 of 2.3.2010, MN 318: Dementsprechend hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht den 
Staat als verfasste Friedens- und Ordnungsmacht beschrieben und die von ihm zu gewährleistende 
Sicherheit seiner Bürger als Verfassungswert anerkannt, der mit anderen im gleichen Rang steht und 
unverzichtbar ist, weil die Institution Staat auch davon ihre Rechtfertigung herleitet. 
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the sovereign is only responsible for countering violent attacks from the outer and within 
society. On the other hand, society governs itself more or less alone. Laissez-faire was the 
credo, meaning let them alone. However, this model became also unsatisfying, due to the 
impressions of social behavior in the years of the starting industrialization. Due to the harsh 
working conditions, including inappropriate supply with basics such as nutrition, sanitary or 
medical care, the danger of riots and social unrest or revolutions was quite high. Hence, it 
became more and more obvious that the sovereign had to take up social tasks in order to 
guarantee internal stability and social security. The concept of a welfare state as the main 
consequence of this development widened the tasks and competence of the sovereign 
enormously. The sovereign – the state – is somehow an omnipresent state occupied with a 
wide range of agendas. Due to these facts, the interdependency of the state and its citizen is 
quite strong.739  
So far the last step in the described development seems to be a step towards prevention. The 
increase of the states’ responsibilities in security issues reaches new heights in the highly 
complex and globalized industrial societies which tend to be more receptive to malfunctions, 
as Huster and Rudolph, two professors of the University in Bochum/Germany, have put it.740 
Due to the potential dimension of damages, even the slightest malfunction can cause serious 
losses – of financial capital as well as human lives. Hence, in industrialized societies the 
sovereign has to take action before problems even arise in order to prevent serious damages. 
In such environments, as they argue, it is not enough to react on existing or obvious dangers, 
rather than (at the best) to avoid an incident to happen. Thus, prevention is better than cure. In 
modern society, the main concept is based on risk (assessment) while in security issues the 
term prevention is used. A state of prevention, as the authors call it, was observed for the first 
time in the domain of environmental and technical law. Two areas of law whose complexity 
and tendency towards danger are obvious. Hence, it is not surprising that when these fields of 
law developed the potential dangers were discussed. The civil society is in demand for 
information regarding the potential dangers connected to technological achievements and 
innovations. Especially, the eventual influence on the environment as the main basis of live is 
of great interest. Hence, the constructors of, for instance, nuclear power plants etc. have to 
proof that they have a profound risk management. Risk management in regard to scientific 
assessment of the consequences and a strict control of them from the sovereign are vital in the 
                                                          
739 Note in this context that the possibility of intervention by the state and therefore the dependency of the 
people on their sovereign is quite high.  
740 Huster, Stefan, Rudolph, Karsten (ed.), Vom Rechtsstaat zum Präventionsstaat (2008), p. 14. 
 191 
 
course of the official approval and technical admission. 
It is often argued that the structure of threats emerging from terrorist activities does not have 
any similarities with that of ordinary criminal law, rather than it is similar to those of the just 
described technical and environmental issues. Huster/Rudolph hold five arguments in favor of 
this point of view. Firstly, the threat cannot be individualized – hence, everybody could be hit 
by an attack. Secondly, the threat is not applicable to a specific location – hence an incident 
could happen nearly everywhere. Thirdly, the dimension of potential damage can be 
compared with that of potential incidences in the technical or environmental field. Fourthly, 
the general preventive aspects of ordinary criminal law are not working, as terrorists cannot 
be impressed by measures of general deterrence, such as sovereign punishment in the form of 
imprisonment etc. And finally, a terrorist threat does not only have a systematic character due 
to its potential network structure. It is also this character making it special, as its activities are 
directed against a political system as such.741 It has to be noted at this stage that 
Huster/Rudolph assume terrorism in its new form targeting nothing less than political 
order/stability and the entire lifestyle of the western world. They noted that terrorism is (not 
necessarily) directed against any important political leaders or elites, taking at least some 
collateral damage in the form of dead bystanders into account. The goals are large-scale 
attacks hitting potentially everybody. Hence, the current form of terrorism is a global threat in 
which suspects and locations for attacks are not identifiable. The dimension of damage caused 
by it does have an extent not known until recently and the characteristics of this threat are 
rather vague and diffuse. Therefore, it shares some important qualities with technical or 
environmental issues and it should be dealt with on the basis of the same principles.  
 
4.1.2 Issues Challenging A State of Law  
As a general rule, a state of law consists of laws set by the lawmaker. These rules are intended 
to guarantee a peaceful coexistence in civil society. The sovereign punishes behavior against 
these rules and maintains thereby peace and security. Thus, behavior in conformity with the 
law does not provoke the sovereign to step in and take any action against a person. This 
implements that the sovereign is content with behavior in conformity with the law. Thus, the 
sovereign does not interfere with the attitude or morals of its citizen. A state of law is 
                                                          
741 cf. Huster, Rudolph (2008), pp. 14-15. 
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characterized by an equal treatment of all its citizens regardless of sex, age, political or 
confessional views. Closely related to this is the principle that the sovereign respects privacy 
and guarantees data protection when handling personal data of its citizens. Equal treatment 
and the respect of privacy are principles set out inter alia in international treaties and 
declarations and can be seen – with other fundamental principles – as the very basis of 
western society, thus of western states as such.  
The big challenge out of this non terminal list of principles of a state of law is that they are 
partly diametrically opposed to prevention and precaution. Prevention by its nature and 
common sense is forcing the security agencies to gather information about potential terrorist 
targets and when these incidents could happen. Furthermore, information about potential 
terrorist activists is needed in order to identify the 'enemy'. Data is collected directly by 
security agencies, or other entities are obliged to do so and disclose the demanded information 
to the security agencies when needed. Hence, as it can be easily imagined, infringements with 
privacy or problems with data protection law may occur.  
The second and probably most challenging issue in the context of terrorism and its prevention 
is the principle of proportionality. As already aforementioned,742 in a state of law an 
interference with fundamental rights caused by authorities is only possible under limited 
circumstances. The relationship between security and freedom is handled via the principle of 
proportionality. It limits and binds the sovereign and its competences on the one hand, and 
strengthens the position of the citizens on the other. According to the principle of 
proportionality, interferences of the sovereign with fundamental and human rights of its 
citizen are only allowed if and in so far as these interferences are firstly, capable to counter 
threats. Secondly, interferences have to be necessary in the sense that there is a pressing social 
need743 and thirdly, interferences have to be appropriate in the sense of modest, excluding any 
form of excess. In order to conduct an evaluation whether the principle of proportionality is 
complied with, it is required that the legally protected interest/good and the corresponding 
threat are described in detail. This is set into relation with the intended interference. Without 
any naming or description of the legally protected good and the threat it is facing, it is not 
possible for the court (who has to issue a corresponding warrant) to evaluate the relationship 
of the intended interference and the legally protected good. However, as security agencies 
                                                          
742 cf. point 3.2.3 of this thesis. 
743 cf. already above and the case of Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March, 1983 
(Application no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75), para. 97 (c). 
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have to handle threats to the legally protected interest ‘security’, this system of evaluation 
leads to a dead end:  
A modern day terrorist threat is not a concrete threat, but rather, the dealing with a certain 
level of risk. In most cases, this risk can neither be individualized nor described but the 
potential dimension of damage is considered to be quite extensive. Thus, the well-established 
system to evaluate proportional interferences does not work properly in this context. What is 
missing is a benchmark, a guideline to conduct an assessment in the matter of terrorism.  
 
After illustrating the fundamental (constitutional) principles western societies are commonly 
based on, the next part of this thesis evaluates further constitutional issues in the context of 
prevention and criminal law: the relationship between the aforementioned tasks744 of the 
public security police and that of the criminal police. 
 
4.2 Public Security Police vs. Criminal Police 
When it comes to the implementation of RFIs, one of the main questions is into which legal 
framework they can be incorporated. The Austrian security agencies have to either apply the 
Code of Criminal Procedure or the Security Police Act in order to deal with criminal 
activities. As shown, neither the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Security Police Act does 
provide currently a legal basis for any investigation method similar to an RFI. Hence, in order 
to evaluate which is the best to host an RFI, the differences between the two acts as well as 
their relationship has to be examined. Therefore, the relationships between the activities of the 
public security police on the one, and the criminal police on the other hand have to be 
presented. Not only are there different prerequisites for who deals with what but there may 
also be diverse outcomes and consequences for the implementation of an RFI.  
Overall, it can be said that there is a fine line between the tasks of the security police and the 
criminal police. Generally speaking, the averting of danger – as the main task of the public 
security police – has to be legally separated from the tasks of the criminal prosecution. 
Theoretically, the relationship between the two forces and thus the difference is clear and 
                                                          
744 As determinate by Austrian constitutional law. 
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depends on the anticipated outcome of an investigation on who will conduct it.745 While the 
Austrian Security Police Act deals with an averting of danger, the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure is concerned with the solution and conviction of already occurred happened 
criminal activities. Thus, criminal prosecution handles committed crimes by solving them, 
governing the solution for these criminal activities and serving repressive purposes. The task 
of the public security police – i.e. the averting of danger – is future oriented. Hence, the tasks 
are not repressive but rather preventive. The task of the public security police tries to avoid 
future criminal acts or harmful outcomes to happen.746 The clarifying tasks of the public 
security police are only intended to ‘solve’ dangerous aggression and are not directed to any 
other judicial punishable activities.  
 
Despite this relatively concrete distinction between the delegated jobs of the public security 
and criminal police, it is possible that their goals and tasks overlap. Especially in the course of 
time, the question emerges as to when the security agencies operate as public security police 
and at which stage criminal police ‘takes over’. Thus, at which stage does prevention turn into 
repression.  
In this respect section 22 para. 3 of the Austrian Security Police Act offers an answer: As soon 
as a specific person is suspected of having committed a criminal activity, the criminal police 
is empowered to investigate, meaning only the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure is 
applicable. Nevertheless, as long as a threat exists or as long as there is danger that the 
offender will repeat the criminal act, the provisions of the Austrian Security Police Act are 
applicable. Hence, the public security police has to investigate the significant matters of 
fact747 of a dangerous aggression. So it is able to evaluate whether there is the threat of further 
dangerous aggressions and perform steps to prevent such aggressions.748 This task exists 
regardless of the tasks according to criminal proceedings. Thus, even after the end of an 
aggression, investigations can be based on the Austrian Security Police Act until a specific 
person is under suspicion.749 After that, a clarification based on legal aspects of the criminal 
                                                          
745 However, this is not always that clear as VwSlg 13084 A/1989 points out in stating that even though the 
security agency applies Art V EGVG in accordance with (the old) section 24 Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the activity falls under the expression of public security police according to Art 10 para. 1 no. 7 
Austrian Constutional Law.  
746 cf. for further remarks in this regard Wiederin (1998), MN 291-5, pp. 68-69. 
747 Thus the course of events as well as the actor(s). 
748 cf. Pürstl, Zirnsack (2005), pp. 99-100. 
749 cf. in this respect especially Wiederin (1998), MN 294-5, p. 69; Hauer, Keplinger (2005), p. 256, as well as 
Fuchs, Helmut, Zerbes, Ingeborg WK-StPO [2006] section 24 MN 38–40.  
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act is needed, to decide who continues work on the case, because once a specific person750 is 
suspected751 of having committed the criminal activity, the provisions of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure apply exclusively.  
However, it is possible that both laws (Act as well as Code) are applicable at the same time, as 
the Administration Court ruled.752 Such situations can emerge when there is not yet a specific 
person suspected of a crime. As the explanatory materials of the Austrian Security Police Act 
state, there is a general danger (of repetition) as long as the offender’s perpetration is not 
proven, thus the criminal act remains unsolved.753 Hence, the security agency fulfills a double 
function – public security police as well as criminal police.754 In any case, this parallel 
application of both laws ends when the identity of a suspected person is clarified and the 
preventive aim recedes that of the criminal law. This shows that the averting of danger is 
always the main priority.755 Until the offender is known the Austrian Security Police Act, and 
from there on only the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable.756 However, there 
is one limitation to this as the provisions on the handling of data of the Austrian Security 
Police Act are still valid.757  
 
As shown, the main difference between the Austrian Security Police Act and the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure is that the clarifying task of the public security police of a 
criminal case ends earlier than that of the criminal police. This involves also the principle that 
the public security police deals to a large extend with the immediate prevention of criminal 
activities, while the tasks of the criminal police are characterized mainly by their repressive 
nature.758 This form of division of agendas has various reasons. The most important one for 
this thesis is that the restriction for the public security police to investigate until a specific 
                                                          
750 A specific person is a person individualized, even it is not yet known by name; e.g. if somebody points at a 
person shouting: 'He did it'; cf. as well VwGH, 17 December, 1997, 97/01/0139. Note in this context that if 
the suspicion against a certain person disappears, the task of the public security police reestablishes. 
751 In this respect it is to mention that the suspicion has to be based on facts (similar to the requirements for a 
search etc – an assumption); cf. furthermore especially Hauer, Keplinger (2005), pp. 298 et seq.  
752 VwGH, 16 February, 2000, 99/01/0399. 
753 EBRV 148 BlgNR XVIII GP, p. 29. 
754 Dearing, Albin, in Dearing, Albin, Haller, Birgitt, Das Österreichische Gewaltschutzpaket (2000), p. 105 et 
seq. 
755 Some even speak of a precedence of the averting of a danger over the solution and conviction of happened 
criminal activities; cf. Fuchs, Zerbes, WK-StPO [2006], section 24 MN 36; as well as Funk, JBl 1994, 
footnote 63. 
756 VwGH, 16 February, 2000, 99/01/0399. 
757 cf. Funk, JBl 1994, footnote 71. 
758 cf. for a comprehensive overview and critique of the Austrian Security Police Act draft, Davy, Benjamin, 
Davy, Ulrike, Gezähmte Polizeigewalt? Aufgaben und Neuordnung der Sicherheitspolizei in Österreich 
(1991), pp. 72 et seq. 
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person is suspected of a criminal act is mainly due to the fact that the suspected person does 
have certain procedural rights – such as those set out by Art 6 Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. These rights, or better their protection, lie 
entirely in the hand of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, meaning that the provisions 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure are responsible for the protection of 
human/fundamental rights.759  This is taken into account mainly by the principle of 
proportionality. Hence, every interference with human/fundamental rights has to be evaluated 
whether it is proportional (in regard to the committed criminal act).  
The division of the tasks is reasonable and comprehensive. However, recent developments in 
this field, especially in the context of surveillance and other investigation methods interfering 
seriously with fundamental rights of the affected person, are the subject of some critique to be 
presented briefly.  
 
4.2.1. Diminishing Separation 
Due to the fact that an RFI is intended to be established in the same way as a major electronic 
eavesdropping operations according to section 136 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure,760 thus not only for crime solution but also for crime preventive 
purposes, the separation of the various tasks of the security agencies becomes more and more 
blurred. The actual functional dissociation of the two task forces, as intended originally by the 
Austrian Constitutional Law, is diminishing and prevention, as the key task of the public 
security police are mixed with the tasks of the criminal police. The repressive nature of the 
criminal police is decreasing and its tasks are taking on a more and more preventive nature. 
This can be clearly observed by the establishment of certain substantive criminal law 
provisions.761 Whether this is a good thing or not, is a completely different question, however, 
from a formal point of view there should be a clear cut distinction in order to fulfill the 
requirements of the Austrian Constitutional Law. Not only from a procedural perspective, but 
also from the perspective of the person applying these regulations, it appears to be more 
                                                          
759 cf. EBRV 272 BlgNR XXIII GP, p. 5 as well as Dearing, Albin, in Dearing, Albin, Haller, Birgitt, Das 
Österreichische Gewaltschutzpaket (2000), p. 106; cf. furthermore below. 
760 cf. already the critique at Fuchs, Helmut, 'Zum Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über besondere 
Ermittlungsmaßnahmen zur Bekämpfung Organisierter Kriminalität' in Strafrechtliche Probleme der 
Gegenwart (1997), pp. 263-299. 
761 cf. in this regard to the sub-chapter on substantive criminal law below.  
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desirable to have clear and distinct boundaries between the tasks. Uncertainties do not 
constitute a sound and proper basis for the well being of a state and for the confidence and 
loyalty its citizen should bare for it. It is especially important that trust can be placed in the 
national authorities, otherwise a peaceful and save coexistence becomes unrealistic.  
 
4.2.2. Protection of Human Rights 
Human rights have to always be minded when dealing with coercive measures. In Austria, the 
protection of fundamental rights is in the hand of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is due 
to the fact that the Austrian Security Police Act empowers the security agencies to 
investigations until a specific person is under suspect. Therefore, the use of coercive measures 
is rather limited. The coercive measures of the public security police are weaker and in 
general less intrusive than those used by the criminal police. On the one hand, this can be 
explained by the fact that public security police does only deal with circumstances where it 
comes to an averting of danger762 thus if there is an immediate need for an interference by the 
security agency. There is no question whether there is culpability in play or not. Even if there 
is vis major, the provisions of the Austrian Security Police Act apply. Moreover, coercive 
measures do not need approval if conducted in the context of an averting of danger.763 On the 
other hand, if a specific person is already identified as a suspect by the security agency, this 
person is subject to investigations by the criminal police and therefore, does have certain 
procedural rights, i.e. rights granted inter alia by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. At this point, there is less urgency764 and the criminal 
police can evaluate everything in detail before conducting, for instance, a search or apply any 
other coercive measures. Moreover, the steps taken by the criminal police have to be directed 
and approved by two further entities, namely the public prosecution and the court. Especially 
the latter fact legitimates a higher degree of intrusion of a suspect’s human and fundamental 
rights, and later on of potential affected persons.  
                                                          
762 Involving also the threat of a repetition of e.g. a dangerous aggression; cf. already above.  
763 However, this does not mean that there is any legal vacuum – all acts of the security agencies are subject to 
(at least) subsequent judicial control and approval; cf. e.g. in the context of the public security police 
section 88 para. 1 Austrian Security Police Act stating that the Independent Administrative Tribunals (Art 
129a Austrian Constitutional Law) pronounce judgment after exhaustion of the administrative appeal 
stages, in so far as such come into consideration on complaints by persons who allege infringement of their 
rights through the exercise of direct administrative power and compulsion.  
764 Although there might be situation of danger in delay; cf. already above.  
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Coercive measures, as used in the context of the criminal police, can greatly interfere with 
human rights. Therefore, these measures have to fulfill certain criteria to become legitimate. 
Substantive reservations765 allow interferences of the state with the fundamental or human 
rights, if these acts are in accordance with the law and ‘[…] necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’766 An interference with fundamental and 
human rights – in our specific case the right to privacy – could be legitimate if certain 
requirements and boundaries are recognized. Since only the Austrian Code of Criminal 
Procedure is capable to deal with the protection of human rights, serious interferences with 
these rights have to be dealt with by this code and not by the Austrian Security Police Act. In 
addition, the latter is not even capable to deal with serious interferences as it does not provide 
any procedural provisions to do so. In this respect, also the German 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof in its ruling regarding the confidentiality and integrity of 
informational systems holds as one of the maxims that the secretly infiltration of 
informational systems has to be based on judicial approval.767 
 
The illustration of the relationship between the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and the 
Security Police Act shows that none of them is capable to host the intended RFI provision. 
While the former is intended to handle serious interferences with fundamental/human rights 
after a criminal incident happened, the latter was established inter alia to counter ongoing or 
hinder approaching criminal attacks. An RFI, however, tries to combine these two tasks. 
Whether such a provision can be introduced properly into the legal system of Austria or 
whether an introduction of the proposed provision would constitute a systematic failure is 
examined in the next chapter.  
 
                                                          
765 cf. already above in the chapter on constitutional law.  
766 Art 8 para. 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; but cf. as well in 
this respect Art 9 para. 2, Art 10 para. 2 etc Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
767 cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, maxim no. 2: German: Die heimliche 
Infiltration eines informationstechnischen Systems ist grundsätzlich unter den Vorbehalt richterlicher 
Anordnung zu stellen. Das Gesetz, das zu einem solchen Eingriff ermächtigt, muss Vorkehrungen enthalten, 
um den Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung zu schützen. 
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4.3 Systematic Failures 
By law, the public security police has to conduct an evaluation of the whole situations prior to 
the use of any of its competences, whereas there are no such requirements for the criminal 
police. The reason for this different treatment is that the public security police does not need 
any approval by a higher authority as it mainly deals with urgent situations. This means that 
the time constraint of the public security police requires a special evaluation of the situation: 
A minimum amount and a sound basis of facts are required before the public security police 
can assume that an averting of danger is needed. These facts have to constitute an individual 
and isolated case. Based on these facts, it is possible to draw conclusions of what is going to 
happen, should the public security police not use its competences. The actual threat can be 
concluded out of a scenario or a situation likely to lead to a harmful outcome – according to 
the customary experiences. This prognosis has to be concrete and comprehensive in all its 
aspects. Thus, the likelihood of a harmful outcome (damage) is objectively given, i.e. 
foreseeable. Furthermore, there has to be a temporal connection between the actual threat and 
the proposed damage, meaning that the actual danger would soon cause damage to legally 
protected goods.768 Only if all preconditions are fulfilled, the public security police is allowed 
to use its competences in order to avert the danger.  
 
Due to the fact that the criminal police is not bound to any similar preconditions, the 
extension of its application towards prevention is highly problematic. Especially, the 
requirements of predictability and the temporal aspect have to be questioned. True, there are 
threats emerging from criminal organizations and terrorist associations but to which extend, or 
which legally protected goods will be affected is rather doubtful. Moreover, it is quite 
uncertain if or where, for instance, a terrorist attack will happen as well as it can be 
questioned who, out of a big group of persons, will commit the criminal activity.769 The 
requirements according to the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure are wage, leaving much 
room for interpretation. Neither do they ask for any clarification and ascertainment of the 
concrete suspicion. In addition, it is to state that the criminal activities of criminal 
organizations and terrorist associations are, according to the Austrian Criminal Code, quite 
                                                          
768 cf. also BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, para. 251-252. 
769  In respect to the culpability of a membership in a criminal organization or a terrorist association, please 
refer below to the chapter on prevetntion and substantive criminal law.  
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broad and do not oblige the criminal police to evaluate the kind of damage or harmful 
outcome of the activity. The proposed provision constitutes only vagueness to a great extend. 
From the point of view of the thesis’ author, this range is far too broad and if the Austrian 
legislator wants to introduce such an intrusive investigation method into the legal framework, 
there have to be stricter, more specific standards. Otherwise, it is rather unlikely that a correct 
application of the provision can be guaranteed.  
An introduction could, for example, provoke problems with Art 18 of the Federal 
Constitutional Law ensuring that every act of the administration has to have its legal basis. 
Furthermore, it is to say that, if there is no defined scenario of threat, both the investigating 
and the prevention authorities have a far too wide scope of action. An extension of 
empowerment – even if limited to the prevention of serious crime – leads to confusion on the 
part of the investigation authorities as well as to indisposition on the part of any citizen. This 
is especially applicable if citizens do not know in which situations they have to envisage 
being monitored.770  
 
The author has to admit that a solution for this difficulty could not be found. Every potential 
approach led to a dead end. Repression does not get along well with prevention and vice 
versa, so it is with the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and the Security Police Act. Both 
are oriented not only in different but also conflicting directions Thus, at the end of the day it 
will be the criminal courts and at the very end the Austrian Constitutional Court deciding 
whether and how the method of an RFI can be established within the Austrian legal system.  
 
4.4 Substantive Criminal Law  
Not only can prevention be handled via procedural provisions but it could also be dealt with 
in substantive provisions. Contrary to procedural issues, the latter are not as obviously: 
Due to the important requirement of proportionality, serious interferences with fundamental 
and human rights by covert investigations, an RFI can only be conducted if there is a serious 
crime to be investigated and solved. Furthermore, a higher degree of suspicion has to be 
                                                          
770 The author is aware of the fact that the similar provision (section 136 para. 1 no. 3 Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure) is already in force; however, the problems are equal and to question as well in this 
context.  
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given, meaning that the assumption of the security agency that a person might be an offender 
is not enough. Hence, strong suspicion in regard to the committed crime as well in regard to a 
specific person (group of persons) have to be given to make a serious interference with 
privacy legitimate. A linkage between the seriousness of the crime investigated, the degree of 
suspicion and the used coercive measures is widely used and appears to be a reliable concept 
in order to guarantee that proportionality is retained. This problem is rather minor, if the 
security agencies investigate a serious crime. Due to the fact that the Austrian legislator 
intends to establish the same requirements for an RFI as for a major electronic eavesdropping 
operation according to section 136 para. 1 no. 3 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, 
there are – besides the already above presented (current) legal as well as technical problems, 
and leaving the questionable preventive aspects aside – no further barriers in this respect. 
From the perspective of proportionality, an RFI could be conducted for the solution of a 
crime. 
 
The establishment of an RFI is intended in order to prevent criminal acts committed, or 
planed by a criminal organization or a terrorist association (according to sections 278a, 278b 
Austrian Criminal Code).771 However, these provisions dealing with such 
organizations/associations constitute already preventive aspects to some extent. Further 
questions arise in this context since the extension of the tasks of the criminal police in the 
direction of prevention is a duplex one.772 First of all, the law mentions explicitly that an RFI 
can be conducted in order to prevent criminal activities, and second of all, the substantive 
provisions of sections 278a and 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code do have another far 
reaching preventive facet. While the former is rather unproblematic and does not raise any 
difficulties, the latter is a bit trickier and therefore has to be illustrated in further detail.  
 
4.4.1 Criminal Organizations and Terrorist Associations 
The definitions of criminal organizations and terrorist associations involve a longer lasting 
aspect, meaning that both groups have to be established for a longer period of time. While a 
                                                          
771 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich of 17 October, 2007.  
772 Note in this context that this is not only true for a RFI but also in respect to major electronic eavesdropping 
operations, as these can be conducted under the same circumstances; cf. in this respect especially Fuchs 
(1997), pp. 263-299. 
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criminal organization has to be structured business alike,773 its terrorist counterpart does not 
have such a requirement.774 A criminal organization is defined by a greater count of 
members,775 whereas its terrorist counterpart is already given when at least two persons 
cooperate. Both provisions (i.e. sections 278a and 278b of the Austrian Criminal Code) 
require that the groups have to be formed with the goal of committing certain criminal 
activities, mentioned in the provisions itself, involving mainly serious crime.776 
To become liable for the criminal activities of a criminal organization or a terrorist association 
means to either be a founder of the group or to be one of its members.777 The latter requires 
that offenders participate in a criminal activity according to the common will of the group or 
that they provide any kind of information or means to the common will of the group, such as 
financial assets. Furthermore, it is required that the offenders are operating intentionally in 
accordance with the common will of the group in every instance.778 This means that they act 
knowingly that thereby the organization/association or its penal activities are fostered. 
However, a simple commitment does not constitute the status as member, since the ‘offenders’ 
have the possibility to step away from their intention. Furthermore, a simple passive member 
of such groups is not subject to any prosecution, according to the report of the judiciary 
committee.779  
The fact that the membership to such groups alone is punishable by terms of imprisonment 
between six months and five years (criminal organization) respectively between five and 
fifteen years (for leaders of terrorist association)780 is highly problematic as it shifts the 
boundary of penal relevant behavior extremely into the direction of prevention.781 Despite the 
linkage to a criminal activity – needed inter alia in order to apply coercive measures – this 
connection is a rather formal one. By referring to the simple membership to one of the 
                                                          
773 German: unternehmensähnlich; meaning that the organization does have several characteristics of an 
ordinary business such as a division of labor between the members, a hierarchic structure as well as a 
certain degree of infrastructure; cf. JAB 409 BlgNR XX GP, p. 11. 
774 The degree of organization is that of a criminal organization according to section 278 Austrian Criminal 
Code.  
775 Regularly this means ten persons; cf. in this regard e.g. 15Os116/08k. 
776 Important in this context is moreover that section 278a as well as section 278b Austrian Criminal Code 
punish members not only for the crimes conducted by themselves, but also for their membership; meaning 
that the actual criminal activity is in conjunction with the provision on organized crime; cf. e.g. 11 Os 62/97 
or 11 Os 58/02.  
777 As defined in section 278 para. 3 Austrian Criminal Code. 
778 according to section 5 para. 3 Austrian Criminal Code; cf. EBRV 1166 BlgNR XXI GP, p. 36. 
779 cf. JAB 409 BlgNR XX GP, p. 12. 
780 Certainly some further preconditions have to be fulfilled, especially the definition of a criminal 
organization/terrorist association must be given.  
781 Note at this stage that it is not the intention of the author to relieve the culpability of founding and active 
members of one of these groups, rather than the author wants to raise awareness for something else. 
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mentioned groups, the field of application is massively extended in the direction of 
preparatory works.782 Furthermore, the principle that suspicion has to be based on objective 
criterion becomes void as there are no real objective circumstances to which the suspect can 
be tied to. Only the mental elements of a crime are taken as reference point of suspicion, or 
putting it differently, there are no real objective circumstance to which the suspicious can be 
tied to.783 This is especially true in circumstances where the criminal organization or terrorist 
association has not yet set ‘classical’ criminal activities. Despite the fact that there are 
exceptions to the context of liability of members, as mentioned above, there can be massive 
interferences with their privacy which are solely based on the reason that these people are 
connected, related or befriended with the wrong persons.784  
 
In order to use coercive measures, the security agencies do need suspects, i.e. persons 
suspected of having done something criminal or suspected for doing something alike in the 
future. Without suspects it is hard to justify any investigation method. Hence, if the security 
agencies do want to investigate whether a person or a group of persons has done (or will do) 
something illegal, these persons have to be known. At least they have to be identifiable. This 
is true for the tasks of the security police and the criminal police. Certainly, not always are 
there concrete persons under suspicion at the beginning of each investigation. The procedural 
principle that there has to be an identifiable person in order to apply coercive measures such 
as an RFI is overruled somehow by the vagueness of the two provision of sections 278a and 
278b of the Austrian Criminal Code. By the wording of substantive criminal law the criminal 
police is explicitly empowered to take preventive actions against a more or less precisely 
defined group of persons. If the group is not identifiable, thus if the security agencies do not 
know a single member of a group who should be monitor? However, if a member of a 
potential criminal group is known, the (assumed) intention of a group of person to cooperate 
and to commit certain criminal acts is taken as the basis for a coercive measure. In addition, 
there are no strict and clear preconditions for the criminal police for when it should be 
allowed to conduct any coercive.  
                                                          
782 Zerbes, Ingeborg, 'Das Urteil des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Online-Durchsuchung und 
Online -Überwachung – Grundrechtlicher Schutz der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität informationstechnischer 
Systeme – auch in Österreich', in ÖJZ (2008), p. 845. 
783 e.g. a simple membership in a criminal organization or terrorist association – which is itself more or less 
entirely defined by intentionality; this is especially true before the member has either participated in 
criminal activities or provided any means or information. 
784 cf. in this regard furthermore below. 
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With the possible implementation of an RFI provision the criminal police, in order to prevent 
criminal activities, will be explicitly empowered by the wording of the proposed RFI 
provision785 and partly by the vague wording of the mentioned substantive criminal law 
provisions.  
Not only has there to be a certain person who is going to commit a crime, but also there has to 
be a certain level of suspicion that this will happen. The Austrian legislator has established 
different levels of suspicion in order to address the principle of proportionality. As a 
cornerstone of the Austrian Constitution, this principle contains elements of the freedom from 
discrimination. The next chapter is dedicated to strong suspicion and will examine whether 
and how strong suspicion is able to maintain the freedom from discrimination.  
 
4.5 Strong Suspicion  
In regards to fundamental and human rights, RFIs appear to be highly controversial, since the 
principle of proportionality emerging out of jurisdiction and doctrinal development forms a 
cornerstone of the Austrian Constitution. It is regarded as the basis for general objectivity, as 
an element of equality before the law786 and in addition, it contains elements of the freedom 
from discrimination.787  
 
In order to evaluate these aspects, it is necessary to point out that generally the Austrian Code 
                                                          
785 as well as in regard to section 136 para. 1 no. 3 Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
786 cf. Art 7 para. 1 Austrian Federal Constitutional Law reads: All nationals (Austrian citizens) are equal 
before the law. Privileges based upon birth, sex, estate, class or religion are excluded. No one shall be 
discriminated against because of his disability; The Republic (Federation, Laender and municipalities) 
commits itself to ensuring the equal treatment of disabled and non-disabled persons in all spheres of every-
day life; Similar to this the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Art 1: All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.  
787 cf. Art 14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stating that [t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status; furthermore the attempts by the 
European Communities in Art 12 EC Treaty, Art 13 Treaty of Amsterdam, or the Council Directives no. 
2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; no. 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation; and no. 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women 
in the access to and supply of goods and services; as well as Directive 2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.  
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of Criminal Procedure deals with criminal activities that have already been committed. It 
handles the investigations of classical crimes, such as homicide, fraud or theft. The penal 
outcome – a dead person or a loss in monetary means – is an important point of reference that 
a criminal activity was carried through. It is the obligation of the investigation authorities to 
figure out thereafter, whether the outcome is the result of an indictable activity, thus whether 
it was achieved in a chargeable manner and with the corresponding malicious intentions. 
Hence, the authorities have to investigate whether both, the physical elements of an offense as 
well as the mental elements of an offense are present.788  
 
Prevention deals with situations that lay outside the realm of regular criminal activities. Not 
every criminal activity is carried out effectively, rather than criminals or terrorists spend a lot 
of time on planning coups and attacks. This planning phase can take place long before the 
actual crime and is characterized by inconspicuous activities, normal and ordinary preparatory 
works. Social adequate activities, such as the purchase of a kitchen knife do not provoke any 
suspicion, as such items are sold zillion times a day. On the other hand, the purchase of a 
kitchen knife could be as well a criminal activity, as this tool could be used to commit a 
felony. The purchase of the knife could be the first step leading to homicide or a robbery. The 
same is true for the purchase of any data carrier, a laptop, a modem or a coaxial cable. With 
the help of such tools/devices a hacker can potentially start a hacking attack on networks; 
denial of service attacks on governmental servers could be conducted and many more 
corruptive things789 are possible with simple, ordinary and non-suspicious tools. Despite the 
fact that preparatory works are already punishable by law, nobody would ever argue that the 
sale of kitchen knives or any other item mentioned should become prohibited. This shows that 
besides the physical elements, mental elements have to be present for a conviction as well. 
Not until a person uses a tool in the wrong, socially inadequate manner there is no reason for 
the investigation authorities to become active. If something happens, the repressive character 
of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure offers a broad range of different coercive 
measures in order to solve the criminal activity. And before that point in time? Nothing – it is 
simply not possible to prevent somebody from buying or using a knife. 
This describes the characteristic of the mental elements of an offense. It cannot be seen, heard 
or monitored. The only option is to wait until either something happens or the potential 
                                                          
788 Rather logically given in the case of homicide, as the death penalty was abandoned in Austria. 
789 Also cf. to the section on substantive criminal law of this thesis. 
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criminals unveil their intentions. Suspicion, at the stages prior to the actual commitment of the 
crime, is, by its very nature, indefinite. As already mentioned above, the security agency has 
to have a sound basis of facts leading to the conclusion that a harmful outcome is inevitable. 
Contrary to the public security police, the criminal police has to take culpability into account. 
Thus, the criminal police deals in addition to the physical elements of a crime, mainly with 
the mental elements of a crime. The physical (thus the rather obvious) elements of an offense 
generally pose a minor problem, as the interpretation of even social adequate behavior gives 
ample scope.790 Every single activity can be explained by the way it fits the predetermined 
conclusion. One can always find enough ‘evidence’ to prove one’s point of view.791  
 
This is true for all preventive measures; however it is intensified when it comes to criminal 
organizations or terrorist associations. In both instances, the mental element outweighs the 
physical elements of the offense. The fact that members of such a group are subject to 
prosecution for their simple membership, even if no criminal activity – besides the foundation 
of a group – was realized, appears to be questionable. Certainly, it is easier for the 
‘prevention’ authorities to focus on a group and to see every single activities of one of its 
members as an activity of the group. By looking at all group activities, however, the 
possibility to gain knowledge of the potential intentions behind these activities is higher, than 
by just focusing on the doings of a single member. The security agencies could gather 
important evidence in regard to the common will of the group by summarizing all group 
activities, which is not necessarily that obvious in every instance. Even these conclusions are 
sometimes a matter of misinterpretation and misjudgments. A cluster of various activities of 
diverse persons does not necessarily indicate whether these people do act in accordance with 
the group’s common will, nor does it put forth the common will. Moreover, there is also a 
problem with the ‘timely’ distance between the preparatory works and the actual committal of 
the criminal activities. Without the knowledge of a person’s intention,792 or at least the strong 
suspicion that somebody intends to commit a crime, coercive measures have to be questioned. 
Prevention in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure does not work without this 
                                                          
790 Note in this context that both kinds of elements are important and necessary to be present for the conviction 
of a criminal act. 
791 Note in this context that even contradicting activities can be interpreted in such way, as it can be argued that 
the criminal tries to lay a false trail. Remark furthermore that the author does not try to discredit the work 
of the security agencies; it is only intended to raise awareness for these facts. To err is human, thus 
everybody – so as the police forces – has to be aware of this problem and behave correspondingly.  
792 e.g. the explicitly expressed intention of a person to commit a crime or to cooperate with others in order to 
commit crimes; or any other hard facts in this direction.  
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knowledge.793  
 
The problem of discrimination plays an important role when it comes to knowledge of 
intention. Concerning the use of a data screening – a specific profiling method794 – the use of 
certain criterion was made illegal. In Austria,795 as well as throughout Europe,796 big 
discussions arose on, whether such profiling methods in the context with terrorist activities 
are in conflict with fundamental rights. Especially after the 9/11 attacks in the United States of 
America, governments all over the world focused their intelligence service investigations on a 
certain group of people. Germany, for instance, collected sensitive personal data from various 
databases relating to approximately 8.3 million persons. The data for this profile was based on 
traits of the ‘Hamburg cell’, members of the 9/11 hijackers, around Mohammed Atta. The 
main intention behind this profiling was to identify and, at a further stage, to monitor 
‘sleepers’, i.e. terrorists not yet active. Due to a claim of a Moroccan national, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in 2006, had to decide whether this form of (pre)investigation 
was legitimate or not. The court ruled that the following characteristics used in the data 
screening in order to identify potential terrorists was unconstitutional:797  
 Male  
 aged 18 to 40  
                                                          
793 Even the report of the expert group recognizes this great problem stating that: German: Denn dann lässt 
man den Verdacht der Planung eines Delikts oder den Verdacht einer Vorbereitungshandlung genügen, also 
den bloßen Verdacht eines Geschehens (wenn überhaupt ein konkretes „Geschehen’ ausgemacht werden 
kann), das weit ins Vorfeld der eigentlichen Rechtsgutsschädigung vorverlagert ist. Außer (vermutete) 
Absichten des „Verdächtigen’ und seinen Gedanken hat man kaum ein reales Substrat zur Hand, an das man 
die Verdachtsprüfung anknüpfen könnte; cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), pp. 35-36; the argument that the mental 
elements leave traces (in the form of notes, e-mails stored on a computer) that can be detected by an RFI is 
a bit shortsighted. As all these traces can be obtained easily via an ordinary house search, the criminal 
police can do so. However, it is not intended to conduct such physical house searches and RFIs cannot be 
subsumed under any form of a search of location and objects; cf. already above in the corresponding 
subchapter. 
794 An investigation method using computer and various databases to match human parameter to specific 
person in order to find an offender.  
795 cf. e.g. Novak, Manfred at 
<http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/524410/index.do?from=suche.intern.portal> retrieved 11 
January, 2010. 
796 cf. especially the corresponding report of the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, 
Ethnic Profiling (2006), at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2006_4_en.pdf> retrieved 11 
January, 2010.  
797 The judgment denied data screening due to the right of informational self-determination (cf. MN 154-162 
of the judgment). Moreover, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that data screening could only 
be considered admissible where the public authorities are acting in response to a ‘specific endangerment’ to 
public order and/or individual rights; cf. in this respect the ruling 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April, 2006 and Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2006, No. 27, page 1939. 
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 (ex-)student  
 Islamic religious affiliation  
 native country or nationality of certain countries, named in detail, with 
predominantly Islamic population.798 
 
This shows clearly the problem of the very human tendency of stereotyping. The hijackers 
were Muslim, thus all Muslim are terrorists. True, Islamic terrorist activities are a threat to the 
western societies, but does a vague threat allow massive interferences with the fundamental 
and human rights of all Muslims? Once again, the answer is that interferences with 
fundamental and human rights should only be allowed in situations where there is already a 
specific danger and were the intentions of a suspicious group are certain to a high degree. This 
is not only true in regard to the mental elements of an offense, but also in the light of the 
security agencies’ human resources. Imagine that the above presented profile is taken as the 
basis for surveillance without any further evidence of a potential common will or any further 
evidence concerning a future terrorist attack. This would mean that a massive amount of data 
would have to be processed (unfeasible financially and manpower wise) and most 
importantly, the desired outcome, i.e. to find a sleeper,799 is not guaranteed.800  
 
This profile is also highly problematic in respect to ethnic or racial discrimination and 
therefore unconstitutional not only in Germany, but also in Austria and the rest of Europe. 
Proportionality as the main principle of objectivity is not given if – without concrete suspicion 
– data of citizen are proceeded. Thereby the principle of equality before the law is violated 
because only male Muslims aged 18 to 40 etc. are under suspicion without having committed 
                                                          
798 cf. Kett-Straub, Gabriele, 'Data Screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional' in German Law Journal, 
[Vol. 07 No. 11] p. 970. 
799 The author assumes that the security agencies want to find sleepers; however, it could be desired to find not 
any sleepers, meaning that Austria is a safe country; cf. as well the next footnote.  
800 Remark in this context that due to the massive amount of data, the risk that a sleeper is not identified is 
quite high. The grid is broad in the beginning and tightens in the course of the investigation. This is 
especially important to achieve a manageable, i.e. proceedable and monitorable number of persons. 
Therefore, every more additional characteristics are added, e.g. whether the persons do have a pilots' 
license etc. Once a person does not fulfill a criterion, it is out and not covered anymore. Moreover, it is to 
mention that all the criterion are widely known or at least easily to guess nowadays, so that it is not hard for 
terrorists to hide and 'fall through the grid.' A comprehensive overview on how the German authorities 
handled their investigations after 9/11 gives Haverkamp, Hauke, 'Präventive Rasterfahndung: Ein effektives 
Instrument der Terrorismusbekämpfung?' in HFR 2009, pp. 106-107.  
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a crime or any other objective evidence, other than pure assumptions or stereotyping.801 
Besides the fact that the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court deals with a 
different investigation method, the principles can also be applied for an RFI. Especially in the 
context of criminal organizations and terrorist associations, the danger of unjustified 
investigations802 is omnipresent. An innocent weekly gathering of male Muslim students in a 
private flat can be seen as a terrorist association, even if they are just studying together for 
their midterm exams etc.803 
 
In Austria, the Federal Ministers of Justice and of the Interior signaled their awareness of the 
problematic relationship between prevention, in the context of criminal procedure, and the 
general requirements for coercive measures. Therefore, it was decided that an RFI should only 
be legitimate in situations where there are some additional formal preconditions given.804 
Concerning an application for an RFI for prevention purposes, the expert group followed the 
view of the two Federal Ministers and proposed to add some further requirements,805 which 
have to be implemented before an RFI can be conducted. Thereby, legal relief, as well as 
proportionality, should be consolidated and the possibilities for a review should be granted. 
Furthermore, the expert group argued that after an RFI is finished, all corresponding 
documents should have to be published anonymously and made accessible to the public. This 
would be a signal and would allow an evaluation and discussion by scholarship.806 
 
The German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof handled the problematic relationship between 
                                                          
801 cf. in this respect e.g. De Schutter, Olivier and Ringelheim, Julie, 'Ethnic Profiling: A Rising Challenge for 
European Human Rights Law' in Modern Law Review, Volume 71, Issue 3 (2008), pp. 358-384.  
802  i.e. not based on strong suspicions due to hard facts. 
803 Another quite controversial and highly political case is that of some animal rights activists which are now 
subject to prosecution because of having committed the criminal activity of a criminal organization 
according to section 278a Austrian Criminal Code; for further details please cf. 
<http://derstandard.at/1259281991089/Monsterprozess-gegen-Tierschuetzer-startet-im-Maerz> retrieved 12 
January, 2010; furthermore, a ‘civil right’ organization of fathers came under suspicion of having 
established a criminal organization; cf. 
<http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/541649/index.do?direct=542213&_vl_backlink=/home/p
anorama/oesterreich/542213/index.do&selChannel=> retrieved 1 March, 2010. 
804 cf. Vortrag an den Ministerrat der Republik Österreich of 17 October, 2007.  
805 As these further requirements are quite broad and bear massive political implications it is not the intention 
of the author to go into any further details in this respect. However, for the interested reader some reference 
will be presented: for an comprehensive overview on the tasks of the relief commissioner please cf. Vogl 
(2004); in respect to the requirement for a council of judges instead of a single judge deciding about the 
conducting of a RFI, please cf. Pressl, Bettina, Die Bedeutung der Ratskammer im Strafprozess (1992); cf. 
as well BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 36. 
806 cf. BMJ/BMI (2008), p. 36. 
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prevention and coercive measures in a different way. In its ruling regarding the confidentiality 
and integrity of informational systems the court pointed out that the secretly infiltration of 
informational systems for the purpose of monitoring of, or searching for information could 
only be legitimated if there are de facto points of reference that a definite danger to a superior 
important legally protected interest is given. Superior important legally protected interests are 
life, limb and liberty of person or interests of the general public. A threat to the interests of the 
general public concerns the foundations or the existence of the state, or the basis of the 
existence of the affected human beings.807 However, the courts states furthermore that an 
interference may be justified, as long as there are determined matters of fact indicating 
imminence to the superior important legally protected interest, even it is not entirely certain 
that the threat will arise.808 The court refers to a risk based approach (danger prognosis) 
stating that it is obvious that assumptions and general empirical judgments are not capable to 
justify any interference via an RFI.809 The main reference point for such prognosis is the 
emergence of a concrete danger.  
For the German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof a concrete danger is defined by three 
criterions: firstly, it is an isolated/individual case; secondly, there is certain proximity of time 
between the danger and the harmful outcome; and thirdly, there is a close connection to an 
individual perpetrator or a group of perpetrators.810 The more concrete the actual danger, i.e. 
the more details known about it and the more foreseeable the danger, the more likely an RFI 
could be applied legitimately. Thus, putting it differently, the seriousness of interference with 
fundamental and human rights by an RFI would not be taken into account appropriately in 
cases where RFIs are conducted without connection to an individual, concrete and foreseeable 
danger for legally protected interests.811 
 
As mentioned in the chapter on general aspects of prevention, a modern day terrorist threat is 
                                                          
807  cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, maxim no. 2 stating: Die heimliche 
Infiltration eines informationstechnischen Systems, mittels derer die Nutzung des Systems überwacht und 
seine Speichermedien ausgelesen werden können, ist verfassungsrechtlich nur zulässig, wenn tatsächliche 
Anhaltspunkte einer konkreten Gefahr für ein überragend wichtiges Rechtsgut bestehen. Überragend 
wichtig sind Leib, Leben und Freiheit der Person oder solche Güter der Allgemeinheit, deren Bedrohung 
die Grundlagen oder den Bestand des Staates oder die Grundlagen der Existenz der Menschen berührt. 
808  cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, maxim no. 2 stating: Die Maßnahme kann 
schon dann gerechtfertigt sein, wenn sich noch nicht mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit feststellen lässt, 
dass die Gefahr in näherer Zukunft eintritt, sofern bestimmte Tatsachen auf eine im Einzelfall durch 
bestimmte Personen drohende Gefahr für das überragend wichtige Rechtsgut hinweisen. 
809  cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, MN 250. 
810  cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, MN 251. 
811  cf. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 of 27 February, 2008, MN 252. 
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not a concrete threat. Handling terrorist threats is rather a handling of a certain level of risk. 
Risk management as defined as ‘the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks 
followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and 
control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events’812 could be the solution to handle 
the prevention of serious criminal acts. Despite the fact that risk management deals mainly 
with risks coming from uncertainties in the financial context (project failures, credit risks, 
etc), it can be applied to natural disasters or alike as well.813 The scientific assessment of risks 
along with the calculus of probabilities could be a way out of the dilemma. There are several 
reasons why the author favors the scientific approach. This approach could possibly offer 
 a clear benchmarks for the authorities regarding the application of RFIs, 
 therefore, a low level of arbitrariness in using RFIs. Therefore,  
 the affected person could trust in an objective application of an RFI, as  
 every RFI (or the precondition leading to an RFI) would be reasonable and replicable. 
Thereby,  
 objectivity would also be given in a potential review process.  
 
Besides this potential solution to the question of strong suspicion, the author wants to add that 
the presented additional preconditions recommended by the Federal Ministers of Justice and 
of the Interior for an RFI are only some good steps in the right direction. It is to point out that 
we are dealing with highly political issues and therefore objectivity should be the highest 
criterion and the benchmark in every investigation. The author is aware that this is hard to 
achieve. However, as RFIs are seen quite controversially an objective application of this 
investigation method is of great importance. Especially, as regularly uncertainty and 
vagueness is surrounding this gray area of covered investigations, creating ambiguous 
situations constantly.814  
                                                          
812  cf. Hubbard, Douglas, The Failure of Risk Management: Why It's Broken and How to Fix It (2009), p. 10. 
813  In order to evaluate risks and thereby to counter threats, scientific standards have been developed: cf. for 
instance the standards oft he Project Management Institute or the International Organization for 
Standardization. ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009, Risk management — Vocabulary (2009) and ISO/DIS 31000, 
Risk management — Principles and guidelines on implementation (2009). 
814 cf. in this respect as well Zerbes (2008), p. 845. 
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Conclusion 
The main intension of this thesis was to answer these following three questions dealing with 
the application of remote forensic investigations within the Austrian legal system: 
 Firstly, from a technical point of view, is it possible to apply an RFI without the target 
person noticing it, thus, does this investigation method even work in praxi? 
 Secondly, from a pure legal point of view would it currently be legal for the Austrian 
security agencies to conduct an RFI? and  
 Thirdly, could the prevention of a criminal incident even be legally conducted within 
the framework of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure (something the author 
disputes)? 
 
While there were rather clear answers to the two former questions, the third question proves 
to be more difficult and uncertain to answer:  
Technically it is possible to apply an RFI if certain preconditions are fulfilled. An RFI works 
if the security agencies follow a certain code of procedure and use customized software tools. 
Whether it is successful in every instance and whether it would be applied often, is a 
completely different thing. Due to its high costs the author assumes that the security agencies 
would apply this method only in a limited number of cases. Hence, remote forensic 
investigations will not be on the daily agenda of security agencies and applications will be 
limited to mainly serious offenses.  
 
From the legal point of view, the author came to the conclusion that neither the Austrian Code 
of Criminal Procedure, nor the Austrian Security Police Act contains a sound basis for an RFI. 
Every investigation method lacks some vital components, thus an RFI cannot be subsumed 
under any of the illustrated methods. The potential legitimacy of an RFI was examined in 
regard to its three different purposes, namely the remote access for a) search purposes, b) 
surveillance of activities or c) surveillance of telecommunication.  
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a) Search Purposes 
The search of locations and objects appeared be to be the best to host an RFI for search 
purposes. First of all, a search of location and objects is the only provision within the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with search purposes. Second of all, this provision can be 
applied independently of the physical condition of the item searched for. Hence, it does not 
make any difference whether the target object of a search is an electronic device respectively 
the data stored on it, or whether the criminal police is searching for any other physical objects. 
In addition IT facilities are also covered by the term objects. However, the biggest handicap 
for an application of this provision in the form an RFI is that the provision constitutes an open 
investigation method. Thus, the conducting officers of the criminal police have to be 
physically present on site. Further problems occur in regard to the rights of the affected 
person respectively to the obligations of the criminal police (e.g. the affected person is 
entitled to be present or to bring in a personal confidant; the duty of the criminal police to 
inform the affected person about the reasons for the search, etc). The affected person’s rights 
are guaranteed by Art 6 ECHR and can therefore not be suspended. Thus, a fair trial is not 
guaranteed if a search is conducted secretively. As it is the intention of the investigation 
authorities to avoid physical presence on site, contentions stating that an RFI could be 
conducted legitimately via this procedural provision are not knock down arguments. Hence, 
an RFI in the form of a remote examination of a computer cannot be based on a search of 
locations and objects.  
The same is true for the corresponding procedural provision in the Austrian Security Police 
Act as the public security police is only allowed to enter and search premises, rooms and 
vehicles if there is an actual or imminent threat to life, health etc. The competence to enter 
and search locations is limited to the search for objects/persons constituting the 
basis/originator of a dangerous aggression.  
 
b) Surveillance of Activities and 
c) Surveillance of Telecommunication 
The investigation methods of surveillance of data and communication, disclosure of 
transmission data and surveillance of persons appeared to be capable to handle the two latter 
intended task of an RFI: surveillance of activities and telecommunication. This is especially 
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true since all of them are covert investigation methods. Contrary to an image of a hard drive 
as conducted via an RFI for search purposes, continued surveillance of the activities would be 
prolonged information on what happened in the course of time. Each alteration, manipulation 
etc. of data is recorded, trusting that sooner or later, suspects will use passwords in order to 
decipher their files. Hence, the activities of a target person could be monitored and thereby a 
copy of the hard drive might be created. Communication over the Internet is a special form of 
telecommunication – hence the legal regulations concerning the surveillance of customary 
telecommunication are applicable as well. Surveillance of telecommunication over a longer 
period of time enables the collection of data on conducted information flow. The common 
basis for all procedural provision in the Austrian legal order to monitor data and 
communication or persons is communication. In every instance, the legislator refers to an 
ongoing or conducted communication. Hence, in order to monitor online activities or 
telecommunication a communication process must take place. Communication in this respect 
involves every kind of communication, no matter how it is transmitted and so there are no 
specific technological requirements.  
Due to the fact that the procedural provisions deal nearly in every instance with the 
interception of communication (apart from a disclosure of communication data – i.e. stored 
outer communication data of who communicated when with whom), an application of an RFI 
cannot be subsumed under these provisions. Interception refers to two points in time, i.e. 
when a communication is sent out and when it is received. By definition it is only possible to 
intercept between these two points. Everything else does not constitute (legally) an 
interception. As the author made clear, it is rather complex to define when a communication is 
sent. Firstly, only observable things can be monitored, i.e. the monitored person has to express 
their thoughts willingly. Secondly, depending on the form of communication further 
limitations apply. Not until the sender pushes the send bottom, a written communication is 
sent. Thus, the originator of an e-mail has the power to refrain from sending the 
communication to the receiver. Before this point in time, the e-mail does not constitute a piece 
of communication and can therefore not be intercepted. In order to gather knowledge of this 
data it is necessary to conduct a search of location and objects, thus an open investigation. 
Furthermore, it is not possible – already by definition – to conduct an interception on a 
technical device. Hence, for the author the use of software devices on communication 
equipment is not an interception but a search of an electronic device.  
Surveillance of persons in the form of a minor, or a major electronic eavesdropping operation 
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is not capable either to host an RFI. In the former case optical and acoustical surveillance of 
persons deals with the listing and recording of privately made statements while an undercover 
agent is present. This person is the crucial requirement – the person cannot be replaced by a 
technical devices. In respect to the latter case a technical device is used in order to monitor a 
target person itself and the statements this person makes. In both cases the target is the person 
conduct and communication and not just the performance of a computer program.  
The Austrian Security Police Act handles the processing of personal data and sets out the 
limits in regard to observations made by the public security police. The provisions, however, 
do not handle the use of electronic devices. Within the mentioned Act only the treatment of 
data gathered via customary observations are governed. The collection of information by 
interviews of person or request to certain other authorities is dealt within the Act. There are no 
indications that the use of special technical devices would be legitimate. In addition, when 
collecting information – even such of location data – the security police depends on the 
cooperation of internet service/access providers or providers of telecommunication services. 
Besides the requirement of a dangerous aggression or a primary assistance, the security police 
is not allowed to store or even monitor communication on their own.  
Furthermore, it is to note that also the German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof in its ruling 
regarding the confidentiality and integrity of informational systems holds that the secretly 
infiltration of informational systems has to be based on judicial approval. Thus, such 
provisions cannot be hosted by the Austrian Security Police Act.  
 
Prevention has a special and interesting relationship to criminal law. In fact, that was the 
reason for the author to have a closer look at it. The problem with RFIs within the Austrian 
legal system is the difficult terrain the law makers are maneuvering through when intending to 
create provisions dealing with prevention in criminal law matters. The range of issues related 
to this question is intensive, thus the author was only able to give a general overview. 
Secondly, the author pointed out some problematic cases within the Austrian legal order, 
starting from constitutional to substantive criminal law and ending with criminal procedural 
law. In sum, no definite answer can be given. It is especially the great vagueness surrounding 
the matter of crime prevention that makes it rather challenging to say whether it can be legally 
conducted within the framework of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular 
one finding is crucial in this respect:  
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The shown lack of determination by the law makers in the context of the evaluation of 
proportionality is a serious issue causing even more severe problems. However, in the 
perspective of modern day terrorism this dilemma is even worse. This becomes obvious when 
having a closer look on the intentions behind modern day terrorism, confessional motivated 
terror. The intention of modern day terrorism is to point out, firstly, that the Western 
(political) system is not working and cannot provide any security to any of its citizens, and 
secondly, that its own ideology/religion etc. is prevailing. Modern day terrorism tries to point 
out the helplessness of the entire Western society. Especially in the cases of suicidal bombing 
attacks this intention can be seen clearly. A person is killing himself – for – what he thinks is - 
the bigger common good. Obviously the Western world has no common understanding for 
these senseless actions in which no direct political message is communicated. 
Comprehensibly, people in the Western world are asking for effective counter attacks, as they 
do not want to be intimidated. They rather want the leaders to show resoluteness and strength 
against a common enemy. The war on terror, as it was proclaimed by the United States, 
involves not only general – commonly known – warfare. Further legislative action has been 
taken.885 The Western world felt and still feels that it finds itself in an exceptional situation if 
not even in a situation similar to a state of emergency. However, exactly at this point of time 
history repeats itself. Thomas Hobbes and his arguments are omnipresent in these discussions 
for ever more competences for the sovereign.  
 
The solution to the dilemma of prevention within the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
could be the application of risk management tools, as known from the economic world. The 
author beliefs a potential solution to this highly political and controversial issue can be found 
by the application of scientific methods. Thereby clear benchmarks for the authorities and a 
low level of arbitrariness in the use of RFIs could be established. Hence, a high level of 
objectivity in the application of RFIs could be assured. 
 
                                                          
885  cf. in this regard, especially the USA PATRIOT Act (abbreviation for Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001). 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an introduction and general overview of the newly 
developed method of remote forensic investigations. It intends to present RFIs in a rather 
broad and general way with a special focus on the relationship between technology and law. T  
The technical part of this thesis involves presentations of software programs potentially 
capable to be applied in RIFs. The terms of ‘malware’ and ‘viruses’ are also clarified, as are 
the expressions ‘spyware’ and the various forms of ‘Trojan horses’. Special attention is given 
to the technical issues and properties of telecommunication as well as to that of decryption 
and encryption. In order to show how a computer has to be searched physically by law 
enforcement agencies, the author gives a brief introduction into computer forensics. The 
illustration includes a description of the established procedures for the investigation 
authorities and the various principles the process is based on. Furthermore, a brief overview 
of the special hardware as well as software tools is given. Thereafter, a presentation of the 
potential application of a remote forensic investigation in regards to its two main purposes, 
i.e. obtaining access to a computer and the exploitation of that access.  
The legal part of this thesis starts with an overview on the relevant provisions in the Austrian 
constitutional law and one of its cornerstones - the principle of proportionality. Despite the 
fact that this thesis is mainly dedicated to procedural law, the author gives a summary of 
important substantive law provisions. This is necessary in order to show that the security 
agencies would – without empowerment to conduct a remote forensic investigation – commit 
a criminal act and would therefore be liable for it as well. After an introduction into criminal 
procedures law, involving an illustration of general principles – such as the principle of 
indictment, or the system of warrants – the relationship between the criminal police, the 
public prosecution and the court as well as their special tasks and competences, the provisions 
in regard to remote forensic investigations are pointed out extensively. Especially the 
following provisions of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure are examined in detail 
including an extensive effort to subsume an RFI under them:  
 Search of Locations and Objects  
according to section 117 no. 2 in conjunction with section 119 para. 1 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure 
 Surveillance of Data and Communication  
 232 
 
according to section 135 para. 3 in conjunction with section 134 no. 3 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure 
 Disclosure of Transmission Data  
according to section 134 no. 2 in conjunction with section 135 para. 2 of the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure 
 Surveillance of Persons  
according to section 136 in conjunction with section 134 no. 4 of the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure 
 
Following this, a similar approach is used in order to present the Austrian Security Police Act. 
Special focus is put on the tasks of maintaining public order, primary assistance and 
maintaining public security. Consequently, the competences of the public security police will 
be illustrated in the same manner as the competences of the criminal police:   
 Competence to Enter and Search of Premises, Rooms and Vehicles 
according to section 39 of the Austrian Security Police Act 
 Legitimacy of Processing of Personal Data 
according to section 53 of the Austrian Security Police Act 
 Special Regulations for Investigation 
according to section 54 Austrian Security Police Act 
 
The final part of this thesis is dedicated to the relationship between the prevention of criminal 
incidents and criminal procedural law. Starting with rather general considerations to 
prevention and a historic overview on the development from a state of nature, to a state of law 
and finally to a state of prevention, following five aspects are examined in depth:  
 General aspects of prevention, 
 Relationship between the criminal police and the public security police, 
 Systematic questions regarding an incorporation of RFIs into the Austrian legal order, 
 Preventive aspects within the regime of substantive criminal law, and 
 Demanded degree of suspicion.  
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Summarizing, it is to state that the intention for this thesis is to give a broad and general 
overview on RFIs, from a technological as well as a legal point of view. The focus is – unlike 
other publications in this respect – not directed on fundamental/human rights issues, rather 
than on issues related to a potential incorporation of RFIs into the Austrian legal order. The 
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and the Austria Security Police Act are the points of 
reference and the standard of comparison.  
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Abstract German 
Diese Arbeit setzt sich zur Aufgabe, die neue Ermittlungsmethode der Online Durchsuchung 
zu erörtern und in einer breiten und allgemeinen Art zu präsentieren. Ein besonderer Fokus 
wird dabei auf das Verhältnis von Technik und Recht gelegt.  
Dem Leser wird vorab ein weit gefasster technischer Teil präsentiert, der die Darstellung der 
verschiedenen, im Zuge einer Online Durchsuchung angewendeten, Software-Programme 
involviert, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf die technischen Aspekte der 
Telekommunikation sowie der Verschlüsselungstechnik gelegt wird. Darüber hinaus 
beinhaltet die, in einem Abschnitt konzentrierte, technische Aufarbeitung des 
Dissertationsthemas eine kurze Einführung in die Computer-Forensik, also die 
Vorgehensweise einer „Computerdurchsuchung“ durch die Strafverfolgungsbehörden. Neben 
einer Beschreibung der festgelegten Verfahren und Prinzipien einer derartigen 
„Computerdurchsuchung“ wird überblicksmäßig auch auf die speziellen Hard- und Software-
Tools eingegangen. Diesen technischen Teil abschließend werden sodann auch die 
angedachten Einsatzgebiete der Online-Durchsuchung aufgezeigt und einer faktisch-
technischen Begutachtung unterzogen.  
 
Der auf die technische Erörterung folgende Rechtsteil der Arbeit enthält neben einem 
Überblick über die verfassungsrechtlichen Bestimmungen, insbesondere eine 
Auseinandersetzung mit der in punkto Online-Durchsuchung wesentlichen Frage der 
Verhältnismäßigkeit. Trotz des Umstandes, dass sich die vorliegende Dissertation vor allem 
mit dem Verfahrensrecht befasst, erfolgt eine kurze Darstellung von wichtigen materiell-
rechtliche Bestimmungen. Nach einer Einführung in die Strafprozessordnung und ihrer 
Grundsätze – wobei insbesondere das Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Kriminalpolizei, 
Staatsanwaltschaft und Gerichten sowie das System zur Durchsetzung von 
Zwangsmaßnahmen erläutert wird – konzentriert sich die Darstellung auf einzelne 
Bestimmungen der StPO, die auf den ersten Blick gerechtfertigt erscheinen, eine Online-
Durchsuchung durchzuführen. Die dabei eingehend beleuchteten verfahrensrechtlichen 
Paragraphen betreffen: 
 Durchsuchung von Orten und Gegenständen (§§ 117 Z2 iVm 119 Abs 1 StPO),  
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 Überwachung von Nachrichten (§§ 135 Abs 3 iVm 134 Z3 StPO),  
 Auskunft über Daten einer Nachrichtenübermittlung (§§ 134 Z2 iVm 135 Abs 2 
StPO),  
 Großer bzw. kleiner Lauschangriff (§§ 136 iVm 134 Z4 StPO). 
 
Im Anschluss widmet sich die Dissertation dem Sicherheitspolizeigesetz.  
Die Aufarbeitung des SPG erfolgt in gleicher Art und Weise wie die zuvor erörterten 
Thematiken, wobei die darin normierten Aufgaben des Rechtsträgers, i.e. die erste allgemeine 
Hilfeleistungspflicht sowie die Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung 
und die damit einhergehenden Kompetenzen der Sicherheitspolizei, einer näheren 
Begutachtung unterzogen werden. Im Speziellen werden folgende Bestimmungen untersucht: 
 Betreten und Durchsuchen von Grundstücken, Räumen und Fahrzeugen (§ 39 SPG), 
 Zulässigkeit der Verarbeitung von personenbezogenen Daten (§ 53 SPG),  
 Besondere Bestimmungen für die Ermittlung (§ 54 SPG). 
 
Die betreffenden Unterkapiteln des rechtlichen Teils dieser Dissertation endet mit dem 
Versuch, die Online-Durchsuchung als modernes Ermittlungs- und 
Beweissicherungsinstrument die besprochenen verfahrensrechtlichen Bestimmungen zu 
subsumieren.  
 
Im abschließenden Teil beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Arbeit mit dem Verhältnis von 
Prävention und (Straf-)Verfahrensrecht. Ausgehend von generellen Überlegungen zu 
Prävention und einem historischen Abriss der Entwicklung vom Naturrecht zum Rechts- und 
schließlich zum Präventionsstaat, beleuchtet der Autor die problematische Wechselbeziehung 
anhand von fünf Punkte näher: 
 Generelle Überlegungen zur Prävention, 
 Verhältnis der Kompetenzen von Kriminal- und Sicherheitspolizei,  
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 Systematische Problem der Eingliederung der Online Durchsuchung im Rechtssystem 
Österreichs, 
 Präventive Aspekte im materiellen Strafrecht, 
 Verdachtslage vor Durchführung einer Online Durchsuchung. 
 
Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass nach Intention der vorliegenden Dissertation der 
geschätzte Leser einen generellen Überblick über das Thema „Online Durchsuchung“ erhalten 
soll. Darüber hinaus wird der Versuch unternommen, sowohl die in der Maßnahme 
involvierten technischen als auch rechtlichen Aspekte gleichermaßen zu erläutern und 
einander gegenüber zu stellen. Der Fokus soll dabei jedoch nicht wie in anderen, bereits 
verfügbaren Schriften auf grund- und menschenrechtlicher Basis liegen, sondern wird 
vielmehr die problematische Eingliederung dieser Ermittlungsmethode in das österreichische 
(Verfahrens-)Rechtsystem aufgezeigt. Dabei dienen insbesondere die Strafprozessordnung 
und das Sicherheitspolizeigesetz als Vergleichsmaßstab.  
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